State v. Smith

Decision Date19 July 1976
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Austin Louis SMITH, Appellant.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Paul J. DeMuniz, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.

Kevin L. Mannix, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and LANGTRY and FOLEY, JJ.

LANGTRY, Judge.

On November 25, 1974 defendant was a prisoner in the Jefferson County Jail. He is a member of the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation, which is located in Jefferson and Wasco Counties on the westerly side of the Deschutes River. Defendant had a dental appointment at a clinic on the reservation, and a county deputy sheriff took him there, in custody and handcuffed, to keep the appointment. Defendant broke from the clinic waiting room and fled, escaping the deputy's custody of him. He was not immediately recaptured, but was returned to the Jefferson County jurisdiction and jail from Lompoc Federal Prison in California in October 1975. He was charged with escape in the second degree (ORS 162.155) and convicted.

In this appeal therefrom he contends that inasmuch as the escape occurred on the reservation over which the state has no jurisdiction he cannot be subject to the stage charge; hence, it was error not to dismiss the indictment, and further error to submit the charge to the jury. The state contends that defendant is considered confined in the county jail from the time of original commitment until lawfully discharged; hence, although he was not physically therein when he escaped he was constructively therein, and his escape was an 'unlawful departure' 'from a correctional facility,' as the crime is defined in ORS 162.135 and 162.155(1)(c). 1

The state's argument is correct (See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 432 (1957) definition of 'escape' in State v. Fitzgerald, 16 Or.App. 376, 379, 518 P.2d 678, Sup.Ct. Review denied (1974)) unless the existence of federal jurisdiction excludes that of the state under the circumstances of this case. Jurisdiction is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) on the state over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country in all of Oregon 'except the Warm Springs Reservation.' See Anderson v. Britton, 212 Or. 1, 11, 318 P.2d 291 (1957), Cert. denied 356 U.S. 962, 78 S.Ct. 999, 2 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1958). The exception of the Warm Springs Reservation was made because the Warm Springs Tribes requested it. Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463, 466, n. 7 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied 368 U.S. 949, 82 S.Ct. 390, 7 L.Ed.2d 344 (1961). The latter case also holds that when federal control is relinquished it is a state question whether state courts gain jurisdiction over such offenses.

We have been cited, and have found, no case which passes upon such a unique question as that here presented.

In F. Cohen, Handbook of Indian Law (1945) jurisdictional questions generally like that before us are discussed. He states:

'* * * (S)tate jurisdiction in any matters affecting Indians can be upheld only if one of two conditions is met: either (1) that Congress has expressly delegated back to the state, or recognized in the state, some power of government respecting Indians; or (2) That a question involving Indians involves non-Indians to a degree which calls into play the jurisdiction of a state government * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) F. Cohen, supra at 117.

In analyzing the subject of state power, Cohen says three elements are to be considered: 'situs, person and subject matter.' He continues:

'In proceeding to analyze this latter exception (2 above) to the general (sic) rule, we may note that in point of constitutional doctrine, the sovereignty of a state over its own territory is plenary and therefore the fact that Indians are involved in a situation, directly or indirectly, does not Ipso facto terminate state power. (This was also noted in Anderson v. Britton, cited in text.) State power is terminated only if the matter is one that falls within the constitutional scope of exclusive federal authority.

'* * * There exists * * * twilight zone in which one or two of the three elements noted--situs, person and subject matter--point to federal power and the remainder to state power * * *.' (Footnotes omitted.) F. Cohen, supra at 119.

In the case at bar, the situs was the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, the persons were an Indian and a non-Indian state officer who legally had the Indian in custody, and the subject matter was state oriented, that is, it was escape from lawful state custody.

Cohen analyzes several situations not helpful to the question at bar, and finally summarizes in two emphasized propositions:

'(1) In matters involving only Indians on an Indian...

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4 cases
  • State v. Winckler
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1977
    ...is plenary and yields only in matters that fall within the constitutional scope of exclusive federal jurisdiction. State v. Smith, 26 Or.App. 49, 552 P.2d 261 (1976). It is well established that crimes committed by Indian people within Indian Country are matters of exclusive federal jurisdi......
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • February 25, 1977
    ...over the offense even though defendant was an Indian and the 'situs' of the offense was the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. 26 Or.App. 49, 552 P.2d 261 (1976). In reaching that conclusion the Court of Appeals cited and relied primarily upon statements in Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian L......
  • Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Gateway Motorcycles, Inc., 89-35250
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • April 24, 1991
    ... ... , Dean Collins ("Collins"), the Yamaha Oregon District Manager, and Beaverton Honda-Yamaha ("Beaverton"), a competing dealership, in Oregon state court, alleging that the defendants had violated Oregon's Anti-Price Discrimination Law, O.R.S. Sec. 646.040, and that Yamaha had violated certain ... ...
  • Adoption of R.S.C., Matter of, C-91-5
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • September 11, 1992

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