State v. Smith

• Citation: 65 Conn. 283,31 A. 206
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 01 December 1894
• Parties: STATE v. SMITH.

31 A. 206

65 Conn. 283

STATE

v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 1, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county.

James F. Smith was convicted of robbery, and appeals. Affirmed.

Levi U. Blydenburg, for appellant.

Tilton E. Doolittle, for the State.

FENN, J. The appellant, at the April criminal term, 1894, of the superior court, New Haven county, was convicted of the crime of robbery. No exception to rulings upon evidence were taken upon the trial, and no requests to charge the jury were made by the accused. In the reasons of appeal, it is asserted that the court erred in failing to give such instructions to the jury, in reference to reasonable doubt and the presumption of Innocence in favor of the accused, as the law requires, in the absence of requests, because they are principles not based upon the special case, but applicable to all criminal causes. By reference to the charge, it appears that the court, after stating the claims of both sides, and in conclusion, said: "Now, gentlemen, all the evidence is before you, and it is for you to determine the facts. It is for you to say where the truth lies. It is for the state to satisfy you, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of this defendant. It is for you to say whether the state has done that, and if, after a careful examination of all the evidence, you are satisfied by it, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense with which he stands charged, it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty; but If, after a careful examination and consideration of all the evidence, you are not satisfied by It beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant is guilty as charged in this information, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty." This language, at first view, would seem to leave no ground of complaint to the appellant. He, however, does complain: First. That the court omitted to say that the accused was presumed to be innocent until he was proven guilty, and that the presumption of innocence continues, and was entitled to weight, until the evidence offered by the state had overborne that presumption, and proved the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Second. That the court failed "to charge the jury upon the question of what a reasonable doubt is, and leaves the jury without instructions upon that question."

We do not think these assignments of error well grounded. The statement so often made in reference to the legal presumption of innocence in favor of every person accused of crime is but a form—sometimes, perhaps, a misleading one—of stating, concerning criminal cases, a general, positive rule of law, based on expediency as well as justice, which regulates the introduction of evidence in all cases, whether civil or criminal, namely, that "whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence or nonexistence of facts which he asserts or denies to exist, must prove that these facts do or do not exist." Steph. Ev. art 93; Greenl. Ev. (14th Ed.) § 34, and note a. Therefore, if the state desires a court to pronounce a person liable to a certain punishment, it must give evidence to prove the facts constituting his...