State v. Smith

• Citation: 202 N.J.Super. 578,495 A.2d 507
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey Plaintiff, v. Willie E. SMITH, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 19 April 1985
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 578

202 N.J.Super. 578

495 A.2d 507

STATE of New Jersey Plaintiff, v. Willie E. SMITH, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Criminal, Essex County.

Decided April 19, 1985.

Lawrence L. Monaco, and Hilary L. Brunell, Newark, for plaintiff (George L. Schneider, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney).

Michael J. Marucci, Newark, and Edward M. Neafsey, Morristown, for defendant (Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Defender, attorney).

COCCHIA, J.S.C.

This formal written opinion is intended to embody and augment the oral decision previously rendered by the court in this matter. The issues addressed herein arise from certain pretrial motions brought by defendant Smith and the State in this case.

The salient facts are as follows. Smith is charged with first degree murder in the shooting death of 16-year old Ismael Rodriquez. Smith was 17 at the time of the murder. ¹ Jurisdiction over the case was waived by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48, also known as the waiver statute. ² The waiver statute allows the Family Court, formerly the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, to relinquish jurisdiction over certain cases to the Law Division without the consent of the juvenile.

N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48 set out the standards to be considered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court judge in determining whether to waive jurisdiction over Smith's case, and reads in pertinent part:

2A:4-48. Referral to other court without juvenile's consent

The juvenile and domestic relations court may, without the consent of the juvenile, waive jurisdiction over a case and refer that case to the appropriate court and prosecuting authority having jurisdiction if it finds, after hearing, that:

a. The juvenile was 14 years of age or older at the time of the delinquent act;

b. There is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a delinquent act which would constitute homicide ... and

c. The court is satisfied that adequate protection of the public requires waiver and is satisfied there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the juvenile prior to his attaining the age of majority by use of the procedures, services and facilities available to the court. ³

A juvenile whose case has been transferred to the Law Division pursuant to the waiver statute is subject to indictment, trial, conviction and sentencing as an adult. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-28 (original version at N.J.S.A 2A:4-50).

Both the Superior Court, Appellate Division and the Supreme Court denied Smith's appeals of the waiver order. The grand jury returned an indictment charging him with purposeful or knowing murder by his own conduct, felony murder, first degree robbery and third degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)-3a, (2), -3a(3), 2C:15-1 and 2C:39-5b. Thereafter, the prosecutor served Smith with notice of an aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g), which reads in relevant part: "The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery...." By serving Smith with notice of the aggravating factor he intended to prove in the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor invoked the capital sentencing procedures of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c.

Smith moved to strike the application of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, maintaining that he should not be exposed to the death penalty. He argued that the death penalty as applied to a juvenile violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution. He further asserted that the New Jersey Legislature, in reenacting the death penalty in 1982, never intended or contemplated that capital punishment might be applied to a juvenile. Finally, Smith contended that the decision of the prosecutor to seek the death penalty in his particular case was arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory, and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's mandate against cruel and unusual punishment and Smith's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

In an endeavor to obtain information to substantiate his claim of arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory prosecution of his case as a capital cause, Smith served the prosecutor with a subpoena duces tecum, demanding that the prosecutor provide him with the guideline according to which homicide cases are selected for capital treatment and memoranda pertaining to the selection and rejection process. The State moved to quash Smith's subpoena duces tecum on the grounds that he had not demonstrated that the information sought was relevant and material to his claim of unconstitutional selectivity in the prosecutor's decision to treat his case as a capital case, and that much of the information demanded by Smith was confidential and not subject to subpoena.

It is these motions by Smith to strike application of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, and by the State to quash Smith's subpoena duces tecum which comprise the substance of this opinion.

I

Smith contends that imposing the death penalty on persons under the age of 18 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and as such is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, brought forward to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. The court, however, declines to resolve this issue because a decision as to whether the death penalty as applied to a juvenile is constitutionally impermissible would be, at this stage of these proceedings, premature and therefore improper.

As a fundamental proposition, courts should exercise restraint when asked to decide questions of constitutional import. "Trial courts are mandated to avoid decisions on constitutional issues except when such decisions are imperative and inescapable." Tonsorial Inc. v. Union City, 115 N.J.Super. 33, 41, 277 A.2d 909 (Law Div.1971); Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N.J. 418, 428, 189 A.2d 27 (1963). Furthermore, courts should not anticipate situations wherein application of a statute might be unconstitutional. State v. Hobbs, 90 N.J.Super. 146, 216 A.2d 595 (App.Div.1966).

It is not essential for the court, at this relatively nascent stage of this case, to determine whether the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution proscribe or permit capital punishment of juvenile offenders. The question is not yet ripe for resolution, and will not become so unless and until Smith is actually sentenced to death. It is possible that a reasonable jury, at the conclusion of the guilt phase of Smith's trial, might find him not guilty of any homicide charge or convict him of a lesser included offense for which the death penalty is not an authorized punishment. Similarly, even if Smith is convicted of purposeful or knowing murder by his own conduct, the jury might decide that the presence of one or more mitigating factors or the exercise of mercy makes imposition of the death penalty inappropriate. Thus, it is purely a matter of conjecture at this juncture whether Smith will in fact be convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The court is disinclined to decide a constitutional question of the magnitude and sensitivity as the one raised here on the basis of a speculative outcome.

The Appellate Division dealt with the same issue in a like manner in an unpublished opinion, State of New Jersey in the Interest of D.B., No. A-353-84T5 (App.Div. Feb. 19, 1985). In that case, the juvenile defendant appealed from an order of the Family Part waiving jurisdiction to the Law Division where he was to be charged as an adult with the crimes of murder, armed robbery and burglary. One of the arguments advanced by the defendant in support of his appeal was that application of the capital punishment statute to a juvenile was unconstitutional. The State countered by claiming that any argument concerning the death penalty was premature. The Appellate Division had this to say with regard to the timeliness of the defendant's challenge to the applicability of the statute:

Neither the United State Supreme Court nor our Supreme Court has held that the death penalty, as applied to a juvenile, violates constitutional standards. (The United States Supreme Court expressly avoided this issue in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 [102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1] (1982). The only bar to execution of juveniles in New Jersey is the waiver statute which prohibits waiver of juveniles under the age of 14. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26a(1).

... Whether defendant will ultimately be convicted and whether the death penalty will be imposed are merely speculations at this point.

Id., slip op. at 16-17. The Appellate Division refused to decide whether capital punishment of juveniles was or was not constitutional.

Given the similarly hypothetical status of Smith's conviction and sentence at this time, this court refrains from deciding the constitutional questions raised by Smith's motion to strike application of the death penalty provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c.

II

Smith also challenges application of the capital punishment statute to his case on the ground that the Legislature never contemplated or intended that the death penalty could be applied to juveniles. He maintains that this conclusion is supported by considerations of statutory language, legislative history and societal attitudes.

Smith asserts that neither the waiver statute in effect when this case arose, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48, nor the present waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, nor the capital punishment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, contains language indicating that the Legislature knew and intended that juveniles tried as adults could be exposed to the death penalty. He points out that the legislative history to the statutes in question, too, is silent on the subject of capital punishment of juveniles. Smith also...