State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 31 July 1873
• Citation: State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267 (Mo. 1873)
• Parties: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. THOMAS SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

53 Mo. 267

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,

v.THOMAS SMITH, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1873.

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court.

O. H. Tavers, for Appellant.

H. Clay Ewing, Attorney General, for Respondent.VORIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant was prosecuted and tried in the Greene Circuit Court upon an indictment for an assault with the intent to kill. It is charged in substance, by the indictment, that the defendant on the 5th day of July, 1871, at the County of Greene, &c., did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, with a chopping axe, which was a deadly weapon, &c., make an assault upon the body of one Amanda Hancock, with the intent to kill, &c.

The evidence on the part of the State was circumstantial, no direct evidence of the assault by defendant being introduced. The defendant introduced several witnesses, whose evidence tended strongly to prove insanity on the part of the defendant.

This evidence tended to prove insanity at a time commencing four or five months before the assault, and only a few days previous to the assault, and after the assault while the defendant was in prison.

At the close of the evidence, the court, on the part of the State, instructed the jury as follows:

First--“The court instructs the jury, that the law presumes that every man that has arrived at years of discretion is sane, and that the presumption continues until the contrary is shown by the weight and preponderance of testimony.”

Second--“The court declares the law to be, that when the State has proven the offense charged, she can rest her case upon the legal presumption that the party accused is of sound mind, and if the defendant seeks to avoid the punishment, he must satisfy the jury by the weight and preponderance of testimony that he was insane at the moment that he committed the crime.”

Third--“That it is not sufficient to warrant an acquittal, for the defendant simply to show that at times he acted and talked strangely and singularly; but that the jury must believe from the testimony, that he was insane at the very time that he committed the offense, and that he was so insane that he could not distinguish right from wrong.”

To the giving of these instructions the defendant objected, and his objections being overruled he excepted. The defendant then asked the court to give the jury several instructions, all of which were refused, and he again excepted.

Two of these instructions asked and refused, were as follows:

“The court instructs the jury that it devolves upon the State to prove that the defendant is guilty, as charged by the indictment, and unless the State has established beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, as charged, they will acquit.”

“That if upon a review of the whole case, and a considertion of all the circumstances connected with it, the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, they will find him not guilty.”

After the above instructions were refused, the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury, that, “If they have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, they will acquit.” This was also refused and the defendant again excepted.

The jury then returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant, and assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of two years.

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground, among others, that the court had erred in refusing proper instructions asked for by the defendant, and in giving improper instructions on the part of the State.

This motion was overruled, and final judgment rendered against the defendant. The defendant again excepted and appealed to this court.

The only questions presented by the record for the consideration of this court, are, as to the propriety or impropriety of the action of the court trying the cause, in giving instructions on the part of the State and in refusing those asked for by the defendant.

By the first and second instructions given by the court on the part of the prosecution, the jury are told, that the law presumes that every man who has arrived at years of discretion is sane or of sound mind; and that if the defendant seeks to avoid this presumption, he must satisfy the jury by the weight and preponderance of testimony, that he was insane at the time he committed the crime.

It is urged by the defendant that the court committed error in these instructions. The authorities upon the subject of insanity, and upon the subject of the burden and amount of proof in such cases, will be found to be very conflicting; some courts holding, that it devolves on the defendant in such cases to prove the fact of insanity by evidence so clear, as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the insanity. Other courts have held, that all that is necessary is to produce enough evidence to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to whether insanity exists in the given case or not; while it has been repeatedly held in this court, that “insanity is a simple question of fact to be proved like any other fact, and any evidence, which reasonably satisfies the jury that the accused was insane at the time the act was committed, should be deemed sufficient.” (State vs. Hundley, 46 Mo., 414; State vs. Klinger, 43 Mo., 127; State vs. McCoy, 34 Mo., 531.)

The burden of proof of course is held by this court to be on the defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity which exists in all cases...