State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 16 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | A164510 |
| Citation | 479 P.3d 553,308 Or.App. 84 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jason Allen SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John P. Evans, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.
Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Sercombe, Senior Judge.
In this criminal case, defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of interfering with a peace officer (IPO), ORS 162.247(1)(b), and one count of resisting arrest, ORS 162.315. Defendant makes a plain-error argument with respect to the resisting arrest charge, and we reject that argument without discussion. Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the IPO charge. Specifically, he argues that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to order defendant to remain at the scene, and, therefore, the officer's detention of defendant amounted to an unconstitutional stop. The state argues that the officer's order was justified by reasonable suspicion and, alternatively, if the officer did not have reasonable suspicion, the officer was nonetheless justified to stop defendant as a "material witness" to a crime. We reverse defendant's IPO conviction.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting all reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Colpo , 305 Or. App. 690, 691, 472 P.3d 277 (2020). We set out the facts in accordance with that standard.
Defendant drove to the Seaside Police Department lobby and immediately handed the receptionist, Burk, a cell phone. Defendant was "agitated," spoke very quickly and loudly, and his face was red. He told Burk, He also told Burk that it was his mother's phone and his mother had been using it to "ruin [his] life."
Burk told defendant that his mother had called 9-1-1 while defendant was on his way to the station and that officers were being dispatched to his mother's residence. Burk asked defendant whether he had permission to use the truck that he had driven to the station, and defendant responded,
Detective Sergeant Knight, who was also in the lobby assisting another individual in an unrelated matter, overheard defendant's conversation with Burk. As defendant turned to leave, Knight turned his attention to defendant, introduced himself, and said, Defendant told Knight "no," and turned to leave. Knight repeated: Again, defendant told Knight no. Finally, Knight told defendant: Once again, defendant said "no," and attempted to leave. Knight testified that he "grabbed [defendant's] arm to try to get ahold of it, and that's when [defendant] ripped it from me and started pushing past me." Knight and defendant struggled until Knight was able to handcuff defendant with the assistance of other officers. Defendant was taken into custody and transported to the hospital where X-rays revealed that defendant's leg was broken in three places. Ultimately, defendant was charged with IPO and resisting arrest.1
At trial, Knight testified that he had reasonable suspicion that defendant may have committed theft or unauthorized use of a motor vehicle:
Knight acknowledged that, at the time he detained defendant, he did not know whether defendant had permission to use the truck and did not know why defendant's mother called 9-1-1.
At the close of the state's case, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing with respect to the IPO charge that Knight did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. The trial court denied defendant's motion:
Subsequently, the jury found defendant guilty of IPO and resisting arrest and defendant filed this appeal.
On appeal, there is no dispute that Knight stopped defendant as he was trying to leave the police station; rather, the dispute hinges on whether the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. The parties agree that, for Knight's order to be a "lawful order" under the IPO statute and in the context of this case, it must have been justified by reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. The parties diverge, however, on whether Knight reasonably suspected defendant of committing (or having recently committed) a crime. In a footnote, the state also argues that, under the principle described in Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon , 331 Or. 634, 659-60, 20 P.3d 180 (2001), this court should affirm on the alternative basis that Knight did not need reasonable suspicion to stop defendant because defendant was a material witness to a crime. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Knight lacked reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, and we further reject the state's alternative basis for affirmance.
The Supreme Court recently has discussed what constitutes a "lawful order" for purposes of the interfering with a police officer as described in ORS 162.247(1)(b).2 In State v. Kreis , 365 Or. 659, 667-69, 451 P.3d 954 (2019), which was decided after briefing and argument of this case, the court held that an order is not a "lawful order" if it is not supported by reasonable suspicion and thus violates an individual's rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.3
In Kreis , officers spotted the defendant in the parking lot of a restaurant—which had recently been the site of multiple thefts—after midnight, standing near one of the few cars in the parking lot. Officers suspected that the defendant was trying to break into one of the cars or attempting to drive under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). One of the officers ran the vehicle's license plate number, and, although the defendant matched the description of the owner of that vehicle, the officer remained suspicious. One officer approached the defendant to initiate a conversation, but the defendant did not respond, turned away, and started to walk away from the parking lot. Id.
Both officers caught up with the defendant and informed him that he was not free to leave until he told them "his name, whether the car that he had been standing near was his, and whether he was a restaurant employee." Id. at 661, 451 P.3d 954. Defendant refused and was arrested for IPO. Id. at 662, 451 P.3d 954.
At trial, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the IPO charge and argued that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to issue a "lawful order" for the defendant to turn around to be handcuffed. The state argued the opposite: that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion, and that, alternatively, "his order that defendant turn and be handcuffed was justified by reasonable officer-safety concerns." The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. Id. at 663, 451 P.3d 954. We affirmed the trial court on the basis that "orders issued to protect officer safety were lawful orders." Id. at 664, 451 P.3d 954.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant renewed his argument that the officer's order was not a "lawful order." The parties disputed whether the order was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 664-65, 451 P.3d 954. Ultimately, the court concluded that the order was not supported by reasonable suspicion of DUII or attempted DUII. Id. at 667, 451 P.3d 954.
The remaining question was whether the order was lawful. The court noted that a lawful order is one that is "authorized by, and is not contrary to, substantive law." And, to aid in that determination, "a court must consider the authority granted, and the restrictions imposed, by the substantive law[.]" The court also noted that constitutional provisions are included in the ambit of "substantive law." Id . at 669, 451 P.3d 954 (...
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