State v. Smith
| Citation | 407 Mont. 18,501 P.3d 398 |
| Decision Date | 28 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0382 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Quincy SMITH, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
For Appellant: Dwight J. Schulte (argued), Schulte Law Firm, P.C., Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, William Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
¶1 Quincy Smith appeals the Twenty-First Judicial District Court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when law enforcement officers entered his private property without a warrant. We address the following issues on appeal:
We hold that the deputy sheriff properly entered the driveway when he already had initiated a traffic stop but exceeded his authority after Smith asked him to leave. We therefore reverse.
¶2 On May 15, 2019, Smith and his friend Jacques Hennequin were driving eastbound on Hidden Valley Road in Ravalli County to Hennequin's house, where Smith resided. Ravalli County Sheriff's Deputy Nicholas Monaco, driving westbound on Hidden Valley Road, observed Smith's vehicle traveling at approximately 57 miles per hour—17 miles per hour over the speed limit. Deputy Monaco activated his lights, turned around, and pursued Smith. Deputy Monaco's dash camera footage shows that Smith's vehicle was visible for approximately one second before it rounded an "S" shaped curve in the road. Approximately twenty-one seconds after Deputy Monaco activated his lights, Smith turned down a 350-foot residential driveway and parked next to the garage.
¶3 The Hennequins' house is located on five acres. It has a perimeter fence and an interior fence around the house and yard. Although both fences have gates, neither gate was closed that night, and there was no gate at the entrance to the driveway. The residence is surrounded by trees and foliage, and the physical nature of the property secludes it from the road and neighboring properties. The property did not have any "No Trespassing" signs posted.
¶4 Shortly after Smith parked his vehicle, Deputy Monaco pulled into the driveway and approached Smith and Hennequin. He advised them that Smith had been speeding. Smith and Hennequin both immediately informed Deputy Monaco that he was on private property and requested that he return with a warrant:
¶5 Deputy Monaco did not leave the property or obtain a warrant. Instead, he requested back-up and continued his investigation by asking Smith for his driver's license and registration. The stop ripened into a driving under the influence (DUI) investigation after Deputy Monaco observed that Smith smelled of alcohol and inquired if he had been drinking. Smith admitted that he had a few drinks at a local bar. Sergeant Guisinger, Deputy Monaco's back-up, arrived and the confrontation continued. Sergeant Guisinger tased Smith after he refused to comply with the officers' directives, and Deputy Monaco arrested him.
¶6 The State charged Smith with speeding, in violation of § 61-8-309, MCA, obstructing a peace officer in violation of § 45-7-302, MCA, DUI in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA, and resisting arrest in violation of § 45-7-301, MCA, all misdemeanors. Smith moved the Justice Court to suppress all evidence obtained from Smith's contact with the officers, arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of the residence and that Deputy Monaco's warrantless entry and refusal to leave the property violated his constitutional rights. The Justice Court denied the motion without a hearing. Following a bench trial, the court found Smith guilty of all charges.
¶7 Smith appealed to the Twenty-First Judicial District Court. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Hennequin and his wife Carli testified to the privacy of their home, explaining that the secluded nature of the property was their biggest consideration in purchasing it. Deputy Monaco testified to the circumstances of the stop, including his pursuit, his interaction with Smith and Hennequin, and his belief that a warrant was not necessary to enter the driveway of the residence.
¶8 The District Court denied Smith's motion to suppress, concluding that Smith did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court explained that there was "[n]o evidence indicat[ing] that either defendant or Hennequin required prior permission before entering the property" and that the property must have more than "landscaping and field fencing" to "confer an expectation of privacy equivalent to that conferred upon a residence." Because the court found that Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway, it did not address whether exigent circumstances justified Deputy Monaco's warrantless entry. Smith pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor DUI, reserving his right to appeal the District Court's denial of his motion to suppress.
¶9 We review the denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the lower court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous; we review de novo the court's interpretation and application of the governing law. State v. Staker , 2021 MT 151, ¶ 7, 404 Mont. 307, 489 P.3d 489 (citations omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the lower court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record creates a firm conviction that a mistake was made. State v. Hoang Vinh Pham , 2021 MT 270, ¶ 11, 406 Mont. 109, 497 P.3d 217 (citing City of Missoula v. Metz , 2019 MT 264, ¶ 12, 397 Mont. 467, 451 P.3d 530 ).
¶10 1. Did Smith have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of his residence when he told a sheriff's deputy attempting to effectuate a traffic stop that he was trespassing and needed a warrant?
¶11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. "The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 11 is to protect the privacy and security of individuals from unreasonable government intrusion or interference." Hoang Vinh Pham , ¶ 13 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
¶12 "States are free to grant citizens greater protections based on state constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitution." State v. Bullock , 272 Mont. 361, 383-84, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (1995) (citations omitted). Montana has done so through Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution, which provides that the right of individual privacy "shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." Because of that heightened privacy right, the Montana Constitution affords broader protection against searches and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment alone. Bullock , 272 Mont. at 383, 901 P.2d at 75.
¶13 Smith argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway of his residence. Because the driveway is within the curtilage of the home or, alternatively, because the nature of the property satisfies Bullock , Smith asserts that Deputy Monaco's warrantless entry onto the property and refusal to leave over Smith's repeated requests violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches.
¶14 The State responds that Smith did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. Smith's property, the State asserts, is distinguishable from that in Bullock , and Smith's failure to stop gave implied consent for Deputy Monaco to enter the property.
¶15 Montana's heightened right to privacy cannot be construed to offer less protection than what the Fourth Amendment guarantees. See Bullock , 272 Mont. at 383, 901 P.2d at 75. Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the curtilage of his or her home—the area immediately surrounding a dwelling—but not beyond that. Florida v. Jardines , 569 U.S. 1, 6-7, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013). The United States Supreme Court has found a front porch, the area "outside the front window," and a garage all within the curtilage of the home. Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6-7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 ; see Lange v. California , 594 U.S. ––––, ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2018, 210 L.Ed.2d 486 (2021). In Collins v. Virginia , the Court held that a driveway was within the curtilage of the home when it ran alongside the front yard, the top portion of the driveway sat behind the front perimeter of the house, and the top of the driveway was enclosed on two sides by brick wall and by the house on a third side.
584 U.S. ––––, ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670-71, 201 L.Ed.2d 9, (2018). The house was accessible from the driveway through a side...
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