State v. Smith, 03-1062.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1062.,03-1062.
• Citation: 683 N.W.2d 542
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Charles Leroy SMITH, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

683 N.W.2d 542

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Charles Leroy SMITH, Appellee.

No. 03-1062.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 16, 2004.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney

General, and Peter C. Hart, County Attorney, for appellant.

Thomas M. Magee, Emmetsburg, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

Charles Leroy Smith was a passenger in a car stopped for a minor traffic offense. After issuing a citation to the driver, the officer asked Smith for identification. Smith handed over his ID, and the officer quickly radioed to see if Smith had any outstanding warrants. Upon learning there was a valid warrant out for Smith's arrest, the officer took him into custody. During a search, methamphetamine fell out of Smith's pocket.

The district court suppressed the methamphetamine, ruling Smith's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures was violated when the police officer asked him for identification and checked for an outstanding warrant. Because we find Smith was not unconstitutionally seized, we reverse the district court's ruling to the contrary and remand for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In March 2003, Deputy Sheriff Eric Ring saw a car waltz through a stop sign in Graettinger. The deputy stopped the car, in which he found a female driver and a male passenger. The deputy took the driver to his patrol car, where he issued her a citation for failure to stop at a stop sign. See Iowa Code § 321.322(1) (2001).

While she was still sitting in his patrol car, the deputy asked the driver if she would wait around while he identified the passenger.¹ The driver agreed, and they returned to the car. The deputy went to the passenger side and asked Smith for identification. Smith gave the deputy a non-operator identification card issued by the Iowa Department of Transportation.

The deputy relayed Smith's identification to his dispatcher in Emmetsburg. The dispatcher informed the deputy that there was an arrest warrant out for Smith in a nearby county. The dispatcher confirmed the validity of the warrant and relayed this information to the deputy. All told, it took less than one minute for the deputy to check Smith's identification.

The deputy ordered Smith out of the car and arrested him on the outstanding warrant. While searching Smith incident to this arrest, a packet of methamphetamine fell out of Smith's pants pocket. Smith was charged with possession of a controlled substance. See id. § 124.401(5).

Smith filed a motion to suppress, alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV. Relying solely upon our decision in State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1990), Smith argued the deputy was required to have a reasonable suspicion Smith was engaged in criminal activity before making an identification. Smith pointed out that the deputy, when he asked Smith for identification, had already finished issuing a citation to the driver. At the motion to suppress hearing, the deputy admitted the driver was free to leave² and that he did not, at any time prior to learning of the arrest warrant, suspect Smith of wrongdoing.

The district court found Becker controlled and granted Smith's motion to dismiss. The court interpreted Becker to hold "there is no right to approach ... or inquire of a passenger absent articulable suspicion [of criminal activity]." The court noted, however, that "an officer, faced with these facts, should be able to [identify] the passenger and it would almost appear that he would be derelict in his duty if he did not...."

We granted the State's application for discretionary review. See Iowa Code § 814.5(2)(b); Iowa R.App. P. 6.201(2002).

II. Standard of Review

Review of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is de novo. See State v. Maddox, 670 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2003)

; State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Iowa 2003).

III. Merits

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment when he asked Smith for identification and checked for outstanding warrants. Smith does not challenge the constitutionality of stopping a vehicle caught running a stop sign, nor searching a defendant incident to arrest on an outstanding warrant. See State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1993)

(officer's observation of traffic offense, no matter how minor, justifies stop of vehicle); State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing search incident to arrest exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). Relying upon Becker, the district court ruled the Fourth Amendment prohibited the deputy from approaching and questioning Smith absent a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on his part. We disagree.

In Becker, two brothers were caught speeding down a highway — with fifteen pounds of marijuana and four ounces of amphetamines hidden in a suitcase in the trunk of the car. 458 N.W.2d at 606-07. After stopping the car, the trooper immediately ordered the Becker brothers to alight and identify themselves. Id. at 606. We held the trooper violated the passenger's Fourth Amendment rights when he ordered him out of the car absent a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on his part. Id. at 607-08. In reaching this decision, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court had held drivers could be ordered out of a car, but had not yet ruled on whether passengers fell within the scope of the rule. See id. at 607 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 336-37 (1977)). In the absence of controlling authority, we distinguished the two sorts of cases. We reasoned:

The situation of the passenger ... is entirely different. The fact that the driver [committed a traffic offense] authorizes the officer to stop the vehicle in which the passenger is riding. The resulting intrusion on the passenger which flows from the initial stop is an unavoidable consequence of action justifiably taken against the driver. Further intrusion is not justified, however, unless some articulable suspicion exists concerning a violation of a law by that person, or unless further interference with the passenger is required to facilitate a lawful arrest of another person or lawful search of the vehicle.

Id. We therefore declined to extend Mimms to passengers in all routine traffic stops. Id. Absent an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing vis-a-vis the passenger (or a need to move the passenger to effectuate a lawful arrest or search), law enforcement officers were not permitted to immediately order passengers from vehicles stopped for routine traffic violations. Id.

Seven years after Becker was decided, the United States Supreme Court extended the Mimms doctrine to passengers. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 885-86, 137 L.Ed.2d 41, 47-48 (1997)

. The Court pointed out "the same weighty interest in public safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger." Id. at 413, 117 S.Ct. at 885, 137 L.Ed.2d at 47.

[A]s a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances ... is that they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car.

Id. at 413-14, 117 S.Ct. at 886, 137 L.Ed.2d at 47. The Court held "an officer making a stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop." Id. at 415, 117 S.Ct. at 886, 137 L.Ed.2d at 48. Wilson, therefore, overruled Becker sub silentio as far as its reliance on the Fourth Amendment.

Even if Becker were still controlling, it is distinguishable from the case at bar. We were presented with — and rejected — an argument similar to Smith's over ten years ago. See State v. Riley, 501 N.W.2d 487, 488-89 (Iowa 1993)

. In Becker, the officer ordered the passenger out of the car; in this case, the deputy merely asked Smith for identification and checked for outstanding warrants.

In Riley, a trooper stopped a car because its driver was not wearing a seatbelt. 501 N.W.2d at 487. After issuing a citation to the driver, the trooper asked the driver for the passenger's name. Id. The driver told the trooper the passenger's name, which the trooper recognized but could not place. Id. The trooper approached the passenger to talk with him. See id.

The passenger argued in a motion to suppress that under Becker, the trooper was not permitted to approach or talk to him. Id. at 488. We rejected this argument. In relevant part, we stated:

This is an incorrect interpretation of Becker.... Becker stands for the proposition that ... immediate removal from the car is clearly an unwarranted intrusion onto the passenger when the officer has no articulable suspicions or need to arrest the driver or make a search. Conversely, we believe that merely talking to a passenger or asking for identification is not the kind of "further intrusion" contemplated in [Becker]. Indeed, other jurisdictions have held that merely conversing with passengers, asking them for identification, or directing questions to them is well within the officer's right and is not illegal.

Id. at 489 (citations omitted). We held the trooper "properly began to approach [the passenger] to talk with him or to ask for identification." Id. We see no compelling reason to depart from our holding in Riley. As our discussion of Wilson above reveals, the United States Supreme Court subsequently held law enforcement officers were permitted to order a passenger out of a car, arguably a more invasive "seizure" of a person than asking for and checking a passenger's identification.

Smith stresses his case is different, however, because the stop ended once the deputy issued the driver a citation.³ After the traffic stop of the driver was completed, the deputy needed, it is argued, a reasonable suspicion vis-a-vis Smith to justify a new stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)

(upon a...