State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 31 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2015–0636,2015–0636
• Citation: State v. Smith, 154 A.3d 660, 169 N.H. 602, No. 2015–0636 (N.H. Jan 31, 2017)
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Robert Grimpson SMITH
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

169 N.H. 602

154 A.3d 660

The STATE of New Hampshire

v.Robert Grimpson SMITH

No. 2015–0636

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: November 9, 2016

Opinion Issued: January 31, 2017

Joseph A. Foster, attorney general(Sean P. Gill, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Stephanie Hausman, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.

LYNN, J.

Following a jury trial in Superior Court(Bornstein, J.), the defendant, Robert Grimpson Smith, was convicted of possession of heroin.SeeRSA 318–B:2, I (2011).The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) denying the defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) excluding the testimony of a defense investigator.¹We affirm.

I

The pertinent facts are as follows.On August 2, 2014, Officer Alden responded to a report that a woman, later identified as Kerry St. Lawrence, had collapsed on the lawn outside 14 Bank Street in Lebanon.When Alden arrived, he saw St. Lawrence sitting bent over on the lawn, approximately six feet from the entrance of the rooming house located at that address.Alden called out to her, but she did not respond.When Alden put his hand on St. Lawrence's shoulder, she slowly lifted her head and looked at him groggily.After St. Lawrence told him that she was having a medical issue, Alden called for the Lebanon fire department.

Two EMTs arrived, as did another police officer, Sergeant Norris.The EMTs assessed St. Lawrence and decided to take her to the hospital.At that time, St. Lawrence began repeatedly yelling for the defendant.The defendant did not respond.Norris asked St. Lawrence where the defendant was.She told Norris that the defendant was in "our apartment" and gave Norris directions to its location in the building.The door to the room St. Lawrence described (room 1) was on the first floor, about ten feet from the rooming house's main door.

Both Alden and Norris were familiar with the house at 14 Bank Street, having previously responded to various complaints at the location.They knew 14 Bank Street to be a rooming house, and testified that the front door was usually wide open.Norris testified that he passes 14 Bank Street on a regular basis because the road is heavily travelled and the police frequently patrol it.Furthermore, he testified that in his eight years on the police force, he had never seen the door closed.Alden described the house as having between eight and ten rooms.Although these rooms were separately numbered and locked, they shared a common hallway, kitchen, and bathroom.

Norris walked up to the rooming house to check on the defendant and make sure that he was okay.Norris walked through the open front door of the rooming house and saw the defendant lying unresponsive on the floor in room 1, the door to which was also open.Norris called for the EMTs to come inside.

Norris followed the EMTs into room 1.After the defendant regained consciousness, he told the EMTs that he and St. Lawrence had used a quarter gram of heroin.As the EMTs were treating the defendant, Norris observed a syringe, a plastic spoon with cotton in the bowl, and a metal spoon.Based upon his past experience, Norris recognized that these items could have been used to prepare and inject heroin.While the defendant and St. Lawrence were waiting to be taken to the hospital, Norris asked if they would consent to a search of room 1.They declined to give consent.

Thereafter, the officers obtained a search warrant, pursuant to which they seized the plastic spoon with cotton, syringe, and metal spoon.The State later charged the defendant with one count of possession of heroin.

In preparation for trial, Sheryl Montague, a defense investigator, interviewed St. Lawrence and wrote an investigation report about the interview.According to Montague, St. Lawrence initially stated that she was "pleading the [Fifth]."In response to Montague's questions, St. Lawrence stated that she had neither been charged nor received a plea deal that required her cooperation in lieu of being charged.St. Lawrence also indicated that she had received a letter from the County Attorney's Office giving her notice to be available for the defendant's upcoming trial.Without further questioning, St. Lawrence added that it was "her apartment, her name on the lease and her items in the apartment."St. Lawrence then repeated that she was "pleading the [Fifth]," and she did not say anything further.

Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the room, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search of the residence.Following a hearing, at which the State offered testimony from Alden and Norris, the trial court denied the defendant's motion.The court found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway at 14 Bank Street, the area from which Norris observed the defendant's unconscious body lying in room 1.Alternatively, the court found that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement justified Norris's entry.The defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court had failed to consider whether the police physically intruded into the defendant's home.The court denied the motion.

During trial, the State moved to exclude testimony by Montague as inadmissible hearsay.The defendant objected, arguing that the statements made by St. Lawrence to Montague were exempt from the rule against hearsay pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) because the statements were against St. Lawrence's penal interest.²The trial court granted the State's motion, ruling that the statements were inadmissible hearsay.³

Following a two-day trial, the jury found the defendant guilty.This appeal followed.

II

The defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.He asserts that Norris's warrantless entry through the front door of the house at 14 Bank Street violated his right to be secure from unreasonable searches under both the State and Federal Constitutions, and that any evidence discovered as a result of that entry should not have been admitted at trial.⁴SeeN.H. CONST. Pt. I, Art. 19;U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.

"When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous, and we review its legal conclusions denovo."State v. Boyer, 168 N.H. 553, 556, 133 A.3d 262(2016).Following our standard practice, we first address the defendant's claim under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis.State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231–33, 471 A.2d 347(1983).

"Our State Constitution protects all people, their papers, their possessions and their homes from unreasonable searches and seizures."State v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46, 48, 834 A.2d 316(2003)(quotation omitted);seealsoN.H. CONST. Pt. I, Art. 19."It particularly protects people from unreasonable police entries into their private homes, because of the heightened expectation of privacy given to one's dwelling."Goss, 150 N.H. at 48, 834 A.2d 316(quotation omitted).A violation occurs if government agents invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.SeeState v. Robinson, 158 N.H. 792, 796, 973 A.2d 277(2009).This is a "twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."Goss, 150 N.H. at 49, 834 A.2d 316(quotations omitted)."[T]he determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to a certain area must be made on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of each particular situation."Boyer, 168 N.H. at 558, 133 A.3d 262(brackets and quotation omitted)."Evidence that is obtained in violation of Part I, Article 19 may be subject to exclusion from evidence in a criminal trial."Id. at 557, 133 A.3d 262(quotation omitted).

"The search of a home is subject to a particularly stringent warrant requirement because the occupant has a high expectation of privacy."State v. Tarasuik, 160 N.H. 323, 328, 999 A.2d 409(2010)(quotation omitted).The protections afforded to a person's home are not limited to single-family dwellings: an apartment can be a home within the meaning of the State Constitution.See,e.g., State v. Chaisson, 125 N.H. 810, 817, 486 A.2d 297(1984)(When officers executed a search warrant at defendant's apartment and an officer remained at the apartment for the purpose of arresting the defendant, that officer's conduct "constituted a search for the defendant within his home."(emphasis added)).Similarly, "we have stated that the privacy interest in a hotel room is comparable to that of the home."Tarasuik, 160 N.H. at 328, 999 A.2d 409(quotation omitted).

Here, the defendant argues that Norris conducted an unconstitutional search when he crossed the threshold of the house at 14 Bank Street, which the trial court characterized as "essentially a boarding house or rooming house."The defendant argues that the common areas in the rooming house, which include hallways, kitchen, and bathroom, should be protected from government intrusion.The State, however, argues that the defendant's protected privacy interest began at the door to room 1 and did not extend to the common hallway.

We have not previously addressed whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of a rooming house, and other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have reached varying conclusions.SeeUnited States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214(D.C. Cir.1976)(reasoning that "appellant's constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to [his room] rather than at the door to the entire rooming house");Bryant v. United States, 599 A.2d 1107, 1109–10(D.C.1991)(reasoning that defendant...