State v. Smith

Citation268 S.E.2d 276,275 S.C. 164
Decision Date21 July 1980
Docket NumberNo. 21263,21263
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. John Henry SMITH, Appellant.

Chief Atty. John L. Sweeny and Staff Atty. Tara D. Shurling, of S. C. Appellate Defense Com'n, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes, Columbia, Sol. Capers G. Barr, III, Charleston, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. We affirm.

In the early morning of December 9, 1978, appellant abducted the prosecuting witness at gunpoint, took her to a secluded area and forced her to have sexual relations. His defense was consent.

Appellant primarily challenges the constitutionality of the kidnapping statute, § 16-3-910, Code of Laws of South Carolina (Cum.Supp.1979), and the life sentence he received pursuant to its terms. That section provides in relevant part:

"Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority of law, . . ., shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall suffer the punishment of life imprisonment . . . "

Appellant first asserts this provision is vague and overbroad in violation of due process requirements. We disagree.

A penal statute offends due process only where it fails to give fair notice of the conduct it proscribes. State v. Crenshaw, 266 S.E.2d 61 (S.C.1980). The terms of this statute are clear and unambiguous. It proscribes the forceful seizure, confinement or carrying away of another against his will without authority of law. We hold it is not unconstitutionally vague, see United States v. Cassidy, 571 F.2d 534 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 2859, 56 L.Ed.2d 793 (1978). Since appellant's conduct fell squarely within the statute's terms, he lacks standing to assert any over-breadth. Daulton v. United States, 474 F.2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1973); State v. Gambrell, 266 S.E.2d 78 (S.C.1980).

Appellant next asserts the mandatory life sentence prescribed by the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment both per se and as applied in his case. We disagree.

The penalty assessed for a particular offense is, except in the rarest of cases, "purely a matter of legislative prerogative," Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), and the legislature's judgment will not be disturbed. See State v. Smith, 267 S.C. 527, 229 S.E.2d 851 (1976); State v. Haulcomb 260 S.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 601 (1973). We hold the mandatory life sentence prescribed by the statute does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se.

Appellant argues the central feature of his crime was the sexual assault and therefore a life sentence for the associated kidnapping constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Indiana Supreme Court has rejected similar arguments on at least two occasions, see Neal v. State, 366 N.E.2d 650 (Ind.1977); Vacendak v. State, 340 N.E.2d 352 (Ind.1976). We adopt the reasoning expressed in those opinions. We hold appellant's sentence of life imprisonment on the kidnapping charge was not "so greatly disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice," United States v. Bondurant, 555 F.2d 1328, 1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871, 98 S.Ct. 215, 54 L.Ed.2d 150 (1977), and hence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Anderson, 561 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943, 98 S.Ct. 438, 54 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977) (two consecutive life sentences).

Appellant finally asserts the trial court erred in allowing his impeachment on a collateral issue. We disagree.

Appellant testified on both direct and redirect examination he owned "a shotgun." The solicitor then asked him how many shotguns he had owned that year. Appellant answered "one" and the solicitor produced a pawn ticket showing he had owned at least two.

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16 cases
  • State v. Copeland, 21808
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 10 Noviembre 1982
    ...of kidnapping is overbroad and ambiguous. We held in State v. Plath, 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E.2d 221 (1981) and State v. Smith, 275 S.C. 164, 165, 268 S.E.2d 276 (1980), the kidnapping statute is constitutional, not overbroad and ambiguous. This exception is without Appellant Roberts argues it......
  • State v. Davis, 23727
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 18 Mayo 1992
    ...16-3-910 fails to minimize the risk that the jury would act arbitrarily and capriciously in sentencing him. See State v. Smith, 275 S.C. 164, 268 S.E.2d 276 (1980). We previously have rejected overbreadth attacks on section 16-3-910, and adhere to our determination that section 16-3-910 is ......
  • Kornahrens v. Evatt, 94-4008
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • 3 Octubre 1995
    ...is "the forceful seizure, confinement or carrying away of another against his will without authority of law." State v. Smith, 275 S.C. 164, 268 S.E.2d 276, 277 (1980). 4 The South Carolina legislature has made murder committed "while in the commission of" a kidnapping a capital offense. See......
  • State v. Plath
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 7 Octubre 1981
    ...Carolina (Cum.Supp.1980), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. This issue is disposed of by our decision in State v. Smith, 275 S.C. 165, 268 S.E.2d 276 (1980), where the statute was held to be 5. Arnold and Plath also contend their indictment improperly set forth the charge of statut......
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