State v. Smith

Decision Date21 July 1986
Docket NumberNo. 2-1285-A-380,2-1285-A-380
PartiesSTATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Michael SMITH, Appellee (Defendant).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, John H. Meyers, Pros. Atty., Twenty-third Judicial Circuit, Lafayette, for appellant.

George G. Wilder, Public Defender, Tippecanoe County, Lafayette, for appellee.

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge.

CASE SUMMARY

Plaintiff-appellant the State appeals the trial court's dismissal of charges against defendant-appellee Michael Smith (Smith) pursuant to Ind. Rules of Procedure, Criminal Rule 4(C), claiming the trial court erred.

We affirm.

FACTS

The facts reveal that Smith was charged with two counts of child molesting on March 14, 1984. Smith was arrested in Tippecanoe County and appeared for an initial hearing in the Tippecanoe County Court in cause TCMT-2-1731-84 on March 16, 1984. Certified docket entries from this proceeding indicate that on April 23, 1984, Smith pled not guilty, and his trial was scheduled for July 31, 1984. The next docket entry indicates that on June 29, 1984, the trial was rescheduled for September 25, 1984, but the record reveals no reason for the delay. Finally, the docket reveals no further action in this cause until March 12, 1985, when the State dismissed the charges against Smith. Prior to the dismissal, however, on January 24, 1985, the State initiated cause number S-5206 against Smith in the Tippecanoe Superior Court by filing child molesting charges that were identical to the charges then pending in cause TCMT-2-1731-84. The parties attended an initial hearing in cause S-5206 on February 11, 1985 at which the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for Smith and set an omnibus date. Thereafter, on March 29, 1985, Smith filed a motion to dismiss requesting discharge because the State had failed to bring him to trial by March 16, 1985, i.e., within one year of the initial charge as required by C.R. 4(C). The State opposed Smith's motion on the grounds that it had been engaged in plea negotiations with Smith's attorney and had failed to schedule Smith's case for trial because it was waiting on a response from Smith to the State's plea bargain offer. This evidence was presented in the form of an affidavit by John Meyers, the prosecuting attorney. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that more than one year had elapsed without Smith having been brought to trial and, therefore, entered a judgment of dismissal.

ISSUE

The State appeals Smith's dismissal, raising one issue:

Whether the trial court erred by dismissing the charges against Smith due to the State's failure to bring Smith to trial within one year from his arrest?

DECISION

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--The State contends that it delayed in bringing Smith to trial because it was engaged in plea negotiations with him and that Smith should be charged with this delay under C.R. 4(C).

Smith responds that the record fails to disclose any delay attributable to him and that, despite its affirmative burden to do so, the State simply neglected to have the case set for trial within one year as required by C.R. 4(C).

CONCLUSION--The trial court did not err by dismissing the charges against Smith.

Under C.R. 4(C), the one-year time limit within which the State must bring a defendant to trial begins running automatically with the later of either the filing of charges against the defendant or his arrest. Hinds v. State (1984), Ind.App., 469 N.E.2d 31, trans. denied. Here, the time period began on March 16, 1984, with Smith's arrest and appearance in cause TCMT-2-1731-84. Bentley v. State (1984), Ind., 462 N.E.2d 58; Pillars v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 679, 390 N.E.2d 679, trans. denied. The duty to bring a defendant to trial within one year is an affirmative one which rests with the State. Martin v. State (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 256. The defendant has no obligation to remind the court of the State's duty, id.; nor is he required to take any affirmative action to see that he is brought to trial within the period. State ex rel. O'Donnell v. Cass Super. Ct. (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 209. However, the one-year time period provided by C.R. 4(C) may be extended by delay arising from a continuance had on the defendant's motion or a delay caused by the defendant's act. 1 Thus, the State had a duty to bring Smith to trial on or before March 16, 1985, unless the period against Smith was tolled by a delay chargeable to him.

The court's docket entries reflect no delay in the scheduling of the trial that can be attributed to Smith. Moreover, there is no written documentation of the plea negotiations or their progress, and an agreement was never reduced to writing. Even the State's affidavit fails to disclose any specific dates or period of time during which it delayed in scheduling the trial because it was actively engaged in plea negotiations with Smith. Consequently, there is nothing from which it could be determined how much of the one-year period was consumed by plea negotiations or how much of this time, if any, should be charged to Smith, much less that there was any actual delay. In this factual vacuum the State, nevertheless, contends that Smith should be held responsible for its failure to schedule a timely trial. The State's theory assumes that a defendant's participation in informal plea negotiations causes an unspecified delay in the scheduling of his trial which constitutes a complete abandonment of his right to be tried within one year. The State attempts to support this theory by analogizing to two cases: Mickens v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 591; Vaughn v. State (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 374, trans. denied. But Mickens and Vaughan are distinguishable from this case because, unlike Smith, Mickens and Vaughan each filed a motion for a seventy-day speedy trial pursuant...

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24 cases
  • Payne v. State, 49A02-9405-CR-00288
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • December 8, 1995
    ...... that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony convictions." See also Smith v. State (1989) Ind., 543 N.E.2d 634, 636. The statute does not require the State to re-prove the underlying felony or felonies of which the jury ......
  • State v. Lujan, 12,527
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  • Sickels v. State , 20A03–1102–CR–66.
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    • March 13, 2012
    ...... State v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). The defendant has no obligation to remind the court of the State's duty, nor is he required to take any ......
  • Sickels v. State, 20A03-1102-CR-66
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    ...that:[t]he duty to bring a defendant to trial within one year is an affirmative one which rests with the State. State v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). The defendant has no obligation to remind the court of the State's duty, nor is he required to take any affirmative actio......
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