State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 28 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-KA-2318,13-KA-2318 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MICAH SMITH |
The Opinions handed down on the 28th day of January, 2014, are as follows:
This case comes to us on direct appeal pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D)(1) after a district court found La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3), pertaining to the unauthorized participation in medical assistance programs, facially unconstitutional. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the district court and uphold the constitutionality of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3).
On February 23, 2012, Micah Smith was charged in the 19th JDC with a violation of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1, which provides:
Added by 2009 La. Acts. 337, eff. July 1, 2009.
Specifically, the state alleged:
On or about March 10, 2010, through and including the present, 2012, Micah Smith, defendant herein, committed the crime of Unauthorized Participation in a Medical Assistance Program in that he, after being excluded by any state or federal agency, he knowingly: Seeks, obtain, or maintains employment as a provider; Seeks, obtains, or retains any monies or payments derived in whole or in part from any state or federal medical assistance funds while excluded from participation in any state or federal medical assistance program; and Seeks, or maintains a contract with a provider in violation of La. R.S. 14:126.3.1.
The state alleges in its brief that it expects to prove at trial that Micah Smith was excluded from participating in medical assistance programs through the administrative process by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals ("DHH") for various allegations of fraud and misconduct. Among other things, DHH administers the Louisiana Medicaid Program. After that exclusion, Smith continued to serve as the billing agent for Medicaid providers, despite his exclusion.1
On February 4, 2013, defendant filed a motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(4) () as overbroad because it would "prohibit a substantial amount of free speech and actions which would be protected under the First Amendment." It is apparent that this provision was intended to prevent a person who is excluded from being employed by, contracting with, or having an ownership or management interest in, any entity that provides services which will be billed to any medical assistance program, from contracting with a provider of such services in order tocontinue to profit thereby. However, defendant argues that it goes too far in prohibiting any contractual arrangement between an excluded person and a Medicaid provider, which "can run the gamut from cutting a provider's grass, to cleaning their home or office, to cutting their hair, or selling them insurance." Therefore, defendant contended that the enactment prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech and the freedom to associate and is thus overbroad. In opposition, the state argued that contractual freedom is not constitutionally protected speech as contemplated by the overbreadth doctrine.
On April 9, 2013, defendant filed a second motion to quash in which he challenged La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) () as overbroad. Defendant argued that this provision "is so sweeping in its proscription that it denies a wide range of protected benefits to which a majority of Americans are entitled." For example, defendant argued that "[a]n excluded provider would not be able to live in government subsidized housing and would not be able to obtain a home loan which was subsidized by the federal government in any way." In opposition, the state argued that the statute is not unconstitutional because it does not affect recipients of the government benefits as those payments are not "state or federal medical assistance funds" due to the fact that they are made directly to healthcare providers. 2
At a hearing on July 2, 2013, the district court denied defendant's first motion to quash but granted his second motion.3 Because the district court ruled that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) is unconstitutional, the matter is directly before us pursuant to La. Const. art. V, § 5(D), under which a case is appealable to this Court if a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.
The state argues that the trial court erred in finding La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) unconstitutional on its face on the basis of overbreadth because the statute does not prohibit protected speech. The state contends that La. R.S. 14:126.3.1(A)(3) prohibits conduct rather than any form of expression.4 The statealso contends that defendant's construction of the statute, under which he claims a person could be denied federal benefits, is unreasonable and, regardless, even if that interpretation were proper, there is no First Amendment right (or other fundamental right) to receive government benefits. In addition, the state argues that the statute may not be invalidated because defendant's unsupported allegations are insufficient to show his hypothesized unconstitutional applications are "real" and "substantial" in accordance with overbreadth jurisprudence. Thus, the state argues that defendant failed to show any realistic danger that a person excluded from participation in Medicaid or Medicare would not be eligible to receive benefits from those programs.5
"As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." United States v. Stephens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S.564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002)). The overbreadth doctrine applies to constitutional challenges made under the First Amendment:
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