State v. Smith
| Citation | 756 S.W.2d 493 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 69852,69852 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gerald SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Nancy A. McKerrow, Office of Public Defender, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., L. Timothy Wilson, John M. Morris, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Appellant, Gerald Smith, was convicted of first degree murder, § 565.020, RSMo 1986. After finding aggravating circumstances as required by § 565.030.4, RSMo 1986, the jury imposed a sentence of death. Appellant appeals from the conviction and sentence.
This Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which the penalty of death is imposed. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. We affirm both the judgment and the sentence.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not in dispute. The evidence is presented in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Appellant, 1 Frank Joseph Guinan, 2 and the victim Robert Baker 3 were all under sentence of death and inmates residing in Housing Unit 3-C at the Missouri State Penitentiary, Jefferson City, Missouri. Housing Unit 3-C is commonly referred to as "death row." Housing unit 3-C is divided into two separate walks, 3-CB and 3-CC. Each walk consists of a row of cells, with each cell opening onto an inner walk. Outside this inner walk, and separated from it by bars, is an outer walk. Access from the inner walk to the outer walk is through two separate security gates that are manually locked by the guards. A "law cage" is accessible from the C-side outer walk and separated by the two security gates from the C side inner walk. The "law cage" is a small room with a locked door where inmates can go to work on their legal cases or someone else's legal case. The outer walk is accessible through a locked gate from a lobby area which separates the B side from the C side.
On November 29, 1985, appellant and Emmett Nave, 4 another death row inmate, were selected as "walk men" for the C wing of Housing Unit 3-C. "Walk men" are selected daily and are permitted out of their cells to pass out meals, sweep the walks, pick up trash and do any other necessary cleaning. Nave asked corrections officer Edward Boyle for permission to consult with Baker in the law cage. Boyle went to see Baker, who resided on B-side, and inquired whether he wished to see Nave. Baker agreed, and also asked to see Robert Driscoll, 5 who was housed on the C-side. During this time, appellant and Nave were out performing their walk men chores. Upon returning to the C-side to arrange for the legal visit, Boyle let inmate Robert O'Neal 6 out of his cell to shower. The shower is located between the first and second security gates on the inner walk. Prior to letting O'Neal out, appellant and Nave were ordered back to their cells.
Boyle then returned to B-side to get Baker. Another officer handcuffed Baker behind his back and brought him out of his cell. Boyle pat searched him, and found no weapons and brought Baker to the C-side and put him in the law cage and removed his handcuffs. Nave also went into the law cage. At this time, appellant was out on the walk. Before Driscoll was permitted to join Baker and Nave, Boyle ordered appellant to step into his cell, and O'Neal to close the shower door. Appellant complied and Driscoll was placed in the law cage. Boyle then allowed appellant and Guinan out of their cells. Guinan asked to replace Nave as walk man while Nave was in the law cage.
At approximately 10:00 a.m., while Baker, Nave and Driscoll were in the law cage, an officer came into the housing unit to obtain Roy Roberts, 7 and to escort him to a different location in the prison. As a security measure, appellant and Guinan were directed to return to their individual cells. Appellant and Guinan complied with the officer's direction. The doors to appellant's and Guinan's cells were not locked. Roberts was subsequently handcuffed and removed from his housing unit. Boyle then went over to B-side to attend to another matter.
Shortly thereafter, Baker informed the correctional officers that he wished to return to his housing unit. Boyle and another officer, Charles Wautelet, then went over to C-side to take Baker and Driscoll back to their cells. As he entered the outer walkway to C-side from the lobby area, Boyle noted that the outer security gate leading to the inner walk was shut, but did not check it. Boyle said he previously left it open to allow the walk men to clean the outer walk. Boyle stated that he saw Guinan standing directly in front of that door, with appellant close behind. When Wautelet came back to the C-side, he saw Guinan standing more in the corner, and did not see appellant.
Boyle handcuffed Baker and Driscoll behind their backs through the locked law cage door. Nave was not handcuffed because he was to resume his duties as a walk man. Wautelet unlocked the door. As Boyle swung the door open, he felt something on his left shoulder. As he was turning back he realized that appellant and Guinan had come through the gate and were in the typing cage stabbing Baker. According to Wautelet, as Guinan rushed past him and went into the law cage he hollered something about a ring and he hollered for appellant to come in and assist him. Appellant knocked Wautelet to the floor on his way into the law cage. Driscoll and Nave were already out of the cage so Boyle shut the law cage door and Wautelet padlocked it while hollering for appellant and Guinan to stop. Wautelet blew his whistle, and went into the lobby to telephone the control center as appellant and Guinan continued to stab and kick Baker. According to Boyle, appellant stabbed Baker at least thirty times. Wautelet returned with Sergeant Baysinger and Officer Brizendine and the attack on Baker slowed. Four more officers arrived and, after some hesitation and further kicking, Guinan and then appellant passed their weapons out.
Baker was lying in a pool of blood gasping for breath. He was taken to the prison hospital, but he died shortly after arrival. Baker had been stabbed over 50 times. Some wounds were six inches deep. Baker died as a result of multiple stab wounds causing internal injuries, mainly to the lungs.
In a videotaped deposition taken of appellant on April 16, 1986, appellant stated that he spoke to Baker, who was then in the law cage, concerning a ring belonging to Guinan. After Baker replied "fuck you," appellant went to his cell and got his weapon. He waited until the guards opened the law cage and he went in after Baker, stabbing him at least thirty times. Appellant also admitted at trial to stabbing Baker.
During the assault, appellant and Guinan cursed and screamed, with Guinan accusing Baker of stealing his ring. Subsequent to the assault, as the correctional officers began to reassert control over the inmates and appellant was relinquishing possession of his weapon, appellant screamed, "let the fucking nigger die." At no time before, during or after appellant's assault upon Baker did appellant exhibit any sign of alcohol intoxication.
The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder. At the punishment phase, of the trial, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that appellant was convicted of murder on August 13, 1981 in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City of the State of Missouri, § 565.032.2(1), RSMo 1986; (2) that the murder involved torture or depravity of mind and as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane, § 565.032.2(7), RSMo 1986; and (3) that at the time of the murder, appellant was in the lawful custody of the Missouri State Penitentiary, § 565.032.2(9), RSMo 1986.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment and in sentencing appellant to death because the death penalty statute was unconstitutional both facially, and as applied to appellant under the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 10, 18(a) and 21 of the Missouri Constitution.
Our decision in State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 680 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed.2d 983 (1983) answers appellant's contentions. In addition, the claim is without merit because appellant does not indicate how the death penalty statute violates the rights of the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Appellant also argues that this Court's refusal to consider all similar cases while conducting its statutorily mandated proportionality review denies him due process, and is ineffective in protecting against the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. We previously addressed this issue in State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 684-85. See also State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 786, 98 L.Ed.2d 871 (1988). The trial court did not err.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment and in sentencing appellant to death because § 565.020, RSMo 1986, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 21 of the Missouri Constitution in that it allows too much prosecutorial discretion in selecting those cases in which to seek the death penalty, particularly when the accused and victim were inmates, thereby permitting the death sentence to be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Appellant claims that in cases like his, the facts establishing guilt of the charged offense also establish the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances, § 565.032.2(9), (13), RSMO 19868, and therefore shifts more discretion from the jury to the prosecutor. Appellant suggests that prosecutorial discretion should be circumscribed by legislatively imposed criteria.
We have repeatedly...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. McMillin
...of the trial judge who is in a superior position to evaluate the demeanor as well as the testimony of prospective jurors. State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 823, 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989). Appellant concedes that the five venirepersons h......
-
State v. Breton
...1354, 1364 (Miss.1988); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 491 (Miss.1988); Jones v. State, 767 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Mo.1989); State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Mo.1988); State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. en banc 1988); State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 373 S.E.2d 518, 535 (1988); State v......
-
Mathenia v. Delo, 91-2042
...crime. State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. banc). cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 S.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984). See also State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 823, 102 L.Ed.2d 812 Here, the court simply instructed the jury to determin......
-
State v. Smith
...second degree murder. We have affirmed the death penalty for a myriad of other killings by incarcerated defendants. E.g., State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 823, 102 L.Ed.2d 812 (1989); State v. Schlup, 724 S.W.2d 236; State v. O'Neal, 718......