State v. Smith, 53801

Decision Date23 June 1970
Docket NumberNo. 53801,53801
Citation178 N.W.2d 329
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Norman SMITH, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Gene L. Needles, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Laughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., James Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Raymond A. Fenton, Des Moines, County Atty., for appellee.

REES, Justice.

The defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with the crime of breaking and entering as defined in § 708.8 of the 1966 Code. He is alleged to have broken and entered Babe's Restaurant in Des Moines with intent to commit a public offense. In advance of trial the defendant moved to suppress evidence found in his hotel room, part of which was seized pursuant to a warrantless search and part of which was subsequently seized pursuant to a search warrant. Timely objections to the introduction of the fruits of the search into evidence were made during course of trial. The motion to suppress and the objections to the introduction of the evidence were overruled. Defendant was found guilty and sentenced, and now appeals from the order overruling his motion to suppress in advance of trial, rulings on objections to the introduction of the evidence and overruling his motion for a new trial. We reverse.

The principal issue before us is whether evidence seized in a warrantless search of defendant's hotel room should be suppressed as having been seized in violation of Amendment 4 of the United States Constitution. A police detective, one Officer Nelson, was investigating a breaking and entering of the restaurant at which the defendant had been employed. The breaking and entering was alleged to have occurred on or prior to March 24, 1969. On the morning of March 25, at about 10 a.m., Officer Nelson went to the hotel in which the defendant was living and after inquiring as to the location of the defendant's room, went to the door of the room and knocked thereon, but was unable to get any response. He could hear heavy breathing and snoring in the room. He then went to the desk clerk who, using a passkey, unlocked the door of the defendant's room. The officer looked into the room and observed the defendant in the bed but decided not to disturb him and left the hotel. Later, about 2 p.m. the same day, the officer returned to the hotel without a search warrant or a warrant for the arrest of the defendant and again knocked on the defendant's door. He could hear someone snoring in the room, but was unable to get any response to his knock. He proceeded to again have the employee of the hotel unlock the defendant's door, and then entered the room. He called out the defendant's name and succeeded in arousing him. He then produced his identification badge and told the defendant he was a detective and wished to talk to him with reference to a breaking and entering at the restaurant. The defendant continued lying on the bed and the detective seated himself in a chair. During the conversation the detective on looking around the room, observed a cigarbox half full of change, two green canvas bags on the refrigerator, and three small paper bag envelopes marked 'Bankers Trust'. In a partially opened dresser drawer he observed rolls of coins. The detective testified he then advised the defendant of his constitutional rights, advised him of his right to remain silent, and any statement he made could be used against him, further he had a right to have an attorney present while being interviewed and if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him. He thereupon placed the defendant under arrest, and took him to jail, taking with him the items he had observed in the room. The following morning the detective secured a search warrant, went back to the defendant's room, made a complete search and found a white canvas bag, two Bankers Trust envelopes, and a bottle of perfume, all of which he took into his possession. The officer testified on his first gaining entry to the room during the morning of March 25 he merely stepped inside the door and made no observations other than to determine the defendant was in the room. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the officer testified he had requested of the defendant permission to look around his room and the defendant gave him permission to do so. This was categorically denied by the defendant.

In support of his contention the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress in advance of trial, the defendant argues the right of privacy guaranteed him by Amendment Four of the United States Constitution is enforceable in the courts in the several states, specifically the State of Iowa, under the due process clause of Amendment 14. He argues because of the manner in which the officer gained entry into his room the officer was a trespasser, making the evidence seized inadmissible. The defendant further asserts a guest in a hotel room is entitled to full constitutional rights, especially those rights relating to searches and seizures.

The State argues that absent any express orders to the contrary there is no rule which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the right of privacy, for a police officer to openly and peaceably knock on the door of any man's 'castle' with the intent only of asking questions of the occupant of the room or dwelling. State further contends the validity of a search and seizure must be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case, and insists objects in plain view of the officer who has a right to be in a position to openly observe them are subject to seizure and may be admitted into evidence although there is no search warrant authorizing such a search or seizure.

I. We recognize all evidence seized in violation of the United States Constitution is inadmissible in state courts because the Fourth Amendment right of privacy is enforceable against the State under the due process clause. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654--655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933. Where a police officer without an arrest or search warrant enters a hotel room with the consent or aid of a hotel employee but without the consent or knowledge of the occupant of the room, a search of the room is unlawful and items seized after such illegal entry are inadmissible in evidence. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51--52, 72 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • State v. Tyler
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • June 30, 2015
    ...Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891, 11 L.Ed.2d 856, 859 (1964) ; Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 565 ; State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1970). However, as we have previously explained:The mere fact that a premise[s] may be characterized as a residence or a motel room......
  • People v. Lerhinan
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • November 22, 1982
    ...a hotel employee may not effectively consent to a search of the room during the rental period (see Stoner v. California, supra; State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329 Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly repudiated the notion that the subtle distinctions developed in property law control Fourt......
  • Latham v. Sullivan, 2-63201
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Iowa
    • May 30, 1980
    ...283 N.W.2d at 342. As a consequence, all evidence seized pursuant to the warrantless search is inadmissible in court. State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1970). The State contends that such an application of the exclusionary rule would be inappropriate in light of the rationale that t......
  • State v. Hraha, 54786
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • January 14, 1972
    ...and intelligently given and not merely a submission to authority. See State v. Baych, 169 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Iowa 1969); State v. Smith, 178 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Iowa 1970); Gilliland v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 S.W.2d 467, 469; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219--220 (9 Cir.); Unite......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT