State v. Smith, No. 24102

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: TOAL; HARWELL
• Citation: 315 S.C. 547,446 S.E.2d 411
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Elijah SMITH, Appellant. . Heard
• Decision Date: 07 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 24102

Page 411

446 S.E.2d 411 315 S.C. 547 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Elijah SMITH, Appellant. No. 24102. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard Dec. 7, 1993.
Decided June 20, 1994.

Page 412

[315 S.C. 548] Wanda H. Haile, Asst. Appellate Defender, Columbia, for appellant.

T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Donald J. Zelenka, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Miller W. Shealy, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard A. Harpootlian, Sol., Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice.

This criminal appeal arises from a jury verdict of guilty on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We affirm.

[315 S.C. 549] Facts

On the night of December 10, 1990, the appellant, Elijah Smith, left his girlfriend's apartment at Saxon Homes in Richland County to purchase more beer. Accompanied by a friend, Anthony Kimble, Smith purchased the beer and was returning to the apartment when he encountered Robert Evans. Smith called out to Evans and the two began a discussion over an alleged $2.00 debt owed by Evans. Evans claiming that he did not have the money began to walk away. Smith called Evans back and the two began a heated argument. At some point in the argument, Evans grabbed Smith and Smith produced a knife stabbing Evans in the heart. Evans died as a result of the stabbing.

On February 14, 1991, Smith was indicted for murder and in May 1992, Smith was tried by jury in Richland County. At trial, Smith was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for thirty years. It is from this conviction that Smith now appeals.

Issues

Smith raises the following three issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Smith's requested jury charge for involuntary manslaughter;

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel a sufficient opportunity to impeach a critical state witness; and

3. Whether the trial court erred in denying certain requested jury instructions regarding the law of self defense and legal provocation.

Law/Analysis

Involuntary Manslaughter

Smith first argues that the trial court erred in denying his requested jury charge for involuntary manslaughter ¹. The

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trial court may and should refuse to charge on a lesser-included offense where there is no evidence that the defendant committed the lesser rather than the greater offense. Casey v. State, 305 S.C. 445, 409 S.E.2d 391 (1991). In[315 S.C. 550] Casey, we noted that, "to constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of the safety of others." Id. at 447, 409 S.E.2d at 392; S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-60 (1985).

Involuntary manslaughter was recently reviewed in Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414 S.E.2d 144 (1992) (citing State v. Barnett, 218 S.C. 415, 63 S.E.2d 57 (1951)), where we stated:

[f]irst, involuntary manslaughter may be described as the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but while one is engaged in the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or bodily harm. The second situation may be described as the killing of another without malice and unintentionally but while engaged in the doing of a lawful act with a reckless disregard of the safety of others.

Id., 307 S.C. at 176, 414 S.E.2d at 146-147.

Our analysis in Bozeman relied heavily on our earlier decision in State v. Craig, 267 S.C. 262, 227 S.E.2d 306 (1976). In Craig, we found no error in failing to charge involuntary manslaughter where a defendant intentionally fired a gun, but claimed that he was only firing above the victim's head. In Bozeman, on facts similar to Craig, we stated that there was "no evidence to support an allegation of mere criminal negligence in the use of a dangerous instrumentality."

The record here demonstrates that Smith acted intentionally in wielding the knife. When Evans grabbed Smith, Smith pulled the knife, a dangerous instrumentality, and stabbed at Evans. Just as in Craig, whether Smith intended to harm Evans is irrelevant. The stabbing is clearly not a lawful act, and the intentional use of a dangerous instrumentality does not support the allegation of mere criminal negligence. Because Smith's actions were outside the definition of involuntary manslaughter as we restated recently in Bozeman, the trial court did not commit error in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter.

Impeachment of State's Witness

Smith next argues that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel a sufficient opportunity to impeach Anteaus Walker, an eye witness to the stabbing. Walker testified that [315 S.C. 551] he observed Smith and Evans fighting, saw Evans fall to the ground, and then saw Smith put away a knife. Walker, who called the police, had charges pending against him for intent to distribute crack and possession with intent to distribute crack within one-half mile of a school. Smith attempted to impeach Walker with these crimes expressly against the ruling of the trial judge who had denied the admission of this evidence. The trial judge sent out the jury, and after a discussion with counsel, gave a curative instruction. ²

Normally, we will not disturb on appeal a trial court's ruling concerning the scope of cross-examination of a witness to test his...