State v. Smith, 126

Citation505 A.2d 511,305 Md. 489
Decision Date01 September 1985
Docket NumberNo. 126,126
PartiesSTATE of Maryland v. Janet SMITH. ,
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

Ann E. Singleton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, Senior Judge, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, JR., Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired), Specially Assigned.

CHARLES E. ORTH, Judge.

We hold in this appeal that a commissioner of the District Court of Maryland has the power to issue a statement of charges.

I

A civilian applied to the District Court of Maryland for a statement of charges. The application alleged that Janet Smith had stolen the applicant's bicycle, valued at $150. The applicant signed the application in the presence of the commissioner and affirmed that the allegations were true. The commissioner issued a statement of charges which charged Smith with the theft of the bicycle having a value of less than $300 in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 342. He then issued a warrant for the arrest of Smith.

The warrant was duly executed and Smith was taken into custody. When the case came on for trial in the District Court, Smith demanded a jury trial, thereby depriving the District Court of jurisdiction. Md.Code (1973, 1984 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum.Supp.) § 4-302 (e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. At arraignment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City Smith made an oral motion to dismiss the statement of charges on the ground that the commissioner had no power to issue it. After receiving written memoranda and hearing oral argument, the court granted the motion and dismissed the statement of charges "without further prejudice to the prosecution." The State appealed. Smith prayed that we issue a writ of certiorari before judgment by the Court of Special Appeals. The petition presented one question Did the trial court correctly rule that District Court commissioners do not have the power to issue statements of charges?

We granted the petition and ordered the issuance of the writ. Smith then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was "not specifically provided for by law...." We denied the motion. Smith renews the motion in her brief. The motion is again denied.

II

As Smith reads the opinion of the circuit court, one of the grounds of its decision to dismiss the charging document was that the issuance of a statement of charges by a commissioner of the District Court violates the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. She claims that the State did not challenge this conclusion. She urges that the State has therefore waived any objection thereto. She asserts:

Because that conclusion, alone, supports the dismissal of the court below of charges against [Smith], the other issues raised by [the State] in this case need not be reached by the Court and for the Court to do so would be to render an advisory opinion.

She declares that "[t]he writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted because [the State] has failed to challenge the holding of the court below that the United States Constitution precludes District Court commissioners from issuing statements of charges and warrants of arrest."

We think that a fair reading of the court's opinion indicates that the court did call upon the due process clause of the federal constitution. In doing so it relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972) and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971). Although the State does not pinpoint due process as such in its brief, it discusses Shadwick and Coolidge in arguing that the lower court's conclusions, in reliance on those cases, were incorrect. We think that the State has mounted a challenge to the conclusions reached by the court below, on the basis of due process, sufficient to preserve the matter for appellate review. Accordingly, we refuse to dismiss the writ of certiorari.

III

When the trial judge decided that a commissioner of the District Court "has no constitutional power to issue and sign a 'Statement of Charges'," he said, in rendering the judgment, that the reason the power was lacking was

because such a power cannot be necessarily implied in the power to issue warrants of arrest contrary to the constitutional mandate of separation of powers in Maryland, and that such a confluence of powers would violate the principle of a 'neutral and detached judicial officer' as required by due process of law.

Smith reads this as advancing three reasons why the power to issue statements of charges will not bear constitutional scrutiny:

1) the Constitution of Maryland does not empower a commissioner to issue a statement of charges;

2) the doctrine of separation of powers forbids that function;

3) the exercise of the function violates the due process clause of the federal constitution.

We accept Smith's reading of the opinion as to the reasons on which the judgment was bottomed and approach our review of the propriety of the holding accordingly.

(1)

The circuit court determined, and Smith argues, that the Maryland Constitution does not empower a commissioner of the District Court of Maryland to issue a statement of charges.

(a) The Constitution

The District Court of Maryland came into being through the passage of a constitutional amendment proposed by Acts 1969, ch. 789, ratified 3 November 1970, and designated as §§ 41A-41I, Art. IV of the Maryland Constitution. 1 Section 41G requires that there "be district court commissioners in the number and with the qualifications and compensation prescribed by law," and spells out their authority in these terms:

Commissioners may exercise power only with respect to warrants of arrest, or bail or collateral or other terms of pre-trial release pending hearing, or incarceration pending hearing, and then only as prescribed by law or by rule.

(b) The Statute

The constitutional amendment was implemented by legislation enacted in 1970 and 1971 which established the District Court of Maryland. With respect to the commissioners required by the Constitution, the law, as it is now in effect, declares that "[t]here shall be in each county, at all times, one or more commissioners available for the convenience of the public and police in obtaining charging documents, warrants, or criminal summonses and to advise arrested persons of their rights as required by law." Md.Code (1973, 1984 Repl.Vol., Cum.Supp.1985) § 2-607(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 2-607(c)(1) provides that "[a] commissioner shall receive applications and determine probable cause for the issuance of charging documents." Subsection (c)(2) designates further duties:

A commissioner shall advise arrested persons of their constitutional rights, set bond or commit persons to jail in default of bond or release them on personal recognizance if circumstances warrant, and conduct investigations and inquiries into the circumstances of any matter presented to him in order to determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of a charging document, warrant, or criminal summons and, in general, perform all the functions of committing magistrates as exercised by the justices of the peace prior to July 5, 1971. (emphasis added)

(c) The Rules

The 1970-1971 legislation was promptly implemented by rules adopted by this Court. Under those rules Chapter 700 of the Maryland District Rules govern the procedure in the District Court and before District Court commissioners in all criminal proceedings. MDR 701. Definitions were set out in MDR 702. Commissioners and District Court judges were considered to be "judicial officers." Id. at § f. " 'Charging document' means arrest warrant, summons to a defendant, statement of charges, citation, or criminal information." Id. at § a. "Citation" was defined in section c. The other four charging documents were not defined.

The court's functions with respect to a charging document, set out in MDR 706, generally could be exercised either by a District Court judge or a commissioner; the Rule speaks in terms of a "judicial officer." An application for an arrest warrant or summons had to be made in writing and signed by the applicant upon oath before a judicial officer. MDR 706, § a. An arrest warrant was to have been issued upon the application (except where a summons is required or permitted, id. at § c2.) if it appears to "the issuing officer" that there is "probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id. at § c1. "Whenever a defendant is arrested without a warrant, the officer in whose custody the defendant is placed for charging shall promptly prepare, or shall supervise the prompt preparation of, a statement of charges against the defendant." Id. at § c3. The defendant was given a copy of the warrant or the statement of charges. Id. at § d. Except for the command in a warrant to arrest the defendants and the command in a summons for the defendant to appear in court, the required contents of a warrant, a summons and a statement of charges were identical. Each of them was required by MDR 706, § e to contain:

(1) the name of the defendant, or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty; and

(2) a plain, concise and definite statement of essential facts constituting each offense charged, and each formal charge placed against the defendant; and

(3) the identity of the person upon whose application the charging document...

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