State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 30 June 2015
• Docket Number: SC 19314
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TREMAINE SMITH

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TREMAINE SMITH

SC 19314

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued April 20, 2015

June 30, 2015

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Terence D. Mariani, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Elizabeth M. Inkster, assigned counsel, with whom was Samuel A. Greenberg, deputy assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

ROGERS, C. J. The issue that we are required to address in this certified appeal is whether the state is required to prove as an element of the crime of robbery in the first degree, as set forth in General Statutes § 53a-134 (a), that the defendant was not the owner of the property that he was accused of taking from another. The defendant, Tremaine Smith, was charged with attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (3), and attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-92 (a) (2) (B). The jury found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and acquitted him of the attempted kidnapping charge, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court claiming, among other things, that the state had failed to prove that he did not own the property that he had been convicted of attempting to take from the complainant, Shakela Cooper, and that this was an element of the crime of robbery in the first degree. State v. Smith, 148 Conn. App. 684, 694, 86 A.3d 498 (2014). The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that the state had the burden of disproving that he owned the property; id., 706; and that it had failed to meet this burden. Id., 711. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of conviction of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on that charge. Id., 721. Thereafter, we granted the state's petition for certification to appeal on the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the defendant's conviction of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of . . . §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134 (a) (3) must be reversed and judgment [of acquittal be] directed because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree?" State v. Smith, 311 Conn. 947, 91 A.3d 462 (2014). We answer the certified question in the affirmative.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. While the defendant was in prison in August, 2009, he mailed $294 in cash to Cooper, who was his girlfriend, and told her to use the money to hire an attorney or to obtain a bond for him. Cooper told the defendant that she would do so, but she never did. Instead, she kept the money. On November 30, 2009, the defendant was released from prison. At approximately 7:30 p.m. that day, the defendant was driving around the city of Waterbury with Shanika Crews. When the defendant saw Cooper, Cooper's brother and a friend of Cooper's walking toward the Waterbury Plaza, he got out of Crews' vehicle, confronted Cooper and attempted to force her to go with him to get his money by grabbing her and threatening her with a knife. The defendant ultimately told Cooper's friend that Cooper "better have my money," told Cooper that he would stop by her house later and walked away. Later that evening, Cooper went to the Waterbury police station and gave a statement about the incident. The state ultimately charged the defendant with attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree.

The jury trial commenced on February 16, 2011. After the state presented its evidence, the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict on both charges. With respect to the attempt to commit robbery charge, defense counsel argued that "there was not enough evidence from which an intent to commit . . . a larceny can be found" because "all the facts show [is] that [the defendant] attempted to regain property that belonged to him, that he had a legal right to, not [that he was] taking the property of another person." The defendant also requested, in the alternative, that the trial court instruct the jury pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-21¹ that it could consider whether the defendant was justified in using reasonable physical force against Cooper in order to regain his own property. The trial court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction pursuant to § 53a-21 because the statute only allows reasonable physical force in defense of property and, therefore, does not apply to § 53a-134 (a) (3), which requires proof that the defendant used a dangerous instrument during the robbery. Cf. State v. Woolfolk, 8 Conn. App. 667, 672A, 517 A.2d 252 (1986) (§ 53a-21 "is inapplicable to the charge of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon"), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 802, 519 A.2d 1207 (1987); see also General Statutes § 53a-21 (person "may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only in defense of person as prescribed in section 53a-19"). The court held for the same reason that the defendant was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground that he owned the money that he had attempted to take from Cooper. Thus, the court implicitly held that, because the defendant had been charged with using a dangerous instrument to attempt to take the money from Cooper, the fact that he owned the money was not a defense to the robbery charge. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree.²

Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury that "[a] person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property, he wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds such property from an owner." It further instructed the jury that "[w]rongfully means that the defendant had no . . . legal justification or excuse for taking the property. Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant had no legal justification or excuse to seek, through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, repayment of any money that . . . Cooper may have owed him." After the jury began its deliberations, the jurors sent a note to the trial court requesting further explanation regarding "the issue of possession of the money." The note stated that "[o]ur specific concern regards the issue of recovering what you perceive as your own property/larceny-robbery. In our deliberations should we be discussing who the money rightfully belongs [to]." In response to this request, the trial court repeated its instruction that the defendant had no justification or excuse to use force or the threat of force to recover the money and further stated that "the fact that the defendant perceived that the $294 was rightfully his, does not permit him, lawfully, to use force or the threat of the use of force, to get the money back." The defendant objected to the additional instruction on the ground that the original instruction had been sufficient.

The jury found the defendant guilty of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and acquitted him of the charge of attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree. The defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, in which he contended that the trial court improperly had failed to instruct the jury that the intent to take property that belonged to another is an element of the crime of first degree robbery and that the defendant could not be convicted of attempt to commit that crime if the jury found that he "had an innocent intent under a good faith claim or color of right to get his $294 back." The defendant also filed a motion for acquittal raising the same claim. The trial court denied both motions and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, that "the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he, with the intent to deprive another of property, wrongfully attempted to take, obtain, or withhold such property from an owner, pursuant to the larceny statute, General Statutes § 53a-119, and that the state was required to prove all of the elements of larceny in order to prove all of the elements of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree."³ State v. Smith, supra, 148 Conn. App. 694. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant's claim and, accordingly, reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render a judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree.⁴ Id., 721. This appeal followed.

The state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly held that it was required to prove that the defendant did not own the money that he attempted to take from Cooper as an element of the crime of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree.⁵ We disagree.

Whether the state must prove that a defendant was not the owner of money that he took from another as an element of the crime of robbery in the first degree is a question of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1, 13, 981 A.2d 427 (2009). "The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ....