State v. Snover

Citation129 A. 198
Decision Date18 May 1925
Docket NumberNo. 20.,20.
PartiesSTATE v. SNOVER.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Supreme Court.

Thomas L. Snover was convicted of arson, and the judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court (126 A. 850), and he brings error. Affirmed.

Joseph M. Roseberry & Son, of Belvidere, for plaintiff in error.

Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., of Phillipsburg, for the State.

BLACK, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted by the Warren county grand jury. The indictment contained three counts.

The first count charged the defendant, with three others, that he did willfully and maliciously set fire to and burn a certain barn, not a parcel of the dwelling house, and a certain grist mill, etc.

The second count charged the defendant, with three others, that he did willfully and maliciously set fire to and burn or cause to be burned a dwelling house.

The third count charged the defendant, with three others, that he did willfully and maliciously set fire to and burn a certain barn there situated, which was at the time insured by the National Liberty Insurance Company of New York with intent to prejudice the insurance company. The jury found all the defendants guilty, as charged in the indictment. The defendant, Thomas L. Snover, was sentenced on the first count. On the second and third counts sentence was suspended. The defendant, then sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court.

Eighteen assignments of error were filed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. Then a writ of error was sued out of this court. As an assignment of error it is alleged the Supreme Court erred in giving judgment for the state by affirming the judgment of conviction; and this, according to our practice, makes available to the plaintiff in error all of the assignments in the Supreme Court.

Only two of the points presented in the argument on this appeal call for any discussion, viz.: First there is assigned as error the overruling by the trial judge three questions put by the defendants' counsel to a witness Isaac E. Wildrick on cross-examination of which the following one is illustrative: "Q. The will was proved in the surrogate's office September 1, 1921, was it not?" referring to the will of his mother, Harriet Willever.

The ruling of the trial court excluding this class of questions falls directly within the prohibition of what this court said in the case of Farley v. Mikulsky, 127 A. 662, viz.: Counsel cannot inject into the trial of the cause collateral matter which has no bearing on the issue between the parties. The application of the principle is illustrated in the case of Daum v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., 69 N. J. Law, 5, 54 A. 221, affirmed 70 N. J. Law, 338, 57 A. 1132; Wigmore on Evidence § 1002; 40 Cyc. p. 2493 (13); 28 R. C. L. p. 607, § 197. A test as to what is collateral is said to be: Could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any independent purpose. Wigmore says the sound rule would be to leave the application of the rule entirely in the control of the trial court. Wigmore on Evidence, § 1003.

It is next argued that it was error for the Supreme Court to refuse to consider whether or not it was error for the trial court to refuse certain requests to charge the jury...

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