State v. Snow, 94-388

• Decision Date: 05 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-388,94-388
• Citation: 670 A.2d 239
• Parties: STATE v. Winfield SNOW. C.A.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 239

670 A.2d 239

STATE v. Winfield SNOW.

No. 94-388 C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 5, 1996.

Andrea Mendes, Special Asst. Atty. General, Aaron Weisman, Asst. Atty. General, for Plaintiff.

Edward J. Romano, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

This case came before the Supreme Court on the appeal of the defendant, Winfield Snow, from a judgment of conviction of one count of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. The defendant received a life sentence on the murder charge and a consecutive term of ten years on the conspiracy count. On appeal, the defendant has raised four issues, challenging (1) the denial of his motion for a new trial, (2) the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the propriety of the state's questioning of a defense witness, and (4) the denial of his motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we deny the defendant's appeal and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The facts insofar as pertinent to the issues raised on appeal are briefly summarized.

Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 8:18 p.m., on January 18, 1991, the Woonsocket police responded to a call and discovered one Peter Zmetra (Zmetra) lying in a pool of blood in the driveway of a house at 171 Carnation Street. A few moments later, rescue personnel arrived at the scene and transported Zmetra to the Landmark Medical Center, where the victim was pronounced dead. At defendant's trial, Francis Perretti, M.D. (Perretti), a forensic pathologist, testified that in the course of performing an autopsy on Zmetra, he located three gunshot wounds on the victim's body and concluded that the cause of Zmetra's death was "multiple gunshot wounds resulting in bleeding, hemorrhage." Richard Wilkinson, Ph.D., of the University of Rhode Island crime lab testified that three bullets were recovered in connection with Zmetra's death and that all three were fired from the same weapon.

Five months after the shooting, in the early morning hours of June 22, 1991, Michael Giroux (Giroux) and Brian Snell (Snell) went to the police and volunteered statements in which both men admitted their involvement in Zmetra's murder but claimed that it was defendant who had actually shot Zmetra. Giroux and Snell were arrested and charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. In exchange for agreeing to testify for the state at defendant's trial, Snell was permitted to plead nolo contendere to an amended charge of second-degree murder and to one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. Snell was subsequently sentenced to serve five years of a twenty-year sentence, with fifteen years suspended on the murder charge and a concurrent sentence of ten years, five years to serve and five years suspended on the conspiracy count. Giroux also pleaded nolo contendere to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery.

As a result of the statements given by Giroux and Snell the Woonsocket police issued a warrant, and the Milford, Massachusetts, police arrested defendant at his girlfriend's residence where, at the same time a police scanner, was seized. On July 16, 1991, an indictment was filed, charging defendant with one count of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. The defendant was extradited over objection, ordered held without bail, and remanded to the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI). On June 25, 1992, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied, and on September 8, 1992, a jury trial commenced.

At trial Snell testified regarding defendant's involvement in the conspiracy to rob and the murder of Zmetra in January 1991. According to Snell's testimony, Giroux initially suggested that Giroux and Snell rob Zmetra on a Friday evening because Zmetra collected rents on Fridays and was likely to be carrying large sums of money on those evenings. Snell further testified that when Giroux became concerned that Zmetra might recognize Giroux, Giroux suggested that they engage defendant to aid in the robbery. According to Snell, he and Giroux went to defendant's apartment, and when defendant agreed to participate, the three men proceeded to plan the robbery.

According to Snell's testimony, defendant suggested that the men wear dark clothing, cover their faces, and use a stolen car on the night of the planned robbery. Snell testified that it was also defendant who proposed that Snell "take him [Zmetra] down and hold him," while defendant took Zmetra's money. Snell further stated that because he and Giroux were unable to steal a car, they used Giroux's girlfriend's white four-door Pontiac on which they placed a stolen license plate.

Snell testified that, at approximately 7 p.m. on January 18, 1991, he and Giroux went to defendant's apartment, where defendant and Snell dressed in dark clothing as planned. Snell also stated that he witnessed defendant showing Giroux a gun in the apartment and saw defendant retrieve a police scanner from defendant's car to bring with them. According to Snell, the three left defendant's apartment in Giroux's girlfriend's car at approximately 7:30 p.m. and soon located Zmetra leaving an apartment building and entering his pickup truck. The three men then circled the block to give Zmetra "time to get to his girlfriend's house," stopped to put the stolen license plate on the car, and proceeded to Carnation Street where they saw Zmetra's car parked in front of the driveway of Wanda Bergeron's house at 171 Carnation Street. Snell testified that Giroux stopped the car, and Snell and defendant, who was holding a gun, left the car, walked around the house, and waited on the side of the house for Zmetra to come out.

According to Snell, as Zmetra left the house and walked down the front stairs, Snell "jumped him" and "pushed him into the side of the house." At that point, Snell slipped, and when Zmetra "came around swinging," Snell ran toward the back of the house. Snell testified that as he was running, he heard two shots fired, stopped, turned around, and saw "flashes of a gun going off" in defendant's hand and Zmetra's body on the ground. The two men then "walked down the driveway, crossed the grass and ran across the street, got into the car" and rode away from the scene.

Several neighbors on Carnation Street testified that they heard the shooting at approximately 8 p.m. and saw two people wearing dark-colored clothes and masks leave the property at 171 Carnation Street, run across the street, enter a white or tan medium-sized car, and drive away quickly. One neighbor testified that when he looked from his window, he saw Zmetra lying in the driveway and phoned 911 for emergency assistance.

The defendant presented several alibi witnesses who described his activities on the night the shooting occurred. Nancy Griffin (Griffin) testified that on January 18, 1991, she arrived at the home of Joan Dyott and Joan Keegan (Keegan) between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m. and did not leave until Keegan arrived at about 8:45 p.m. She further testified that defendant was present the entire time she was there. Contrary to Griffin's testimony, Keegan testified that Griffin had left Keegan's home by the time she arrived. Keegan further testified that defendant had been at her home but left about five minutes after her arrival, at 8:45 p.m.

At the close of the state's case, defendant made a motion for a judgment of acquittal, on which the trial justice reserved judgment. On September 15, 1992, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and on September 22, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. On September 30, 1992, the trial justice denied both defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial. Following his sentencing, on December 4, 1992, defendant filed this appeal, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-24-32.

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial justice must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, in fact giving full credibility to the state's witnesses, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt. State v. Mercado, 635 A.2d 260, 263 (R.I.1993); State v. Laperche, 617 A.2d 1371, 1373 (R.I.1992). If the totality of the evidence so viewed and the inferences so drawn would justify a reasonable juror in finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied. Laperche, 617 A.2d at 1373; State v. Grundy, 582 A.2d 1166, 1170 (R.I.1990); State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581-82 (R.I.1987). In reviewing a trial justice's denial of such a motion, this Court applies the same standard as the tribunal below. Mercado, 635 A.2d at 263.

In the present case, defendant argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because Snell's testimony was so "inherently unreliable" and "incredible" that, even if viewed in the light most favorable to the state, a rational juror could not find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In denying defendant's motion, the trial justice gave the requisite full credit to Snell's detailed testimony concerning defendant's role in planning and executing the crimes against Zmetra, reviewed the testimony of the Carnation Street neighbors, considered the physical evidence, and concluded that there was ample evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

Viewing the same evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we concur with the determination of the trial justice. Consequently, we hold that the trial justice properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Motion for a New Trial

In ruling on a motion for a new trial, "the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses...