State v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 27 February 1985
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Randy Lee SNYDER, Appellant. 34083; CA A29049.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 958

695 P.2d 958

72 Or.App. 359

STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Randy Lee SNYDER, Appellant.

34083; CA A29049.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted July 27, 1984.

Decided Feb. 27, 1985.

David E. Groom, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.

Stephen F. Peifer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David B. Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before RICHARDSON, P.J., and WARDEN and NEWMAN, JJ.

WARDEN, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for burglary in the second degree. ORS 164.215. After the trial court had denied his motion to suppress evidence taken as a result of his being stopped by police officers, he waived his right to a jury trial and was tried by the court. His conviction stemmed from a February 23, 1983, break-in at a gas station in Redmond, in which 140 to 160 packages of cigarettes were stolen. We affirm.

Grant County Deputy Sheriff Woodruff encountered defendant at about noon on February 25, 1983. Woodruff was driving west to Dayville to investigate a burglary at the Dayville High School that had occurred during the previous night. Defendant was traveling east on foot about a mile east of Dayville. Woodruff knew most of the people who lived in and around Dayville but did not recognize defendant.

Woodruff stopped and asked defendant, among other questions, whether he had been in Dayville. Defendant responded that he had been there overnight. Woodruff then asked for his name and identification. He said his name was Lauren Anthony McDowdy but could not produce identification. He said that he was from Florida and gave from memory a five-digit Florida driver's license number. Woodruff was suspicious, because he remembered Florida's driver's license numbers as having 12 digits, but he proceeded to Dayville.

The trial court found that in this encounter with Woodruff

"defendant was not required to alter his course, but proceeded in the same direction he had been headed, voluntarily walked up to the officer, carefully checking his pack for identification. The officer testified that the defendant was free to leave here. The testimony is uncontroverted by the defendant. The questioning appeared to be friendly, courteous. The officer told the defendant he would give him a ride if the defendant was still staying in the area. There was no show of physical force or authority which would restrain the defendant's liberty."

Because of his suspicions, Woodruff radioed his office in John Day, stating the name defendant had given him, describing defendant, including the fact that he had an artificial arm, and requesting verification of the Florida driver's license number. Walker, a police officer for the city of John Day, monitored Woodruff's radio message.

Two hours later Walker encountered defendant in John Day. Walker knew of the Dayville burglary, that defendant was a transient who had been in Dayville when the burglary had occurred and had given Woodruff a fictitious Florida driver's license number. He stopped defendant and asked him his name. Defendant said his name was Lauren Andrew Dowdy (not quite the name he had given Woodruff). Defendant denied having had contact with Woodruff earlier that afternoon. Walker decided to take defendant to the police station "to find out who the defendant was." He patted defendant down and found, among other things, a pipe with marijuana residue in the bowl. He then took defendant to the police station.

The trial court made findings with respect to this second encounter:

"First, the defendant was searched for any weapons for the officer's protection and safety. * * * Secondly, he was not handcuffed or placed under arrest. Thirdly, I rule that the circumstances did not result in the defendant voluntarily going down to the police station. There were two police cars in the vicinity, the officers were in uniform. The request by the officer was they go down to the police station to find out who the defendant was. That gave rise to an inference that a reasonable person would not believe that he was entitled to refuse that request. In other words, I hold that the taking of a defendant down to the police station under these circumstances was involuntary despite his comment to the officer, 'That sounds like fun.' "

At the station Walker advised defendant of his Miranda rights and questioned him about who he was and where he was going. ¹ Defendant admitted that his true name was Randy Snyder and volunteered that there might be a warrant for his arrest in Deschutes County. Walker ran defendant's name through the computer system and confirmed that there was a Deschutes County warrant for his arrest for second-degree criminal trespass and driving while suspended. He then informed defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant signed a card granting permission for a search of his person and property.

Walker took defendant to the Grant County Sheriff's Office in Canyon City to be booked and lodged in jail. There Walker and another officer searched defendant's personal effects and found a brown box bearing the address of the hospital in Redmond. Inside the box were 33 packages of cigarettes. Walker again advised defendant of his Miranda rights and obtained defendant's confession to the burglary of the Redmond gas station. Defendant also confessed to stealing some meat and cheese from a church in Independence. The next day, defendant repeated the confessions to Walker and an officer from Redmond. He never confessed to the burglary of the Dayville High School.

Defendant argues that his initial encounters with both Woodruff and Walker were stops within the meaning of ORS 131.615(1) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and that neither officer had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop. ORS 131.615(1). He also argues that Walker violated ORS 131.615(2) and the rule announced in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), by removing him to the police station. Defendant contends that the cigarettes and his confessions were "fruit of the poisonous tree" and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress them.

The trial court based its denial of the motion to suppress on the following rulings: that the encounter with Woodruff was not a stop; that the encounter...