State v. Snyder

• Citation: 672 A.2d 535,40 Conn.App. 544
• Decision Date: 31 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 13785,13785
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Van SNYDER.

Page 535

672 A.2d 535

40 Conn.App. 544

STATE of Connecticut v. Van SNYDER.

No. 13785.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 2, 1995.

Decided March 12, 1996.

Certification Denied May 31, 1996.

Rita M. Shair, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom were John A. Connelly, State's Attorney, Robin Lipsky, Assistant State's Attorney, and, on the brief, David J. Sheldon, former Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, for appellant State.

John M. Gesmonde, Hamden, for appellee (defendant).

Before HEIMAN, SCHALLER and HENNESSY, JJ.

HEIMAN, Judge.

The state appeals ¹ from the judgments ² rendered by the trial court, following the court's granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the informations charging him with five counts of harassment in the second degree ³ in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183(a)(2). ⁴ The trial court found that a direct communication from a defendant to a victim is required to establish a violation of § 53a-183(a)(2), and that, in the present case, the informations failed to allege that the defendant directly communicated with any of the complainants. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the informations on the ground that they failed to charge an offense constituting harassment in the second degree. The state contends that the trial court's ruling was improper. The state asserts that in order to establish a violation of § 53a-183(a)(2), it does not have to prove that the defendant directly communicated with the persons whom the defendant intended to harass, and that, therefore, its informations did not fail to charge an offense. We agree with the state and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts essential to an understanding of our resolution of this appeals are as follows. ⁵ In April, 1993, Joseph Sullivan, the acting superintendent of public schools in Waterbury, and Charles Joy, the assistant superintendent for instruction, were jointly involved in the suspension of the defendant from duty for one week. The defendant was the principal of Crosby High School.

Commencing in July, 1993, Sullivan, Joy, and Foster Crawford, the assistant superintendent for special education, began receiving by mail magazine subscriptions to which they had not subscribed and packages of merchandise and services that they had not ordered. For example, Joy received dozens of video cassettes, audio discs, music cassettes, and collector plates and cards. Joy estimated that as of October, 1993, he had received over 500 pieces of mail and merchandise valued at approximately $5620.

All three of the victims had been billed for these unsolicited items and had received second and third notices from billing services. In these past due notices, the billing agencies threatened that they would take aggressive collection action if the outstanding bills were not paid. The notices caused the victims to believe that such action would have an adverse effect on their credit standings.

Additionally, Sullivan, Joy and Crawford had spent a considerable amount of time making telephone calls and mailing numerous forms and letters in attempts to cancel unwanted magazine subscriptions, and to stem the tide of unordered and unwanted merchandise and services. Joy changed his telephone number in an effort to stop solicitors from calling at all hours of the day and night.

On September 8, 1993, Joy attended a meeting in the defendant's office at Crosby High School. Joy wanted to take notes at the meeting and picked up a note pad from the defendant's desk. Joy noticed that the pad had an imprint of his name and home address. On September 15, 1993, Joy again attended a meeting at Crosby High School and, while he was using the telephone in the defendant's office, he saw ten or twelve subscription forms protruding from the defendant's desk drawer.

On September 21, 1993, Joy received a telephone call from a person claiming that Joy was registered for a particular seminar. Joy asked the caller to send him the original registration card and the envelope in which it had been mailed, and the caller did so. When Joy received the registration materials, he compared the handwriting on the materials with the handwriting on certain documents that the defendant had prepared and signed. Joy concluded that the handwriting on the registration materials was very similar to that of the defendant. Joy also recognized that the postage on the registration envelope was from a postage meter at 236 Grand Street, the building where Joy's office was located.

On October 8, 1993, Joy intercepted the mail from the Crosby High School mail bag and noticed a subscription card with his name and address listed as the subscriber. Joy asked a secretary to examine the contents of the mail bag, and the secretary found six pieces of mail similar to the one that Joy had discovered.

The false subscription cards and known samples of the defendant's handwriting were submitted to the state forensic laboratory for handwriting comparison. The examiner concluded that the cards and the known samples were written by the defendant.

On October 21, 1993, pursuant to a warrant, the police searched the defendant's office at Crosby High School. The items seized included thirty-one assorted mail orders and requests for magazine subscriptions and a box containing over 510 homemade address labels. Among the addresses printed on the labels were those of Joy's residence, Sullivan's residence and Crawford's residence and office. Over 300 of the labels contained the residential address of Guy DiBiasio, a former superintendent of public schools in Waterbury. The police also found three order forms containing the Waterbury address of Robert Rousseau, Karen Rousseau and James Wigglesworth.

During the search, the defendant told the police that he had been subjected to harassment by the school officials who had suspended him, and, that for this reason, he was ordering subscriptions to be sent to the officials. The defendant also stated that he was having problems with a student, and that he had a confrontation with the student's father. Because the defendant was upset with this student and his father, he began ordering magazine subscriptions to be sent to the student's home.

Approximately one month after the search of the defendant's office, Robert Rousseau and Karen Rousseau reported to the police that they had been involved in a verbal confrontation with the defendant and that, thereafter, they had begun to receive numerous items of unsolicited mail. Karen Rousseau stated that the argument with the defendant pertained to Wigglesworth, her son. According to Karen Rousseau, one unwanted item sent to her home was a gift allegedly from Joy to Wigglesworth, an item that Joy claims he did not send.

Also subsequent to the search of the defendant's office, DiBiasio filed a complaint with the police, claiming that he had been receiving hundreds of unsolicited mail subscriptions at his residence. DiBiasio reported that while he was superintendent, he had disciplined the defendant for a violation of school policies.

On the basis of these facts, the defendant was arrested and charged in three informations with a total of five counts of harassment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-183(a)(2). The informations allege that the defendant, "with intent to harass and annoy" the complainants, "did communicate by mail with other persons to cause numerous pieces of unsolicit[ed] mail and packages to be received by" the complainants "in a manner likely to cause annoyance and alarm." ⁶ The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the informations, claiming (1) that the informations were defective because they failed to charge an offense, and (2) that the law defining the offense charged was unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. The defendant based his motion on Practice Book § 814, article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution, and the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the United States. ⁷ The trial court granted the defendant's motion on the ground that the informations failed to charge an offense constituting the conduct proscribed in § 53a-183(a) (2). ⁸ The trial court found that in order to establish a violation of § 53a-183(a)(2), the state must prove that the defendant directly communicated with the person whom he intended to harass, and that the informations charging the defendant with violating § 53a-183(a)(2) failed to allege such a direct communication. According to the trial court, § 53a-183(a)(2) "does not encompass within its ambit content-neutral communications made to a party other than the complainant which are not in any way annoying or alarming to such other party. While the defendant's intention may have been to annoy or harass the complainants and their receipt of numerous unsolicited mail order items was, in all likelihood, annoying and possibly alarming, his alleged actions do not constitute criminal conduct." Following the trial court's dismissal of the informations, the state appealed.

On appeal, the state asserts that to establish a violation of § 53a-183(a)(2), it need not prove that the defendant communicated directly with the persons whom the defendant intended to harass, and that, therefore, its informations did not fail to charge an offense. The defendant disagrees with the state's position and argues that the statute proscribes a defendant only from engaging in direct communication with a victim in an effort to harass the victim. We agree with the state.

To resolve this appeal, we must determine whether § 53a-183(a)(2) requires the state to prove that a defendant, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm...