State v. Soprych
| Docket Number | A176391 (Control), A176392 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 2023 |
| Citation | 324 Or.App. 659,527 P.3d 808 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael Lee SOPRYCH, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Neil F. Byl, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellant Section, Office of Public Defense Services.
Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.*
In this consolidated appeal, defendant appeals (1) a judgment of conviction for one count of unlawful possession of 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), in a usable quantity, ORS 475.874(2)(a) ; and (2) a judgment extending his probation in another criminal case based on the guilty verdict in the first case. He assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances on which his conviction was based. Those controlled substances were found during a warrantless search of a locked safe in defendant's bedroom; the state's theory was that defendant consented to the search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, agreeing with the state that defendant had consented to the search of the locked safe in which the controlled substances were found. We conclude that the record does not allow for the nonspeculative inference that defendant intended to consent to the search of the locked safe, as required under State v. Blair , 361 Or. 527, 396 P.3d 908 (2017). Accordingly, we reverse and remand both judgments for further proceedings.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress by "accepting the trial court's supported factual findings and determining ‘whether the trial court applied legal principles correctly to those facts.’ " State v. Soto-Navarro , 309 Or App 218, 223, 482 P.3d 150 (2021) (quoting State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66, 74-75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993) ). Absent express factual findings, we presume the trial court found the facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion. State v. Peek , 310 Or App 587, 589, 485 P.3d 292, rev. den. , 368 Or. 597, 495 P.3d 684 (2021).
The relevant historical facts are not disputed; we take most of them from the transcription of the audio from the body camera recording of defendant's arrest and the search of his house; the recording was played into the record at the hearing on the motion to suppress and thereby made part of the transcript.
Officers from the Beaverton Police Department went to defendant's home after defendant's roommate reported that defendant had pistol-whipped him at their residence. After police called loudly for defendant to come out of his house with his "hands in the air," defendant did so. Officers immediately handcuffed and Mirandized him. Sergeant Mastripolito then began to converse with defendant.
Mastripolito first told defendant about the pistol-whipping allegation. Defendant denied it. In response to Mastripolito's question whether defendant had "any guns in the house," defendant said "no." After telling defendant that it was his job "to find the truth," Mastripolito asked if there were any weapons in the house. Defendant responded "no." Mastripolito asked, "Can we check?" Defendant responded "yes." Mastripolito then asked, "You wouldn't mind if we checked?" Defendant responded "no."
Mastripolito then explained to defendant that checking the house for guns could help police corroborate defendant's version of events. He also told defendant that the purpose of "check[ing]" for a gun was for safety:
Mastripolito stayed with defendant outside, continuing to converse with him, while other officers entered the house. Mastripolito also was in radio contact with the officers inside the house. After telling them what bedroom was defendant's, he asked defendant, He then asked whether officers could "look in there?" Defendant responded, Mastripolito declined defendant's offer to unlock his bedroom door, and asked defendant which key was the one for the padlock on the door. Defendant told Mastripolito that the keys were in the grass. Officers retrieved them and used them to open the padlock on his bedroom door.
Officers then searched defendant's bedroom. They discovered a locked safe in defendant's closet. They then used one of defendant's keys to open the safe; they did not ask for defendant's permission first. Inside the safe, they found MDMA and two guns. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, second-degree assault, unlawful use of a weapon, and menacing. The state later dismissed the last three charges.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of the MDMA found in the safe in his bedroom. He argued that the state had procured it in an unconstitutional warrantless search, in violation of defendant's rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although defendant acknowledged that he had said yes when police asked if they could check his home for firearms, he contended that, in doing so, he had not authorized police to open his locked safe. The state responded that by authorizing the officers to enter his home to look for guns, defendant authorized them to look any place where guns might be located, including the locked safe. The trial court agreed with the state and denied the motion to suppress. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court found him guilty as charged. As mentioned above, a judgment extending defendant's probation in another case was entered based on the guilty verdict.
Defendant appealed both judgments. On appeal, he assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and, relatedly, to the probation-violation finding based on his conviction. He contends that the trial court erred when it determined that he consented to a search of the locked safe. For the following reasons, we agree.
It is undisputed that that defendant authorized officers to enter his house to "check" for weapons. The question is whether, by opening defendant's locked safe, officers exceeded the scope of the "check" authorized by defendant. Because defendant's grant of authority to officers to check his house for weapons was ambiguous as to whether it encompassed opening defendant's locked safe, the answer to that question hinges on defendant's actual intent in authorizing officers to check his house for weapons. Blair , 361 Or. at 537-38, 396 P.3d 908. In particular, it hinges on whether defendant actually intended to authorize police to open his locked safe. Id . That, the Supreme Court has explained, is a question of fact. Id . at 537, 396 P.3d 908. Accordingly, we review the trial court's determination that defendant intended to consent to a search of the safe to determine whether there is constitutionally sufficient evidence to support it. Id . at 537-38, 396 P.3d 908 ; State v. Cross , 316 Or App 506, 512-13, 502 P.3d 753 (2021).
In this case, we conclude that the...
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State v. Keck
...played into the record at the hearing on the motion to suppress and thereby made part of the transcript," as in State v. Soprych , 324 Or.App. 659, 661, 527 P.3d 808 (2023).Officer McBride pulled defendant over for a traffic violation around 4:30 a.m. while defendant was on his way to do co......