State v. Soucy
| Decision Date | 04 December 1951 |
| Citation | 84 A.2d 838,97 N.H. 233 |
| Parties | STATE v. SOUCY. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gordon M. Tiffany, Atty. Gen. Maurice M. Blodgett, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Conrad Danais, County Solicitor, Manchester, for the State.
John W. King, Manchester, for the respondent.
R.L. c. 118, § 12 does not define what constitutes operating a vehicle recklessly. Something more than mere negligence is required however. To constitute the offense a vehicle must be operated under such circumstances, and in such a manner, as to show a wilful or reckless disregard of consequences. State v. Yosua, 91 N.H. 181, 182, 16 A.2d 370; People v. Allison, 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 932, 226 P.2d 85, 86; 5 Am.Jur. 932. But an active intent is not required. State v. Yosua, supra.
Morin testified that after the accident he got out of his car and saw the respondent get out of his car and that when Soucy walked toward him he staggered, his coat was unbuttoned, he smelled of liquor and his face was flushed. There was also evidence that Soucy had had seven drinks of whiskey in a club from which he left shortly before the accident. There was further testimony that after the cars had been separated Soucy told Morin: 'Let's go to the station'. Morin did but Soucy did not report there until the next morning after the police had called his home informing his wife to whom the car was registered that it had been involved in an accident and a report should be made. When he did report Soucy did not know whom he had been in collision with when asked by the police.
Although Soucy testified that he was driving about twenty-five miles an hour at the time of the accident there was considerable damage to the front end of his car and better than $100 of damage to the rear end of the Morin car. The latter testified that when he was about one hundred feet from the bridge he got 'this great big shove in the back and about three seconds later the same thing happened.'
On the above evidence the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the respondent guilty of operating his motor vehicle recklessly in violation of R.L. c. 118, § 12.
Respondent's argument that the complaint for violation of R.L. c. 118, § 19 is defective because it does not allege that he failed to 'forthwith bring his vehicle to a stop, return to the scene of the accident' is without merit.
The object of this statute is to enable one who is in any way damaged by the operation of a motor vehicle upon a public...
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State v. Etzweiler
...harm but was consciously indifferent to that risk. State v. Dodge, 103 N.H. 131, 133, 166 A.2d 467, 468 (1960); State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 234, 84 A.2d 838, 840 (1951) (vehicle must be operated to show a reckless disregard of the consequences); see RSA 626:2, II(c). The forbidden harm may......
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State v. Gallagher
...in this state which determines whether the hit-and-run statute applies to offenses committed upon private property. In State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 84 A.2d 838, it was not disputed that the offense occurred upon a public way and the discussion of the statute in that case was limited to that......
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State v. Strescino
...reckless driving (RSA 262:15 (supp); RSA 262-A:61 (supp)), 'Something more than mere negligence is required however.' State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 234, 84 A.2d 838, 840. 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, s. 972 (1957). See also, Comment, pp. 49-55 in Model Penal Code, s. 201.4 (Tent. D......
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State v. Reynolds, 87-340
..."[s]omething more than mere negligence." State v. Strescino, 106 N.H. 554, 556, 215 A.2d 706, 708 (1965) (quoting State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 234, 84 A.2d 838, 840 (1951)). Culpable neglect is "censorious, faulty or blamable," Mitchell v. Smith, 90 N.H. 36, 38, 4 A.2d 355, 357 (1939); it i......