State v. Southerland, No. 24135

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: RUSHING; CHANDLER, Acting C.J., MOORE, J., and WILLIAM H. BALLENGER and WALTER J. BRISTOW, Jr.
• Citation: 316 S.C. 377,447 S.E.2d 862
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Robert H. SOUTHERLAND, Appellant. . Heard
• Docket Number: No. 24135
• Decision Date: 02 February 1994

Page 862

447 S.E.2d 862 316 S.C. 377 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Robert H. SOUTHERLAND, Appellant. No. 24135. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard Feb. 2, 1994.
Decided Aug. 15, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1994.

Page 865

[316 S.C. 380] Deputy Chief Atty. Joseph L. Savitz, III, of the S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr. and Asst. Atty. Gen. William Edgar Salter, III, Columbia, and Sol. Donald V. Myers, Lexington, for respondent.

RUSHING, Acting Associate Justice:

Robert H. Southerland appeals his death sentence and his convictions of murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and forgery. We affirm.

[316 S.C. 381] I. Facts

On the evening of October 5, 1989, Southerland, Tony Cooper, David Burroughs, and Brenda McLaurin abducted Kim Quinn from her home and drove her to an isolated pond. Cooper and Southerland dragged Quinn from Cooper's car and raped her. Southerland then shot Quinn in the neck, back, and head. Cooper severed Quinn's hands and feet with an axe. Southerland and Cooper then covered Quinn's body with gasoline and debris which they set on fire. The remains of Quinn's body were discovered three days later.

We consolidate Southerland's direct appeal with our mandatory review of his death sentence pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1985).

II. Discussion

A. Jury Selection

1. Batson

Southerland contends that the Solicitor's explanation for striking one black juror was not racially neutral in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We disagree.

Batson prohibits the use of preemptive strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. To sustain a Batson challenge, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the solicitor exercised preemptive strikes on the basis of race. State v. Geddis, --- S.C. ----, 437 S.E.2d 31 (1993). A prima facie case under Batson requires more than a mere showing that the State exercised a strike against a cognizable racial group. See State v. Smith, 293 S.C. 22, 358 S.E.2d 389 (1987). Southerland merely established that the State struck one black potential juror. He did not establish any other circumstances which would raise an inference of discrimination. In fact, the State accepted two black jurors although it did not use all of its peremptory challenges. In addition, the State struck a white alternate and allowed a black alternate to sit. Accordingly, Southerland did not make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination.

Even if Southerland had made a prima facie showing of racial bias, his Batson challenge fails. When a defendant makes a prima facie showing of racial bias, the [316 S.C. 382] burden shifts to the State to articulate a race neutral explanation for the strikes in question. State v. Geddis, --- S.C. ----, 437 S.E.2d 31 (1993). With proper caution, the trial judge held a Batson hearing at Southerland's request even though Southerland did not make the required prima facie showing. The State explained that its investigation of the juror showed that he lied on his juror questionnaire and that his co-employees found him arrogant and untrustworthy. We hold that the State's explanations were racially neutral and, therefore, did not violate Batson.

Page 866

2. Voir Dire Issue

Southerland next contends that the trial judge improperly precluded him from examining individual jurors as to whether they would give special weight to testimony of law enforcement officers. We disagree.

We previously addressed this issue in both State v. Davis, --- S.C. ----, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2355, 124 L.Ed.2d 263 (1993) and State v. Adams, 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E.2d 208, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1023, 104 S.Ct. 558, 78 L.Ed.2d 730 (1983) (overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991)). In both Adams and Davis we held that jurors should not identify credible witnesses before trial; rather, jurors must determine the credibility of witnesses after hearing all the testimony. An inquiry as to the weight a juror would give one kind of witness over another invades the province of the jury to determine credibility in the context of the entire case. Davis, at ----, 422 S.E.2d at 139. Based on our holdings in Davis and Adams, we find that the trial judge did not err in preventing Southerland from questioning jurors as to whether they would give special weight to a police officer's testimony.

B. Guilt Phase

1. Evidence of other crimes

Southerland contends that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence that he stole the shotgun used to kill Quinn from a trailer two weeks before the murder and that he traded the shotgun for drugs the day after the murder. We disagree.

[316 S.C. 383] This Court has abolished in favorem vitae review, and it will only consider issues which are raised by contemporaneous objection or motion. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 60, 406 S.E.2d 315, 324 (1991). Southerland did not object when the State initially presented the evidence in question. Therefore, he has waived his right to raise the issue on appeal. Accordingly, Southerland's claim regarding the evidence is not properly before this Court.

Even if Southerland had preserved his objection to the evidence, the introduction of the evidence at trial was proper. While evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the bad character of a defendant, it may be admissible when it tends to establish (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan, or (5) identity. State v. Johnson, 306 S.C. 119, 125, 410 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1691, 118 L.Ed.2d 404 (1992) (citing State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923)). The evidence showed that Southerland possessed a shotgun at the time of the murder, that the shotgun was the type used to kill Quinn, and that Southerland disposed of the shotgun after the murder. This evidence established identity and a common scheme. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly admitted the evidence.

2. Evidence that other people had a motive to murder the victim

Southerland argues that the trial judge erred by excluding evidence that Quinn was involved in a conspiracy to smuggle drugs into prison. He contends that this evidence would have shown that her co-conspirators had a motive to murder her. Thus, his guilt would have appeared less plausible. We find no error in the trial judge's exclusion of...