State v. Southern Pac. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 March 1929
• Docket Number: No. 3388.,3388.
• Citation: 281 P. 29,34 N.M. 306
• Parties: STATEv.SOUTHERN PAC. CO.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

34 N.M. 306

281 P. 29

STATE

v.SOUTHERN PAC. CO.

No. 3388.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

March 21, 1929.Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1929.

Syllabus by the Court.

Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit, to prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice, to favor public convenience, and to oppose all prejudice to public interests.

Statutes, though imperfect in form, should be upheld and sustained by the courts, if they can be so construed as to give sensible effect and to render them of binding force.

The intention of the Legislature in passing a statute is the primary and controlling consideration in determining its proper construction.

Where the language of a statute is doubtful, or an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its spirit or reason, even though this necessitates the rejection of words and substitution of others.

Chapter 48 of the Session Laws of 1921 interpreted, and held, that the clear and primary intent of the Legislature was that Harding county be thereby created to function from June 10, 1921, as a county; that, in order for it to do so, it was authorized to procure funds by special tax levy or levies, and to anticipate the collection of such tax levy or levies by issuing not to exceed $30,000 of certificates of indebtedness of said county, payable not more than five years after date of issue; that such tax levies, when collected, should be set aside by the county treasurer of said county and used for the payment of said certificates of indebtedness and the interest thereon, and for no other purpose; that the county is authorized, before or after tax levies are made, to anticipate the collection thereof, in order to effectuate the primary intent, object, and purpose of the act; and that the levies as made in this case were authorized by said act.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Laws 1921, c. 48, § 17, creating Harding county and authorizing special tax levy, and anticipation of the collection thereof, in order to effectuate the primary intent, object, and purpose of the act, held not in violation of Const. art. 9, § 10, forbidding county to borrow money, except to erect necessary public buildings or to construct public roads and bridges, in that the Legislature, having power to create new counties, could authorize new county to incur financial obligations necessary to enable it to function as a complete municipal subdivision of the state.

Laws 1921, c. 140, placing limitation on county levies, held inapplicable to levies for the payment of public debt or interest thereon.

Appeal from District Court, Harding County; Kiker, Judge.

Action by the State against the Southern Pacific Company. Judgment for the State, and defendant appeals. Affirmed, and cause remanded.

Where the language of a statute is doubtful, or an adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its spirit or reason, even though this necessitates the rejection of words and substitution of others.

Del W. Harrington, of El Paso, Tex., and E. R. Wright, of Santa Fé, for appellant.

Frank H. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Frank Curns and J. W. Chapman, both of Santa Fé, for the State.

BICKLEY, C. J.

This is a case brought by the state of New Mexico against the Southern Pacific Company, a corporation, in the district court of Harding county, for the collection of certain taxes for the years 1921-1925, inclusive. The complaint alleges that the defendant is a railway company operating a railway between the city of Tucumcari, N. M., and Dawson, N. M., and whose line of railway passes through various school districts of the county of Harding. It further alleges that certain taxes were duly and regularly assessed in Harding county against the Dawson Railway Company, the predecessor of the Southern Pacific Company, for the years 1921-1924, inclusive, and for the year 1925 they were duly and regularly assessed against the Dawson Railway Company and the defendant, Southern Pacific Company; that said taxes covered state, county, school, and municipal taxes, in the amounts shown in the copies of tax statements attached to the complaint; that the total amount so assessed for all of said years aggregated $126,562.86; that the Dawson Railway Company and the defendant, Southern Pacific Company, have paid thereon the sum of $122,281.76, leaving a balance of unpaid taxes in the sum of $4,281.10, together with interest and penalties thereon, as provided by law; that said unpaid taxes were legally and duly incurred and are overdue and delinquent. The prayer is the ordinary prayer for a judgment, and for a declaration of a lien, and an order for the sale of said property in the manner provided by law.

Plaintiff and defendant stipulated the facts contained in the assessment rolls, and said stipulation and facts were made a part of defendant's amended answer. The material allegations of the amended answer are:

Defendant denies that the sum of $4,281.10 was duly, regularly, or legally assessed and levied against the Dawson Railway Company or the Southern Pacific Company, and denies that said sum or any portion thereof is due and unpaid. It affirmatively alleges: That said sum results from certain special levies made in the years 1921-1925, as follows:

Year. Designation. Rate. 1921 Interest and sinking .00124 1922 Interest and sinking county expense debentures, chapter 48, § 17, 1921 Laws .00147 1923 Interest and sinking fund .00159 1924 Interest certificates of indebtedness .00343 1925 Interest on certificates of indebtedness .00342

That said levies and assessments were pretendedly made under the authority of chapter 48, § 17, of the Session Laws of 1921; that said section does not provide for or authorize the making of any such levy for any of said years, for the purpose of paying either principal or interest of any certificates of indebtedness authorized by said section 17; that said certificates of indebtedness were issued in July, 1921, before any levies had been made; that no levies have ever been made for the purpose of meeting the expenses payable for the years 1920-1921 out of the court fund, salary fund, and current expense fund, but that said levies and assessments were made to pay interest and principal of the certificates of indebtedness; that said certificates of indebtedness were issued without authority and are void; that each of said levies and assessments is void and in contravention of the laws and Constitution of the state of New Mexico, and that the property of the said defendant was not, and is not, subject to taxation for or on account of said levies.

Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the amended answer. This demurrer although very specific and quite lengthy, merely presents the question that the facts pleaded in the amended answer, including the facts stipulated, show that the levies and assessments were authorized by law and are valid and regular, and therefore the facts pleaded in this amended answer do not constitute a defense. The trial court sustained the demurrer and gave defendant leave to further plead. Defendant refused to further plead, and the court entered judgment upon the basis of the stipulated facts, and the defendant appealed and assigned as error the ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer.

Appellant contends:

(1) That the levies and assessments are void, because there is no authority, in section 17 or anywhere else in the act, for the levying of any tax to pay interest and principal on the certificates of indebtedness.

(2) That the certificates of indebtedness are void, because issued before a levy was made, and therefore the levy to pay same is void.

(3) That tax statutes must be strictly construed.

We will first consider appellant's contention that tax statutes must be strictly construed. We have no fault to find with this contention, so long as the rule is properly applied in a case calling for its application. It must, however, be borne in mind that this contention is a mere statement of one of the rules of statutory construction, and as such has received wide sanction. Cooley on Taxation, vol. 2 (4th Ed.) §§ 501-505.

[1][2][3][4] It is, however, fundamental that the primary rule in interpreting a statute is to ascertain if possible the legislative intent, and, if the intent is clear, no occasion exists for invoking rules of statutory construction having to do with statutes of a particular class. The foregoing has been well expressed in Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, vol. 2 (2d Ed.) § 363, as follows:

“If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the law-maker. The intent is the vital fact, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. * * * In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and object of the Legislature. * * * If a statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, so that no doubt arises from its own terms as to its scope and meaning, a bare reading suffices; then interpretation is needless. * * * The rules of construction with which the books abound apply only where the words used are of doubtful import; they are only so many lights to assist the court in arriving with more accuracy at the true interpretation of the intention. This is true whether the statute be public or private, general or special, remedial or penal.”

See 25 Ruling Case Law (Statutes) § 216; Territory v. Prather, 18 N. M. 195, 204, 135 P. 83; State v. Llewellyn, 23 N. M. 43, 69, 167 P. 414; De Graftenreid v. Strong, 28 N. M. 91, 94, 206 P. 694; City of Tombstone v. Macia, 30...