State v. Spagnola

• Decision Date: 07 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 101,521.,101,521.
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Shaun Eugene SPAGNOLA, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

289 P.3d 68

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Shaun Eugene SPAGNOLA, Appellant.

No. 101,521.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 7, 2012.

Meryl Carver–Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.

Jodi E. Litfin, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Natalie Chalmers, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, Steve Six, former attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN

, J.:

On review of an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, Shaun Eugene Spagnola seeks reversal of a conviction of possession of methamphetamine, arguing that the district court admitted evidence derived from an unlawful search of his pockets following a traffic stop. We conclude that the search was not consensual under the circumstances and violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protection against unreasonable searches.

On June 3, 2007, Officer Aaron Jones of the Topeka Police Department observed a car drive through an intersection without stopping for a stop sign. Jones activated the lights of his patrol car and signaled the car to pull over to the side of the road. As the car pulled over, it rolled onto the curb and into a grassy area next to the curb and then back off of the curb before coming to a complete stop. Jones saw the driver reach down toward his right side as he pulled over, as if reaching into a pocket or the car console. Jones walked over to the car, and Spagnola, who was driving, presented his driver's license.

Jones returned to his patrol car and, concerned that Spagnola might be armed, requested backup assistance. After the backup officer arrived, Jones returned to Spagnola's car and asked him to step out of the car. As Spagnola was getting out of the car, Jones asked him whether he had anything illegal in his possession. Spagnola replied that he was working on a computer monitor for a friend and he thought the monitor might have been stolen. Jones saw a small clip-on knife protruding from one of Spagnola's pant pockets, and he removed the knife and then asked him whether he had anything illegal on his person. Spagnola said, “Other than a knife, no.” Jones informed him that the knife was not illegal and inquired about drugs, knives, guns, needles, “or anything like that.”

After Spagnola said that he did not have any illegal items on his person, Jones asked, “Is it okay if I search your pockets?” Spagnola said, yes. Jones then asked Spagnola to turn around, place his hands behind his back, and interlace his fingers. Jones again asked for permission to search his pockets, and Spagnola again consented.

Spagnola was wearing cargo shorts with numerous pockets. In a zipper pocket behind the right cargo pocket Jones found two baggies of what appeared to be methamphetamine and a third baggie containing what appeared to be methamphetamine residue. Jones read Spagnola his Miranda rights and put him in handcuffs. The contents of the baggies were subsequently identified as methamphetamine.

The State filed a complaint charging Spagnola with one count of possession of methamphetamine and one count of failure to stop at a stop sign. Spagnola filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and all statements that he made after the evidence was seized. The district court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the motion. Immediately before trial, Spagnola filed a renewed and more extensive motion to suppress, which the district court, following oral argument, also denied.

Following a bench trial, the judge found Spagnola guilty of both counts. The court sentenced Spagnola to a fine of $60 for failing to stop at a stop sign and a suspended sentence of 11 months' imprisonment with a supervised postrelease period of 12 months for the possession of methamphetamine conviction. Spagnola timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that he had failed to preserve the suppression issue for appellate review. The Court of Appeals went on to note in dicta that even if the issue had been preserved, there was “ample basis” for denying the motions to suppress, State v. Spagnola, No. 101,521, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2010 WL 597004, at *2 (Kan.App.2010)

(unpublished opinion). This court granted review under K.S.A. 20–3018(b).

Preservation

[1]

Two witnesses testified at trial: Brad Crow, a forensic chemist for the KBI, and Aaron Jones, the police officer who searched and arrested Spagnola. Their testimony was presented without objection, but Spagnola objected to the introduction of Crow's lab report and the introduction of the three plastic baggies “on the grounds of our motion to suppress.” The objections were overruled. The majority of the Court of Appeals panel found that Spagnola asserted his objections too late in the course of the witnesses' testimony to allow appellate review.

The general rule is that the failure of a party to make a specific contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence or testimony at trial precludes review of the admissibility of that evidence or testimony on appeal. K.S.A. 60–404

; see State v. Gaona, 293 Kan. 930, 956, 270 P.3d 1165 (2012).

In State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 204 P.3d 585 (2009)

, this court reiterated its commitment to the contemporaneous objection requirement. The court noted that the purpose of the requirement is to give the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial without exposure to tainted evidence, thus avoiding possible reversal, and the rule is also necessary to ensure that litigation may be brought to a conclusion. King, 288 Kan. at 342, 204 P.3d 585.

In State v. Bogguess, 293 Kan. 743, 747, 268 P.3d 481 (2012)

, however, this court relaxed the objection requirement in the specific context of a bench trial on stipulated facts when the same judge presides over the hearing on the motion to suppress and conducts the trial:

“When a bench trial consists solely of stipulated facts, there is no opportunity for the defendant to make a contemporaneous objection at trial to the admission of specific evidence. And when the bench trial is conducted by the same judge who presided over the hearing on the motion to suppress, there is no reason to rehash the same arguments when no additional evidence has been presented. The lack of a contemporaneous objection does not bar our review under these circumstances.” (Emphasis added.)

In Bogguess, 293 Kan. at 747, 268 P.3d 481,

the court cited with approval State v. Parson, 226 Kan. 491, 493–94, 601 P.2d 680 (1979). In Parson, the court noted that the contemporaneous objection rule is relaxed to fit particular trial situations, including trials to the court rather than to a jury. Because the trial court and opposing counsel were informed of the appellant's objections to the evidence in his argument on the motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, the court and the State had sufficient notice of the specific objections prior to the trial court's decision. Parson, 226 Kan. at 493–94, 601 P.2d 680

.

The Parson

court in turn cited State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643, 652, 549 P.2d 886 (1976), where this court held:

“Ordinarily, failure to make timely, specific objection to the admission of evidence will bar consideration of the admissibility question on appellate review. [Citations omitted.] Here, the appellant's objection was not ‘timely’ in the strict sense, but there is no doubt the district court was apprised of the issue before it rendered its decision.... What transpired is consistent with the rationale underlying the contemporaneous objection rule— i.e. [,] objecting to admissibility and stating the grounds therefor permits the court to preclude improper evidence from affecting the decision. This was a trial by the court; no jurors had been swayed by the improper evidence. The court had not rendered its decision when the issue was raised, and we think under the circumstances of this case the spirit if not the letter of the contemporaneous objection rule was satisfied.”

[2]

In the present case, the trial court explicitly stated it understood that any future objections would be based on its ruling on the suppression issue and that the issue was clear. Although the court directed Spagnola to make specific contemporaneous objections, it did not repeat that requirement when it denied Spagnola's second suppression motion immediately before trial.

The same judge twice ruled on the suppression issue and then conducted the trial. As Judge Malone pointed out in his Court of Appeals dissenting opinion in Spagnola, 2010 WL 597004, at *2,

the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule was fulfilled without necessitating repeated interruptions of the trial. Furthermore, Spagnola interposed timely objections when the State sought to introduce physical evidence at the trial. For these reasons, we deem the suppression issue adequately preserved for appellate review.

The Constitutionality of the Search

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

In appeals of suppression issues, this court reviews the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision for substantial competent evidence and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts de novo. The ultimate determination of the suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate review. The State bears the burden to demonstrate that a challenged search or seizure was lawful. When the parties do not dispute the material facts, the suppression question is solely one of law. State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 676, 682, 246 P.3d 678 (2011).

The trial court held that a chain of events, starting with Jones' traffic stop and suspicion that Spagnola was intoxicated, led to a proper stop, the detention of Spagnola, and the request for consent to search his pockets. The Court of Appeals agreed. Spagnola, 2010 WL 597004, at *2

.

The Court of Appeals did not address, however, whether the search as carried out was...