State v. Sparkling

• Decision Date: 29 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. WD 73737.,WD 73737.
• Citation: State v. Sparkling, 363 S.W.3d 46 (Mo. App. 2011)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Clifton S. SPARKLING, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

363 S.W.3d 46

STATE of Missouri, Appellant,

v.Clifton S. SPARKLING, Respondent.

No. WD 73737.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Nov. 29, 2011.Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 31, 2012.

Application for Transfer Denied

May 1, 2012.

Mark A. Richardson, Cole County Prosecuting Attorney, Anji Gandhi and Sarah V. Hamilton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellant.

Margaret M. Johnston, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Respondent.

Before Division II: MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge, and JOSEPH M. ELLIS and VICTOR C. HOWARD, Judges.

MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge.

Pursuant to section 547.200.1(3),¹ the State of Missouri filed this interlocutory appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri (“trial court”), granting Clifton S. Sparkling's (“Sparkling”) motion to suppress statements. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background²

On June 16, 2010, Barret Wolters, a detective with the Jefferson City Police Department, met with Sparkling, at Sparkling's request, at the Jefferson City Police Department. Sparkling had been arrested and was in custody. The interview lasted almost two hours and was recorded by a surveillance camera. Thereafter, Sparkling was indicted on four felony charges: forcible rape, § 566.030; forcible sodomy, § 566.060; kidnapping, § 565.110; and armed criminal action, § 571.015. Sparkling filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Wolters, asserting that he made them without having first been advised of his constitutional rights and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights.

At the hearing on Sparkling's suppression motion, Detective Wolters testified that before he interviewed Sparkling, he read Sparkling the Miranda³ warning,⁴ using the police department's “Statement of Rights” form. There are blank lines before each of the Miranda rights listed on the form where the person in custody can initial. Detective Wolters did not ask Sparkling to initial them (and Sparkling did not initial those lines), but he did direct Sparkling to sign the form and Sparkling complied with the detective's directive without reading the form. Detective Wolters asked Sparkling if he understood his rights, but the detective did not recall how Sparkling expressed his understanding. The detective stated that he had no way of knowing if Sparkling understood them. Fortunately, there is a videotape of the Miranda portion of the interview with Sparkling. That videotape was introduced into evidence and has also been provided to this court as part of the record on appeal. As reflected in the trial court's order, the trial court viewed the videotape. We, too, have examined the videotape footage before arriving at our conclusion.

The video reflects that Sparkling was in custody, handcuffed, and present in an interrogation room with Detective Wolters. The video reflects that Detective Wolters read Sparkling his Miranda rights. However, when Detective Wolters asked Sparkling if he understood his rights, Sparkling made no audible reply or any physical gesture indicating he understood his rights. ⁵ Undaunted, Detective Wolters slid the Miranda form over to Sparkling and instructed him to “sign right there.” Detective Wolters did not ask Sparkling if he was able to read, nor did Detective Wolters suggest to Sparkling that he could take the time to read the form Sparkling was signing—a form confirming that Sparkling had, in fact, read the form. The video reflects that the only thing Sparkling did in response to the directive from Detective Wolters was to sign the form where Wolters told him to sign. The video clearly reflects that Sparkling did not read the form he was instructed to sign by Detective Wolters. The trial court correctly noted in its order that while the Miranda waiver form states, “I have read (or been read) the above statement of my rights and I understand each of those rights, as indicated by my initials,” Sparkling did not initial on any of the lines next to the enumerated rights.

In its order, the trial court concluded that the State had not carried its burden to prove that Sparkling waived his Miranda rights with the full awareness of the nature of the rights he was abandoning and the consequences of such abandonment. The trial court noted that the State was relying on Sparkling's signature on the form as evidence that he understood his rights, but that such conclusion was inconsistent with the statement purportedly ratified by the signature, “as indicated by my initials,” because there were no initials. The trial court concluded, “Either [Sparkling] 1) signed the form, not understanding what it said; or 2) signed the form, indicating that he had read or been read the enumerated rights, but did not initial each line, which by the plain language of the form, negates the conclusion that he understood each of those rights.”

The trial court found that the State made no record that Sparkling understood his rights: “There is no indication that [Sparkling] could read and write English. [Sparkling] was not invited to read the statement and was not given time to read the form. He did not verbalize his understanding of the rights. He simply signed where he was told to sign.” The trial court ordered Sparkling's statements suppressed because the State failed to show that his custodial statements were made as a result of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

The State filed this interlocutory appeal.

Standard of Review

“A trial court's order suppressing evidence is entitled to interlocutory appeal under section 547.200.1.” State v. Wilson, 169 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo.App. W.D.2005). Our review of a trial court's order sustaining a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether or not substantial evidence supported the ruling. Id. The trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous and leaves us with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id. We consider all the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.

Analysis

In its sole Point, the State asserts that the trial court clearly erred in sustaining Sparkling's motion to suppress because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, under the totality of the circumstances, Sparkling understood and voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and that an accused must receive specific warnings that he or she has the rights to remain silent and to receive assistance of counsel before and during questioning. A statement obtained from an accused during custodial interrogation is admissible only if the State establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused validly waived the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). To establish that an accused has validly waived his or her Miranda rights, the State must demonstrate “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. On review, “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (internal quotation omitted).

The waiver inquiry “has two distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). “First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. “Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. “Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).

The voluntariness of Sparkling's waiver was not at issue.⁶ As the trial court correctly acknowledged, this was not a case where law enforcement engaged in intimidation, coercion, or deception. Rather, Sparkling asserted that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.

The issue before us is whether the State met its burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Berghuis v. Thompkins, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2261, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168, 107 S.Ct. 515). “If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.” Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602). “The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.” Id. Only where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and it was fully understood by the accused, does an accused's uncoerced statement establish an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. Id. at 2262.

The State contends that Sparkling's Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent based upon the totality of the circumstances because he was read his Miranda rights; it was apparent during the interview that he wrote, spoke, and understood English; he signed the Miranda form; he spoke intelligently about his case, he contemplated getting an attorney, he attempted to deflect blame from himself to his co-defendant, he...