State v. Spearin

• Decision Date: 31 May 1984
• Citation: 477 A.2d 1147
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Nelson SPEARIN.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1147

477 A.2d 1147

STATE of Maine v. Nelson SPEARIN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 15, 1983.

Decided May 31, 1984.

David M. Cox, Dist. Atty., Gary F. Thorne, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Bangor, for plaintiff.

Steven C. Fletcher (orally), Rockland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN and GLASSMAN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A.R.J.

McKUSICK, Chief Justice.

After a jury trial in Superior Court (Penobscot County) defendant Nelson Spearin was convicted for arson, Class B, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 802 (1978), ¹ conspiracy to commit arson, Class C, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 151 (1983), and solicitation of arson, Class C, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 153 (1983). On appeal to the Law Court, ² defendant sets forth eight separate arguments, claiming error relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, the conduct of the proceedings, the sufficiency of the indictment for solicitation, and the constitutionality of his conviction for both arson and conspiracy to commit arson. We conclude that defendant's convictions did not result from any reversible error, and therefore we deny his appeal.

The evidence adduced at trial may be summarized as follows: On July 5, 1977, a fire took place in defendant's house at 67 Taylor Street in Lincoln. The State's first witness, Ronald McComb of the Lincoln Fire Department, arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 11:00 p.m. After the fire had been brought under control, McComb entered the house to take photographs. There he observed burn damage in a downstairs room, in an upstairs room, and in the crawl space separating the two rooms. In the downstairs room McComb observed rags and papers piled on top of a bureau.

Fire Investigator John Stevens of the State Fire Marshall's Office visited the scene of the fire three days later. In the back room of the house he observed a cardboard box containing burnt rags and papers, sitting on a bureau. Like McComb, Stevens saw burn damage on the wall adjacent to the bureau, in the crawl space above it, and in the upstairs room. Stevens stated that the bureau was the low point of the burn and the likely point of origin. He also found down-burning on the flooring timbers in the crawl space, which he testified was consistent with the fire having burned for a long period of time or having been accelerated in the crawl space by means of a flammable liquid. Testifying as an expert in arson investigation, Stevens gave his opinion, arrived at through a process of eliminating possible alternatives, that the fire was of human origin.

Several other witnesses testified as to inculpatory statements purportedly made by defendant following the fire. Peter and Holly Quirion, acquaintances of defendant, both testified that in May of 1978 defendant admitted to them that he was responsible for the fire. Another witness, Linda Crosby, testified that on several occasions after the fire she heard defendant tell her boyfriend, one James Hamilton, that he would pay Hamilton for setting the fire just as soon as he received the insurance money. Trooper Ronald Graves of the Maine State Police testified that defendant told him, "I burned--I mean ... my house burned and I'm waiting for money for that." Finally, Anne Neaher testified that a few days prior to the fire defendant and James Hamilton visited her home and offered her husband, Marshall Neaher, money if he would burn defendant's house.

Robert Neal, an insurance agent, testified that 13 days before the fire defendant had come to Neal's office to request that Neal transfer the ownership of the insurance policy on the house from his mother's name to his own. He also asked for an increase in the amount of coverage and for coverage for the contents of the house. After the fire defendant filed a claim under the insurance policy.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Corpus Delicti. The State's burden of establishing corpus delicti is twofold. The State must produce 1) sufficient credible evidence exclusive of any admission or confession of the defendant as will "create a substantial belief that the crime has been committed by some person," and 2) sufficient evidence on the whole record to establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d 160, 164-65 (Me.1983). Defendant contends that the State satisfied neither of these standards.

The degree of proof of the corpus delicti exclusive of the defendant's statements need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 165; State v. Snow, 438 A.2d 485, 487 (Me.1981). The necessary quantum of proof is less than a "fair preponderance of the evidence" and resembles the probable cause standard. State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d at 165; State v. Snow, 438 A.2d at 487; State v. Ames, 388 A.2d 94, 96 (Me.1978); State v. Atkinson, 325 A.2d 44, 45 n. 1 (Me.1974). If properly admitted, Fire Inspector Stevens' opinion testimony that the fire was of human origin provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's determination that the State had met its initial corpus delicti burden.

Defendant challenges both Stevens' competence to give expert testimony and the basis for his opinion that the fire was of human origin. Stevens testified that at the time of the trial, some five years after the fire, he had been with the State Fire Marshall's Office for eight years. He stated that at the time of the fire he had served as chief investigator in "possibly a hundred or more" fires and had received three weeks of classroom training. Prior to joining the State Fire Marshall's Office, Stevens had served as a firefighter with the Orono Fire Department for six years, during which he had received at-the-scene training by fire investigators. While we agree with defendant that Stevens' record of formal instruction was limited we cannot say that the presiding justice committed an abuse of discretion in permitting Stevens to testify as an expert in arson investigation. See State v. Anderson, 434 A.2d 6, 9 (Me.1981); State v. Elwell, 380 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1977).

Defendant also challenges the basis of Stevens' conclusion that the fire was of human origin. After identifying the bureau top as the likely point of origin, Stevens reached the conclusion that the fire was caused by a human being through a deductive process of eliminating natural and accidental causes. Stevens testified that through his investigation he was able to rule out spontaneous combustion, storage of flammable liquids, lightning, and a woodstove or kitchen range as possible causes of the fire. A representative of Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, who testified just prior to Stevens, stated that there was no electrical service to defendant's house at the time of the fire. By eliminating all natural and accidental causes in the area of origin, Inspector Stevens concluded that the fire was intentionally set.

We have in the past approved the admission of expert opinion as to the origin of fires based on the process of elimination. See State v. Elwell, 380 A.2d 1016; see also State v. Spearin, 463 A.2d 727, 729, 731 (Me.1983). However, defendant strenuously urges, on the basis of our opinion in State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 419, 424-26 (Me.1981), that the process of elimination was a legally deficient method for determining the cause of the fire in this case. In Howes, the fire inspector, who was the same John Stevens, did not visit the scene of the fire until 14 months after it occurred, and by that time the area was completely burned out and overgrown. He acknowledged that he was unable to determine the fire's point of origin and that he had not investigated several incendiary materials present at the scene. We found that under those circumstances the process of elimination was a legally deficient basis for the conclusion that the fire was of human origin, and we held that the State had not carried its overall burden of proving the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 425.

Here, by contrast, Stevens visited the fire three days after it occurred, was able to identify the likely point of origin, and was able to eliminate the natural and accidental causes in the area of origin. While there is room in the record to question Stevens' conclusions, such questions go to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See State v. Spearin, 463 A.2d at 731. We find that the inspector did have a sufficient basis to support his belief that the fire was intentionally set. ³

When defendant's inculpatory statements are included, there can be no doubt but that on the record as a whole the State met its burden of establishing the corpus delicti of arson beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d at 164. Four different witnesses testified as to statements made by defendant admitting responsibility for the fire.

2. Solicitation. Defendant also claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction for solicitation. Under Maine law a person is guilty of solicitation

if he commands or attempts to induce another person to commit murder or a particular Class A or Class B crime, whether as principal or accomplice, with the intent to cause the commission of the crime, and under circumstances which the actor believes make it probable that the crime will take place.

17-A M.R.S.A. § 153(1). Count III of the indictment, tracking the language of this provision, charged defendant with soliciting Marshall Neaher to commit the crime of arson. On appeal defendant claims that the State introduced no evidence from which the jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's offer to pay Marshall Neaher a sum of money to burn defendant's house was made under circumstances that defendant believed made "it probable that the crime would take place."

The principal evidence relating to the charge of solicitation was the testimony of Anne Neaher, Marshall Neaher's estranged wife. She testified that shortly before the fire, Marshall, who was then living in New...