State v. Spears, 12908

• Decision Date: 20 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12908,12908
• Citation: 647 A.2d 1054,36 Conn.App. 106
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut, v. Lake SPEARS.

Page 1054

647 A.2d 1054

36 Conn.App. 106

STATE of Connecticut, v. Lake SPEARS.

No. 12908.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 28, 1994.

Decided Sept. 20, 1994.

Richard D. Haviland, New London, for appellant (defendant).

C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., with whom was Sarah E. Steere, Certified Legal Intern, for appellee (State).

Before LANDAU, SPEAR and CRETELLA, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the state of Connecticut has acquired criminal jurisdiction over the Mashantucket Pequot Indian reservation in Ledyard. The defendant, Lake Spears, was charged by a substitute information ¹ with committing various crimes while on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the charged offenses were allegedly committed on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation. ² The trial court denied that motion, and rendered a judgment of conviction following the defendant's plea of nolo contendere to the charges of interfering with a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, and disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53a-182. The defendant's plea was entered conditional on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. ³

The following facts are not in dispute. The Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe is a federally recognized tribe that owns and occupies a tribal reservation containing approximately 1800 acres in Ledyard. The defendant is a member of the Narragansett Indian tribe, and not a member of the Mashantucket Pequot tribe. ⁴ On November 29, 1991, in response to a telephone call, State Trooper Robert Maynard was dispatched to investigate a disturbance at 8 Elizabeth George Drive, a residential address on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation. Maynard was assisted by Ledyard town constables Sergeant David Guiher and Officers John Craig and William Blanchette. As a result of actions by the defendant, he was arrested by Maynard and Craig, charged, and ultimately presented before the Superior Court. At the time of the defendant's arrest and presentment, he was "an Indian in Indian territory." After the trial court found the defendant guilty on the plea of nolo contendere, the defendant appealed. ⁵

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1983 ⁶ (Settlement Act) effected a complete grant of criminal jurisdiction over the Mashantucket Pequot reservation to the state in that it (1) found that the plain meaning of § 6 of the Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1755, ⁷ fully subjects the reservation to state criminal jurisdiction, and (2) found that the Mashantucket Pequot tribe has consented to state criminal jurisdiction.

The state asserts that it possesses criminal jurisdiction over the Mashantucket Pequot reservation pursuant to an express grant by Congress in § 6 of the Settlement Act. The state does not claim that the tribe is divested of self-government, or that the tribe cannot enact tribal laws that govern the conduct of tribal members, or that the tribe lacks power to enforce such laws. ⁸

The parties in this matter are in the curious position of agreeing on the issue, the general principles of law, the relevant authorities and the primary facts. Where the parties differ is on the result that is rendered after the facts are applied to the law.

The defendant claims that the state lacks jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by Indians while on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation. The state and the defendant agree that states do not have jurisdiction over Indian country unless Congress has specifically authorized such jurisdiction. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). They disagree, however, in regard to the application of § 6 of the Settlement Act. Specifically, they disagree on the issue of whether § 6 vests the state with jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians on the Mashantucket Pequot tribe's reservation.

We agree with the defendant, and we arrive at our conclusion by way of the following statutory path. Section 6 of the Settlement Act, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1755, addresses the issue of the state's jurisdiction over the Mashantucket Pequot tribe. This statute refers to portions of title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326. The dispute in the present case concerns the impact of 25 U.S.C. § 1755 on §§ 401 and 406 of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a) and 1326, respectively. Specifically, the issue before us is whether 25 U.S.C. § 1755 vests the state with criminal jurisdiction over the Mashantucket Pequot tribe notwithstanding the provision contained in 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a), which otherwise requires that a tribe manifest its consent to jurisdiction prior to a state's assumption of jurisdiction.

We begin our analysis by examining the well established principles that govern state jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. ⁹ "Criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in 'Indian country' ... is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, ¹⁰ state, and tribal law." ¹¹ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Negonsott v. Samuels, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 1121, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993). "As a practical matter, this has meant that criminal offenses by or against Indians have been subject only to federal or tribal laws ... except where Congress in the exercise of its plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs has 'expressly provided that State laws shall apply.' " (Citation omitted.) Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 746, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). "When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2584, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980).

In 1953, pursuant to its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress enacted Public Law 83-280, ¹² the first federal jurisdictional statute of general applicability to Indian reservation lands; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2106, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), and "the primary expression of federal policy governing the assumption by States of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations." Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 884, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2309, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986) (Three Tribes II ). The primary purpose of the act was to address the "problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement." Id.; Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, 439 U.S. at 471, 99 S.Ct. at 746; H.R.Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1953). Other purposes of the act were "to [promote] the gradual assimilation of Indians into the dominant American culture and [ease] the fiscal and administrative burden borne by the Federal Government by virtue of its control over Indian affairs." Three Tribes II, supra, 476 U.S. at 886, 106 S.Ct. at 2310; Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. at 387-88, 96 S.Ct. at 2110; H.R.Rep. No. 848, supra, 3, 6.

Section 2 of the act ¹³ embodied the provision for state criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on reservations. Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, at 380, 96 S.Ct. at 2107. It effected an immediate grant of criminal jurisdiction over Indian country to five states. ¹⁴ To the remaining states, it provided an option to assume jurisdiction over criminal offenses in Indian country "without consulting with or securing the consent of the tribes that would be affected." Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, 439 U.S. at 473-74, 99 S.Ct. at 748. Section 7 of the act established a procedure by which all other states could obtain civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes: "The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof." See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, at 474 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 748 n. 9; Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Connecticut, Inc. v. Potter, 217 Conn. 612, 622, 587 A.2d 139 (1991).

In 1968, Congress enacted title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act, ¹⁵ which repealed § 7 of Public Law 83-280. Title IV requires that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 144, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2272, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984) (Three Tribes I ). "The impetus for the addition of a consent requirement in the 1968 amendments was congressional dissatisfaction with the involuntary extension of state jurisdiction over Indians who did not feel they were ready to accept such jurisdiction, or who felt threatened by it." Three Tribes II, supra, 476 U.S. at 892, 106 S.Ct. at 2314, citing S.Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1967). Section 401 of title IV, ¹⁶ which addresses the subject of criminal jurisdiction over Indian country, provides: "The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which could be affected by such...