State v. Spears

• Citation: 567 A.2d 1245,20 Conn.App. 410
• Decision Date: 26 December 1989
• Docket Number: No. 7117,7117
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. William Charles SPEARS.

Page 1245

567 A.2d 1245

20 Conn.App. 410

STATE of Connecticut v. William Charles SPEARS.

No. 7117.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 17, 1989.

Decided Dec. 26, 1989.

Pamela J. Bristol and Michael J. Lefebvre, Certified Legal Interns, with whom were Richard Emanuel, Branford, Timothy H. Everett and, on the brief, Michael R. Sheldon, and Todd D. Fernow, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Julia DiCocco Dewey, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John Connelly, State's Atty., and Bradford Ward, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before BORDEN, SPALLONE and FOTI, JJ.

BORDEN, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of the lesser included offense ¹ of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(3), ² as an accessory pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-8. ³ The defendant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He claims that the trial court erred (1) in unconstitutionally diluting the state's burden of proof and the presumption of innocence in its instructions to the jury, (2) in relieving the state of its burden of proof and invading the jury's factfinding function by referring in its jury instructions to the state's principal witness as an accomplice, and (3) in violating the defendant's rights to a trial by jury and due process of law by repudiating the jury's verdict and imposing a sentence based on its own factual determination regarding charges of which he was acquitted. We find no error.

The state's principal witness was Valerie Carson, the daughter of the victim. Carson had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in connection with her mother's death, and testified against the defendant.

The state presented the following evidence. The defendant and Carson had known each other since grammar school, and were intimate friends from December, 1984, until April, 1987. In February, 1986, the defendant introduced Carson to crack cocaine. By February, 1987, she and the defendant had expensive crack habits for which she bore the primary financial burden, spending as much as $1000 per weekend. Carson's salary was inadequate to cover these expenses, and in order to finance their drug habits, she began pawning her personal possessions, borrowing money and writing bad checks. She also made a fraudulent attempt to obtain a home improvement loan secured by the residence that she owned jointly with her mother, she was unsuccessful. Carson's failure to obtain the loan, compounded by the defendant's anger toward her for failing to obtain the money, made her despondent and resulted in a suicide attempt.

Carson testified that the defendant repeatedly told her that he could "take care" of her mother "in a heartbeat," which he told her meant death by strangulation. If her mother were dead, Carson anticipated that she would receive $10,000 as beneficiary of an insurance policy, and would obtain full ownership of the house. She also testified that the defendant brought rubber work gloves from his workplace in preparation for the strangulation.

On the evening of the homicide, Carson took her mother's checkbook and forged a check to obtain cash to buy crack for herself and the defendant. Later that evening, she met Larry Leach, a mutual acquaintance of her and the defendant. Leach testified that he and Carson smoked numerous vials of crack, that Carson drove him to the defendant's apartment, that Carson then drove him and the defendant to the victim's house, and that Carson entered the house alone. Further, Leach testified that while he and the defendant were in the street, Carson reappeared at the door wearing gloves and holding a knife, and called for the defendant to enter the house alone. Leach testified that he left the scene after the defendant entered the home.

Carson testified that she and the defendant had agreed that she would distract her mother with a knife while the defendant would render her unconscious by striking her and that he would then strangle her. She also testified that in the actual execution of the plan, the defendant grabbed the victim from behind, tried to hit her on the head with a candleholder, choked her, commanded Carson to stab her, and that the defendant aided Carson in the stabbings by placing his hand over hers to assist in driving the knife into the victim. The defendant also repeatedly stabbed the victim with a second knife.

Carson also testified that after the homicide, she and the defendant ransacked the house to simulate a burglary, and that the defendant attempted to start a fire by pouring alcohol on the victim's face and lighting it. There was independent forensic evidence that the victim's face was stained with rubbing alcohol.

The defendant and Carson then left the scene and returned to his apartment, where they removed their outer clothing and discarded it in a sewer along with the victim's purse and checkbook. Their planned alibi was that they had spent the evening together at the defendant's apartment. The next morning, Carson returned home, purported to "discover" the body and ran to a neighbor to notify the police. Carson testified further that while she was incarcerated for the homicide of the victim, she received letters from the defendant wherein he professed his love for her, suggested that she not inform the police of his involvement and indicated that his fate was in her hands.

The defendant testified that he did not join in any plan to kill the victim. He also testified that when Carson called him into the victim's house, he followed her into the kitchen, where he saw the victim on the floor with blood on her face and head. He testified that he then ran outside and vomited.

The jury acquitted the defendant of the crime of murder as charged, both as a principal and as an accessory, and of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as a principal. The jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as an accessory. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred in providing an instruction to the jury that unconstitutionally diluted both the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction at issue is as follows: "It is the sworn duty of the courts and jurors to safeguard the rights of persons charged with crime by respecting the presumption of innocence which the law imputes to every person so charged and by making the state meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but you must keep in mind that those rules of law are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty. If and when the presumption of innocence has been overcome by evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the crime charged, then it is your sworn duty to enforce the law and to render a verdict of guilty." (Emphasis added.)

The defendant challenges the propriety of the language emphasized above. He argues that by instructing the jury that "those rules of law are made to protect the innocent and not the guilty," the court improperly instructed the jury that neither the presumption of innocence nor the reasonable doubt standard protects the guilty and innocent alike. We disagree.

Because the defendant failed to raise this claim at trial, we undertake a limited review of the record to determine whether the record supports his claim. State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 388-89, 556 A.2d 112, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989), citing State v. Bailey, 209 Conn. 322, 329-30 n. 4, 551 A.2d 1206 (1988) (in determining whether the record supports a constitutional claim for the purpose of Evans review, it must be shown that the claim is truly of constitutional proportions and not simply characterized as such by the defendant). We conclude that the defendant's claim falls short of Evans review; State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 327 A.2d 576 (1973); for want of support in the record. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 10 Conn.App. 302, 306-307, 523 A.2d 891, cert. denied, 204 Conn. 805, 528 A.2d 1152 (1987).

Our Supreme Court has consistently rejected challenges to jury instructions with language very similar to that challenged in this case. See State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 14, 28, 505 A.2d 690 (1986); State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 168-69, 491 A.2d 1075 (1985); State v. Just, 185 Conn. 339, 352-53, 441 A.2d 98 (1981); State v. Jonas, 169 Conn. 566, 578, 363 A.2d 1378 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 1132, 47 L.Ed.2d 331 (1976); State v. Guthridge, 164 Conn. 145, 154, 318 A.2d 87 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 988, 93 S.Ct. 1519, 36 L.Ed.2d 186 (1973); State v. Cari, 163 Conn. 174, 180-81, 303 A.2d 7 (1972). Those cases hold that an instruction that the law is made to protect society and the innocent and not the guilty, does not dilute the presumption of innocence when it is "used in conjunction with a clear instruction both as to the presumption of innocence and as to the duty of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's guilt...." State v. Palmer, supra, 196 Conn. at 168, 491 A.2d 1075.

We perceive no difference between those cases and this case, where the reasonable doubt standard is also linked to the challenged instruction. As long as the challenged instruction is used together with clear instructions on both the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard, "such language is both proper and correct." Id. Where both the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard are linked with the challenged instruction, the use of clear instructions on these "logically similar" concepts; see State v. Coleman, 14 Conn.App. 657, 669, 544 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 815, 546 A.2d 283 (1988); eliminates any risk that the jury will believe it is free to disregard those concepts in reaching its verdict.

In this...