State v. Speed

Decision Date14 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. 43,786-KA.,43,786-KA.
Citation2 So.3d 582
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Samuel Lynn SPEED, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Annette Roach, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.

Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Catherine M. Estopinal, Geya D. Williams Prudhomme, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.

Before STEWART, CARAWAY and MOORE, JJ.

CARAWAY, J.

Samuel Lynn Speed was convicted by a jury of aggravated second degree battery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7, and adjudicated a second felony habitual offender. He received a sentence of 16 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension. Speed appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm the conviction and, as amended, affirm the sentence.

Facts

On March 9, 2006, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Sheteda Johnson was asleep in the home she occupied with her three children and Samuel Speed, her boyfriend. Johnson was sleeping alone in her bedroom when she was awakened by the feel of something hot on her skin. She jumped out of bed and ran into the hallway screaming, attempting to remove her shirt to get the hot substance, which was later identified as grease, away from her skin. Johnson ran in one direction down the hallway, but turned and ran toward her children's bedroom, which was next door to her bedroom. The children were attempting to exit the room as Johnson tried to enter it. They saw the injuries to their mother and took her across the street to Johnson's mother's house, where an ambulance was called. Speed was standing in the hallway where the bedrooms were located during some portion of these events. He made no move to help the victim or to contact emergency services for her.

The victim was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed with second and third degree burns on her face, back, shoulders and right hand. For six to seven months following the incident, the victim made regular visits to a doctor to check her injuries. She lived with her mother for two to three months following the incident because she needed help bathing and changing her bandages. During her trial testimony, Johnson was asked to remove her shirt so that she could show the jury the extent of her injuries. Despite defense counsel's objection, the victim was permitted to do so.

Johnson testified that she loved Speed and believed that he did not intend to hurt her. She stated that the state pursued the charges against her will. Johnson testified that Speed claimed he had tripped over something on the bedroom floor, accidentally spilling the grease on her. Johnson also testified that she believed Speed when he told her that he was taking the hot grease to throw it in the commode in the bathroom. The grease had been sitting on their stove in the kitchen. She acknowledged, however, that there was no bathroom in her bedroom and it would have been unnecessary for the defendant to enter that room to throw hot grease into the commode. She also admitted that the grease had been solidified when she had earlier asked Speed to dispose of it. Johnson testified that anyone coming from the kitchen would pass the bathroom before getting to the bedroom where she slept. Johnson also admitted that she and Speed had a "discussion" several weeks before the incident in which Speed accused her of having an affair.

On cross-examination, Johnson testified that the incident could have been an accident, although she wondered why he had come into her room with hot grease. She admitted giving a statement in an affidavit concerning her belief that the incident was an accident. She also stated in the affidavit that she had forgiven Speed and wanted him to go on with his life.

Officer Chad Dailey of the Shreveport Police Department investigated the incident and spoke briefly to Johnson as she was being treated in the ambulance. He believed her to be in shock when he spoke to her, but she told him that "while she was sleeping her live-in boyfriend had thrown hot grease on her while she was sleeping in the bed." Dailey also spoke to the victim's neighbor, Jesse Ray Murray. Dailey testified regarding what Murray told him as follows:

he stated that over the past several days he had had a couple of conversations with the defendant in which the defendant had told Mr. Murray that he felt like the victim was having an affair on him. And Mr. Murray said that the defendant had said that a few days prior he had a pot of boiling water on the stove and was waiting for her to come home and he was going to throw the water on her. Mr. Murray told me he was able to talk him out of that incident.

Dailey was later called on the morning of the crime, and told that Speed was at the patrol desk to turn himself in.

Jean Johnson, Johnson's mother, testified that her doorbell rang at approximately one in the morning and when she answered it her daughter was "standing there with her arms away from her like this and she was covered in oil." Jean Johnson further testified that her daughter said, "Why did he do this to me?" She knew her daughter was referring to Speed.

Finally, Jesse Ray Murray, the neighbor of Johnson and Speed, was called to testify. Murray did not witness the incident, but walked outside after he heard the arrival of the ambulance. Murray had spoken to the defendant a couple of days before the incident. Murray described the conversation as follows:

Q: What did Samuel Speed tell you about Sheteda?

A: Well, came over and said something was going on, you know, with her.

Q: Okay. If you could be specific to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury as to what he said.

A: He was saying that something is going on, I think he had just got out the hospital or something. Anyway he said that what he was going to do was get him some hot water and throw on her.

Q: Okay. Did he say why he was going to do that?

A: Well, what he said was cause I think it's some kind of fidelity (sic) between her and some other guy cheating or something there going on

* * *

Well, he said he had some hot water on the stove at that present time that he was going to throw on her whenever she came back to the house.

* * *

Okay. What I told him was, I said, man, look, if it's that bad what you need to do is get your stuff and leave.

Murray indicated that a similar discussion between Speed and himself also occurred the next day.

When asked on cross-examination why Murray did not tell Johnson or her mother about the threats made by Speed, Murray responded:

Well, because I felt that it was enough — it wasn't enough to we — hadn't nothing really happened. People will talk when they angry, upset, so I took it for granted that that's more or less, course see, I wasn't going to get really going to get involved in it cause, see, they could have just went on back home tonight and made it up and got up and forgot all about it. [sic]

Murray was also asked repeatedly about an incident involving Speed's dog. Murray testified that Speed and Johnson were out of town between 3 and 6 months before the present incident and their dog got out of their backyard and attempted to attack him. Murray shot once at the ground near the dog, but it kept advancing on him, so he shot and killed the dog. He then notified Speed and Johnson.

A six-person jury unanimously found Speed guilty as charged of aggravated second degree battery on March 22, 2007. Motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal were subsequently filed and denied by the court. The state filed a habitual offender bill of information and the district court adjudicated Speed a second felony offender.

At the end of the habitual offender proceeding and prior to sentencing, Johnson, Merita Starks, Speed's daughter, and Speed testified. After hearing testimony from these witnesses regarding the accidental nature of the incident and the hardship that Speed's incarceration would cause, the trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to 16 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Speed appeals his conviction and sentence.

Discussion

Speed argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the state failed to prove he had the requisite intent to commit a battery upon the victim. Speed contends that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and that Johnson believed the incident was accidental. Speed urges that Murray's testimony was unreliable because Murray could not remember certain events and there was tension in the relationship between Speed and Murray after Murray shot his dog.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; State v. Murray, 36,137 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/29/02), 827 So.2d 488, writ denied, 02-2634 (La.9/05/03), 852 So.2d 1020. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La.2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517; State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Hill, 42,025 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied, 07-1209 (La.12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529; State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La.App. 2d...

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