State v. Spencer

• Decision Date: 01 December 1942
• Parties: STATE v. SPENCER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

29 A.2d 398

20 N.J.Misc. 487

STATE

v. SPENCER.

Special Statutory Tribunal of New Jersey.

Dec. 1, 1942.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Gordon Spencer was convicted of cruelly abusing and needlessly killing one alley cat by beating it with a stick, and his application for review of the conviction was granted by a special statutory tribunal.

Reversed.

James A. Breslin, Asst. Pros, of Pleas, of Lyndhurst, for complainant.

Herbert F. Myers, Jr., of Hackensack, for defendant.

DEL MAR, Judge.

The defendant was tried and convicted in the First Criminal Judicial District Court of the County of Bergen on a complaint alleging that he did, "Cruelly abuse and needlessly kill one alley cat by beating it with a stick."

The complaint charges that the defendant committed a misdemeanor and alleges facts which if true would constitute a violation of R.S. 4:22-17, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17. He waived indictment and trial by jury, pled not guilty and was tried and convicted by the judge of the aforesaid court. The defendant has taken the steps required by statute to have the conviction and the proceedings leading to it reviewed by me sitting as a statutory tribunal. There were returned to me copies of the complaint, warrant, commitment and record of conviction, together with a state of the case certified by the judge of the lower court.

Twenty reasons were advanced why the conviction should be reversed, only two of which need to be noticed: First, that the lower court erred in denying defendant's motion to "dismiss the complaint" at the end of the State's case; second, that there was no evidence justifying defendant's conviction.

No objection was made to the procedure adopted, and at the hearing the so-called state of the case was considered by both sides as a part of the record returned to me, nevertheless, because the matter appears not to have had judicial consideration, I consider it advisable to offer some comments on what the procedure should be and the nature of the review or appeal.

My jurisdiction over the review is set forth in R.S. 2:214-14 et seq., N.J.S.A. 2:214-14 et seq. Section 14 provides that the "Judge of the court of quarter sessions * * * may order the complaint and warrant, commitment and record of conviction to be brought forthwith before him for review."

It also provides, if the conviction is for a criminal offense, that due notice shall be given to the prosecutor of the pleas. Section 15 provides, "If an appeal shall be taken from, or an order of review or a writ of certiorari allowed upon, a judgment in a cause tried in a criminal judicial district court, a transcript of the proceedings and testimony made by the stenographer designated pursuant to section 2:212-18 shall be certified by the judge as the state of the case, to be used on the hearing of the appeal, review or certiorari."

Section 16 provides, "If, upon a review of a conviction in a criminal judicial district court under authority of section 2:214-14 of this title, the complaint, warrant, commitment and conviction shall be found to be illegal, the same shall be forthwith set aside, and the person so convicted shall either be discharged from custody or remanded for a new trial in such criminal judicial district court."

In my judgment the foregoing provisions are ambiguous. Sections 14 and 16 taken together would indicate that my authority was limited to a strict review of the legality of the complaint, warrant, commitment and conviction. Section 15 indicates that where a stenographer is used in the court below, a stenographic transcript shall be returned as a part of the state of the case and that the review is in the nature of an appeal. No provision is made for a return of a transcript or certification of the testimony where no stenographer is appointed.

At common law it was the practice of magistrates to keep a docket in which was set forth the names of the witnesses and a summary of the testimony given by each. The record returned in this case includes such a summary of the testimony, and in the absence of any objection I have considered it as part of the state of the case.

Criminal judicial district courts, organized under the statute, are courts of record; R.S. 2:212-5, N.J.S.A. 2:212-5, and the judges thereof have the power, to make such rules and regulations as shall be necessary for the orderly conduct of the business and proceedings of his court; R.S. 2:214-1, N.J.S.A. 2:214-1. So far as I have been able to learn, no such rules and regulations have ever been adopted, nor has the court of quarter sessions of this county, nor any judge thereof, ever made any rules or regulations governing reviews or appeals from such courts.

The criminal judicial district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of quarter sessions and special sessions to try all misdemeanors, other than high misdemeanors, where such misdemeanors are committed within the limit of the judicial district in which such criminal court is established, and the person or persons charged with any such offense shall in writing waive indictment and trial by jury; see R.S. 2:213-2, N.J.S.A. 2:213-2. A trial such as therein provided for is akin to a trial by the judge of the court of special sessions. If the case at bar had been tried before a judge of the court of special sessions, the defendant, upon conviction, would by virtue of R.S. 2:195-16, N.J.S.A. 2:195-16, have the right to the benefit of a review of the entire record of the proceedings, in addition to the procedure provided for by a strict writ of error. This latter statute was in effect at the time of the passage of the original act under which the criminal judicial district courts were organized.

It is quite evident that one of the purposes in creating criminal judicial district courts was to lift from the judges of the court of special sessions some of the burden of disposing of cases in those courts. It would be anomalous if, in two courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the defendant in special sessions should have the benefit, if he so desires, of a review of the entire record and that he should not have the same benefit if the case was tried in a criminal judicial district court. An interpretation of the various acts hereinbefore referred to which would bring about that result should not be given unless it is clear that the legislature so intended. The very paucity of description of the review in the Criminal Judicial District Court Act suggests that the legislature had in mind that the review by a judge of the court of quarter sessions was but a step in the procedure outlined by the Criminal Procedure Act. Furthermore, R.S. 2:214-15, N.J.S.A. 2:214-15, indicates...