State v. Spieler

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Carl William SPIELER, Sr., aka Carl Spieler, aka Carl W. Spieler, aka Carl William Spieler, Defendant-Appellant.
• Citation: 460 P.3d 535,302 Or.App. 432
• Docket Number: A167909
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 26 February 2020

302 Or.App. 432

460 P.3d 535

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Carl William SPIELER, Sr., aka Carl Spieler, aka Carl W. Spieler, aka Carl William Spieler, Defendant-Appellant.

A167909

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Submitted November 26, 2019.

February 26, 2020

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Neil F. Byl, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Sercombe, Senior Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for, among other offenses, two counts of attempted second-degree assault, ORS 161.405 ; ORS 163.175 (Counts 1 and 2), and two counts of attempted assault of a public safety officer, ORS 161.405 ; ORS 163.208 (Counts 3 and 4).¹ As explained further below, the conduct underlying defendant’s convictions on Counts 1 through 4 involved defendant accelerating his car directly at two law enforcement officers who were standing somewhere between a "car length" and 20 feet in front of defendant’s car.

In his first four assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 1 through 4, because the state failed to "offer sufficient evidence to prove that defendant personally intended to injure the officers." We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to infer that defendant intended to injure the officers. That was not the only permissible inference, but it was one permissible inference. See State v. Bivins , 191 Or. App. 460, 467, 83 P.3d 379 (2004) ("[T]he established facts may support multiple reasonable inferences and, if they do, which inference to draw is for the jury to decide."). We therefore reject the first four assignments of error without further discussion.²

In his fifth assignment of error, defendant argues that the "trial court erred in basing its decision to convict defendant of [Counts 1 through 4] on an incorrect understanding of the law: that a person cannot accelerate his or her car at somebody without having the intent to cause that person physical injury." Furthermore, defendant contends that the trial court erred because it convicted defendant of Counts 1 through 4 after determining that defendant acted "with reckless disregard for the safety of the officers when he drove his car towards them in an effort to escape," but that for a person to "attempt" an assault, the person must act with the intent to cause physical injury.

As explained below, we disagree with defendant that the trial court based its decision to convict defendant on a conclusion that, as a matter of law , "a person cannot accelerate his or her car at somebody without having the intent to cause that person physical injury." We also disagree with defendant that the trial court determined that defendant was acting with mere "reckless disregard for the safety of the officers when he drove his car towards them in an effort to escape," rather than an intent to cause them injury. Accordingly, we affirm.

"We review for legal error whether the trial court properly construed a statute and applied a correct legal theory of criminal liability."

State v. Chandler , 293 Or. App. 705, 707, 430 P.3d 186 (2018). The historical facts relevant to our analysis of this appeal are undisputed.

Sergeant Castilleja and Officer Gaston arrived at an apartment complex to arrest defendant on a felony warrant. The officers saw defendant walk out of the apartment complex towards a car. Castilleja made eye contact with defendant and told him to stop and that he was under arrest. Defendant ran to his own car, got inside, and locked the doors. Castilleja and Gaston drew their guns and shouted at defendant to get out of the car. Castilleja broke the back passenger-side window with the butt of his gun and reached inside the car to unlock the front door. Defendant put the car in reverse in order to exit his parking space, forcing the officers to move out of the way to avoid being struck by the car.

After defendant exited the parking space, the officers positioned themselves somewhere between a "car length" and 20 feet in front of defendant’s car, such that the officers were standing between the front of defendant’s car and the exit to the parking lot. Castilleja was in front of the center of defendant’s car, while Gaston was slightly to one side, in front of the car’s passenger side tire. Both officers pointed their guns at defendant’s car and ordered him to stop.

Defendant looked at Castilleja, made eye contact with him, and then shifted his gaze to what Castilleja described as "looking through" him. Defendant then quickly accelerated directly toward Castilleja and Gaston. Castilleja "darted" or "jumped" out of the way, and "just barely cleared the car as it was going past." Gaston also managed to move out of the way. Defendant’s car missed hitting Castilleja by less than three feet and missed Gaston by 5 to 10 feet. Defendant did not try to avoid hitting the officers, but also did not swerve in an attempt to hit the officers after they moved out of the way. Had the officers been unable to move out of the way, they would have been struck by defendant’s car.

Defendant kept accelerating as he drove out of the parking lot. The officers decided not to pursue defendant, but instead notified dispatch. After a series of police pursuits involving other officers, defendant was apprehended and arrested. Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted second-degree assault, two counts of attempted assault of a public safety officer, and various other offenses.³

As relevant here, the two counts of attempted second-degree assault and the two counts of attempted assault of a public safety officer alleged, in relevant part, that defendant "did unlawfully and intentionally attempt to cause physical injury."

Defendant waived his right to a jury, opting instead for a bench trial. In their opening statements, the parties outlined their theories of the case with respect to the attempted-assault charges. Both parties recognized that, in order to convict defendant on those charges, the court would have to find that he intended to physically injure the officers when he was accelerating toward them. The state argued that, when defendant accelerated at the officers, he intended to get away but also specifically intended to injure the officers. Defendant argued that he only intended to get away and never intended to injure the officers.

With the case so teed up, the state put on its evidence, establishing what had physically occurred during the incident, which defendant did not dispute. As for defendant’s intent when he was accelerating toward the officers, the evidence was, not surprisingly, circumstantial. In closing, both parties argued to the trial court as factfinder about what inference it should draw, pointing to aspects of the evidence that favored their respective positions. Echoing the opening arguments, the state urged the court to find that defendant intended both to get away and to injure the officers, while defendant urged the court to find that he intended only to get away and did not intend to injure the officers. Defendant essentially admitted that he acted recklessly but argued that the court should not—or even could not—find from the evidence that he affirmatively intended to injure the officers.⁴

As soon as the parties finished closing arguments, the court rendered its verdict—guilty on all counts—and stated as follows regarding the attempted-assault counts:

"Pretty much all I’ve thought about this morning is the only issue that is in any sort of dispute today, and that is what was going on in your head at the time that you accelerated your vehicle with two law enforcement officers standing directly in front of you.

"[The prosecutor] says that that amounts to intent. You’ve heard your attorney argue, very strongly and—and very well, that your purpose was to simply get away. And no doubt that your first motive was to get away.

"I don’t believe that had the officers not been standing in front of your car would you have made an effort to try to run over them. But that’s not the facts of this case. The facts of this case [are that] they were standing in front of your car, you clearly knew that they were there, and that you accelerated your car directly toward them.

"And the car is a dangerous weapon and had one of them not gotten out of the way, I think it’s pretty clear that there is an excellent chance that you would be looking at a second-degree assault and hopefully not a first-degree assault because that would have resulted in them being hurt very badly.

"So the question for me is can you drive your car directly at two people and say that [i]t was not my intent to cause them injury. That certainly was a risk that you were prepared to accept that they would be injured.

"* * * * *

"And my final determination is you cannot drive your car directly at somebody accelerating and say it wasn’t my intent to cause them an injury.

"So I’m finding you guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the Attempted Assault in the Second Degree. And for the same reasons, I’m finding you guilty of 3, 4."

Defendant contends that, in finding him guilty for the stated reasons, the trial court improperly conflated recklessness with intent. As previously noted, it is undisputed that the state had to prove that defendant intended to injure the officers and that it would not be enough for the state to prove that he recklessly put them at risk of injury. See State v. Tapp , 110 Or. App. 1, 5, 821 P.2d 1098 (1991) (one cannot "attempt" a crime involving recklessness). Relying on the court’s speaking verdict, defendant argues that, "instead of concluding that defendant personally intended to injure the...