State v. Spivey

Decision Date18 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 143PA15.,143PA15.
Citation368 N.C. 739,782 S.E.2d 872
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
Parties STATE of North Carolina v. Jacob Mark SPIVEY.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Brent D. Kiziah, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

NEWBY, Justice.

In this case we decide whether an indictment charging defendant with injury to real property "of Katy's Great Eats" is fatally flawed because it does not specifically identify "Katy's Great Eats" as a corporation or an entity capable of owning property. An indictment for injury to real property must describe the property in sufficient detail to identify the parcel of real property the defendant allegedly injured. The indictment needs to identify the real property itself, not the owner or ownership interest. By describing the injured real property as "the restaurant, the property of Katy's Great Eats," the indictment sufficiently identifies the crime being charged. Because it gives defendant reasonable notice of the charge against him and enables him to prepare his defense and protect against double jeopardy, the indictment is facially valid. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue.

The State presented evidence at trial that showed that on 11 January 2013, defendant was at a restaurant called "Katy's Great Eats" to sing karaoke. When defendant went outside to the patio to smoke a cigarette, another patron, Christina Short, made a joke about President Obama and mocked defendant for voting for him. Defendant did not respond and went back inside the restaurant to eat his food. Approximately ten minutes later, as defendant was leaving the restaurant and walking to his car, Ms. Short made another derogatory comment toward him. Defendant again did not respond. Instead, angered by Ms. Short's comments, defendant got into his car, backed it across the parking lot, and drove it straight into the patio area of the restaurant where Ms. Short and other patrons stood. The car crashed into the front window and outside wall of the restaurant before stopping. Defendant attempted to flee in his car, but police stopped him a short distance away. Defendant admitted to police that he drove his car into the restaurant with the intent to hurt Ms. Short, but he denied trying to kill her.

A grand jury returned six bills of indictment for a variety of charges stemming from the incident, including attempted first-degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, felony hit and run, injury to real property, reckless driving to endanger, and eleven counts of assault with a deadly weapon. The indictment in Case Number 13CRS050341 stated:

I. The jurors for the State upon their oath present that ... the defendant ... unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did fail to immediately stop the vehicle the defendant was driving at the scene of an accident and collision in which the defendant was involved. This accident and collision occurred at Katy's Great Eats 1054 S. College Rd, Wilmington, North Carolina and resulted in injury to a person, to wit: Christina Marie Short. The defendant knew and reasonably should have known that the vehicle that the defendant was operating was involved in the accident and collision and that the accident and the collision had resulted in injury to a person, to wit: Christina Marie Short.
II. The jurors for the State upon their oath present that ... the defendant ... unlawfully and willfully did wantonly damage, injure and destroy real property, front patio, façade, and porch of the restaurant, the property of Katy's Great Eats.
III. The jurors for the State upon their oath present that ... the defendant ... unlawfully and willfully did operate a motor vehicle on a public vehicular area without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger persons or property.

At the close of the State's evidence at trial, defendant moved to dismiss several charges, including Count II in the above indictment for injury to real property. Defendant argued that the indictment failed to allege "Katy's Great Eats" was a legal entity capable of owning property and that the proper legal name of the corporate entity is "Katy's Great Eats, Inc." The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant did not present any evidence.

During closing argument, defense counsel admitted that defendant was at "Katy's" on the night in question, that Ms. Short insulted defendant on two separate occasions, and that defendant subsequently drove his car into "Katy's bar." Defendant's primary defense was that his conduct was not deliberate or premeditated; rather, he drove his car into the restaurant with the general intent to hurt, not kill, Ms. Short. In fact, defense counsel not only admitted that defendant drove his car into "Katy's bar," but also asked the jury to find defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, felony hit and run, and, significant here, injury to real property. Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, six counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and one count each of felony hit and run, reckless driving to endanger, and injury to real property.

The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's conviction for injury to real property and remanded the matter for resentencing. State v. Spivey, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 769 S.E.2d 841, 844 (2015). The Court of Appeals concluded that Count II of the indictment charging injury to real property "is invalid on its face" because it "does not contain any allegation that the victim, ‘Katy's Great Eats,’ is a legal entity capable of owning property, and the name ‘Katy's Great Eats' does not otherwise import a corporation or other entity capable of owning property." Id. at ––––, 769 S.E.2d at 844. We allowed the State's petition for discretionary review.

It is well settled "that a valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an accused for a felony." State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 308, 283 S.E.2d 719, 729 (1981) (citations omitted). The Criminal Procedure Act of 1975 (1975 Act) requires that an indictment contain "[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant ... of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation." N.C.G.S. § 15A–924(a)(5) (2015). The 1975 Act was intended "to simplify criminal proceedings." State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436, 333 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1985). Under this statutory framework,

it is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands of the State with technical rules of pleading; rather, its purposes are to identify clearly the crime being charged, thereby putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it and prepare for trial, and to protect the accused from being jeopardized by the State more than once for the same crime.

Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 311, 283 S.E.2d at 731 (citation omitted). An indictment must allege "all the essential elements of the offense endeavored to be charged," State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 267, 582 S.E.2d 593, 600 (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 327, 77 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1953) ), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985, 124 S.Ct. 44, 156 L.Ed.2d 702 (2003), but it is generally sufficient if couched in the language of the statutory offense, State v. Williams, ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 781 S.E.2d 268, 272 (2016) ("[T]his Court has acknowledged the general rule that an indictment using ‘either literally or substantially’ the language found in the statute defining the offense is facially valid and that ‘the quashing of indictments is not favored.’ " (quoting State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 681, 365 S.E.2d 579, 582 (1988) )).

Here defendant was charged with injury to real property under section 14–127, which makes it a crime to "willfully and wantonly damage, injure or destroy any real property whatsoever, either of a public or private nature." N.C.G.S. § 14–127 (2015). Count II of defendant's indictment specifically alleges that he "unlawfully and willfully did wantonly damage, injure and destroy real property, front patio, façade, and porch of the restaurant, the property of Katy's Great Eats." The indictment mirrors the language of the controlling statute, and the description of the real property as "the property of Katy's Great Eats" clearly identifies the specific parcel of real property defendant allegedly injured. It is clear from the transcript that there was no confusion or controversy at trial regarding which establishment defendant damaged. Consequently, the indictment sufficiently advised defendant of the conduct that is the subject of the accusation.

Ideally, an indictment for injury to real property should include the street address or other clear designation, when possible, of the real property alleged to have been injured; however, under N.C.G.S. § 15A–925, had defendant been confused regarding which parcel of real property he was accused of injuring or "need[ed] more information to mount his preferred defense, he [could have] ‘request[ed] a bill of particulars to obtain information to supplement the facts contained in the indictment.’ " State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299, 310–11, 758 S.E.2d 345, 353 (2014) (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 210, 321 S.E.2d 864, 872 (1984) ).

Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that we should treat indictments charging injury to real property no differently than indictments charging crimes involving personal property, such as larceny, embezzlement, or injury to personal property. In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied on its own ...

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  • State v. Mostafavi
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
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    ...for trial, and to protect the accused from being jeopardized by the State more than once for the same crime." State v. Spivey , 368 N.C. 739, 742, 782 S.E.2d 872, 874 (2016) (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 311, 283 S.E.2d 719, 731 (1981) )."An indictment must allege all the esse......
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