State v. Spooner

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CALOGERO; LEMMON; COLE; MARCUS, J., concurs for reasons assigned by COLE; WATSON, J., concurs but notes that he agrees with COLE; COLE; DENNIS
• Citation: State v. Spooner, 520 So.2d 336 (La. 1988)
• Decision Date: 18 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-KK-0892,87-KK-0892
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Norman J. SPOONER. 520 So.2d 336, 56 U.S.L.W. 2482

Page 336

520 So.2d 336

STATE of Louisiana v. Norman J. SPOONER.

No. 87-KK-0892.

520 So.2d 336, 56 U.S.L.W. 2482

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 18, 1988.

Opinion Assigning Additional Reasons

Feb. 4, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1988.

John M. Crochet, Public Defender's Office, Lake Charles, for relator.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Richard Ieyoub, Dist. Atty., Saundra M. Isaac, and Elizabeth S. McCall, Asst. Dist. Attorneys, for respondent.

CALOGERO, Justice.

After Norman Spooner pled guilty to possession of controlled dangerous substances that were found during a search of his vehicle by state police, the state sought a court order forfeiting Spooner's ownership of the vehicle and cash money found on his person at the time of his arrest. Applying the provisions of La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 32:1550 (West Supp.1987), the trial court ordered forfeiture of the vehicle and the money. In so ruling, the trial court expressly relied on La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c), which provides that money seized in close proximity to illegal controlled substances shall be presumed to be forfeitable contraband unless the owner thereof proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. After the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's forfeiture order, ¹ we granted Spooner's application to consider the ruling of the courts below. ²

Today we hold that the statutory presumption embodied in La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) is invalid because it infringes upon due process rights and property interests protected by the Louisiana constitution. We also find that the provision which requires the claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the money is not contraband violates due process protections afforded by the United States Constitution. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the court of appeal insofar as they allowed the forfeiture of currency which was found on defendant's person at the time he was arrested for possession of controlled dangerous substances, and remand the case for a new trial so that the state may have the opportunity to prove, without the benefit of the presumption, that the currency is contraband. However, we affirm the judgments of the courts below to the extent that they allowed the forfeiture of the vehicle operated by defendant at the time of his arrest, because we find that the state sufficiently proved that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband within the meaning of La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(5) and R.S. 1550(C)(3).

The central issue presented by this case is whether the property owner may be required to prove at a forfeiture proceeding that money found on his person at the time of his arrest is not contraband. After reviewing pertinent provisions of the state constitution and our holding in State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La.1983), we conclude that the property owner cannot be required to disprove a presumption that his property is contraband. Instead, the state must bear the burden of proving that the seized property is contraband.

In so holding we do not reach the additional issue raised by the parties as to whether the state must prove the grounds supporting forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt. ³ There is divided sentiment among the members of this Court as to whether the state should be required to prove the grounds for forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether it should be allowed to utilize a less exacting standard, such as proof by clear and convincing evidence or by simply a preponderance of the evidence. For reasons more fully delineated below, we conclude that this case does not present the appropriate vehicle for the resolution of that issue.

Because we affirm the trial court's ruling that the state proved the grounds for forfeiture of the automobile beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not consider here whether proof under a lesser standard would have been sufficient. Similarly, because the state failed to provide any evidence that the seized currency was contraband, we are not called upon to decide whether, hypothetically, the state could have satisfied its evidentiary burden on this issue by proof short of the reasonable doubt standard. Instead, we focus herein on the threshold question of which party must bear the burden of proof in a forfeiture proceeding, and in the process we take the opportunity to expound upon the important constitutional considerations which apply to this area of law.

(I) FACTS

While on routine patrol on I-10 near Lake Charles, State Trooper Scott Havens observed a 1980 Toyota Celica with an expired California license plate. After learning by radio that the vehicle was registered to one Frank Spooner, the trooper signaled its driver to pull over to the side of the roadway and stop. The driver complied, and stepped out of his vehicle. Trooper Havens approached and inquired as to his identity.

The driver did not profess to be the owner of the vehicle. He identified himself as Ernest Narcisse, produced a California driver's license in that name, and told the officer that the car was owned by Frank Spooner. "Narcisse" claimed that he was driving the car to California as a favor to Spooner, who resided in that state. Trooper Havens became suspicious when the driver could furnish neither the car's registration papers nor an address or phone number at which Spooner could be reached in California. He requested permission to search the vehicle, and after obtaining the driver's written consent, he radioed for assistance. Another state trooper arrived on the scene and the search of the vehicle began.

During the course of the search, the officers discovered two sets of scales, on which there was a residue of cocaine, and assorted pills, some of which were controlled dangerous substances. The driver was advised of his Miranda rights and placed under arrest. Confronted with a second driver's license discovered in the interior of the car, the driver admitted that his name was indeed Frank Spooner and that he was the owner of the automobile. Approximately $1,400 in cash was discovered in Spooner's back pocket during the pat-down that followed his arrest.

Spooner subsequently pled guilty to four counts of possession of controlled dangerous substances. Thereafter, the state filed a petition under R.S. 32:1550 seeking forfeiture of the cash and automobile. ⁴

(II) FORFEITURE: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Before discussing and analyzing the actions of the courts below, it is helpful to review at the outset the provisions of the controlled dangerous substances forfeiture statute which are at issue in this case. La.R.S. 32:1550(A) provides that certain property "shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture" if that property is used to facilitate the transportation, sale, possession or manufacture of controlled dangerous substances. The statute classifies property that is used for such an illicit purpose as "contraband."

It is important for the purpose of statutory construction to distinguish between the two generic categories of property which may be classified as "contraband." Items, the possession of which is intrinsically illegal, such as illegal narcotics, are categorized as contraband per se. Things which are subject to forfeiture because they are the immediate instrument of a crime, but the possession of which is not intrinsically illegal, such as automobiles, guns and currency, are considered derivative contraband. See State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140, 144 (La.1983). While this generic distinction is not made when the word "contraband" is used in R.S. 32:1550, for purposes of clarity we refer to these terms hereafter whenever necessary to distinguish between these items (contraband per se and property which may be considered derivative contraband).

In order to obtain the forfeiture of any type of derivative contraband, the statute requires a showing that "the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or that the contraband was intended for commercial sale." La.R.S. 32:1550(C)(3). The state must also prove that the seizure was constitutional, or was based upon reasonable grounds for the investigating officer to believe that the seizure was constitutional. R.S. 32:1550(C)(1).

With respect to the forefiture of an automobile or any other type of conveyance, the state must also show that the owner was "knowingly and intentionally" a consenting party or privy to a violation of the state's drug laws. Sec. 1550(C)(2). Further, it must be demonstrated pursuant to Sec. 1550(A)(5) that the vehicle was used or intended to be used to transport or in any manner facilitate the transporting, sale, receipt, possession, manufacture, compounding, dispensation or concealment of illegally acquired controlled dangerous substances.

Money which is seized incident to the enforcement of the state's drug laws may also be subject to forfeiture. Sec. 1550(A)(3) classifies as contraband all cash used to facilitate the transportation, sale, manufacture and possession of controlled dangerous substances. Sec. 1550(A)(7)(a) further provides that anything of value furnished or acquired in exchange for a controlled dangerous substance, including all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, is considered forfeitable contraband. Finally, Sec. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) provides that currency seized in close proximity to illegal drugs or paraphernalia is presumptively contraband:

There shall be a rebuttable presumption that all moneys, coin, and currency seized incident to a valid arrest and found in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances or contraband manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia or records of the illegal importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled dangerous substances, are contraband as defined herein. The burden of proof shall be upon claimants of such property to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

Having reviewed the provisions of La.R.S. 32:1550 which are pertinent to this case, we now turn to...