State v. Spotted Horse, 16644

Citation462 N.W.2d 463
Decision Date04 October 1990
Docket NumberNo. 16644,16644
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Peter SPOTTED HORSE, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota

John P. Guhin, Deputy Atty. Gen., Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Atty. Gen. (on brief), Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

Randolph J. Seiler of Seiler & Cain, Mobridge, for defendant and appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

Peter Spotted Horse, Jr. (Spotted Horse) appeals 1 a judgment rendered on a jury verdict convicting him of driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (DUI) and failure to display current registration. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

On April 1, 1988, Spotted Horse, an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe who resided on the reservation, was driving off the reservation in the town of Mobridge, South Dakota. His car was not displaying valid 1988 license plate stickers, in violation of SDCL 32-5-98 (a Class 2 misdemeanor). Seeing this violation, Mobridge City Police Officer Roger Krone (Krone) attempted to stop the vehicle by turning on the red revolving light on top of his patrol car. This attempted stop occurred within the boundaries of the municipality of Mobridge.

Spotted Horse did not stop. Instead, he drove across the Missouri River bridge and onto the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation (reservation). Krone continued the pursuit with his siren running and red light flashing. The chase reached speeds ranging from 90 mph to 109 mph. 2 Spotted Horse proceeded north on Highway 1806, driving seven or eight miles onto the reservation. Spotted Horse then turned off of Highway 1806 and drove within the city limits of the town of Wakpala, then into a housing area, and onto a private driveway or yard. Krone continued following Spotted Horse the entire time, never losing sight of him.

Once Krone exited his police car, Spotted Horse began to drive away again. Krone ran to the vehicle, reached inside and shut off the ignition. There were two adults and two children in the car. Krone informed Spotted Horse that he did not have "current [license] plates" on his car and told him numerous times to get out of the car. Spotted Horse refused. Krone started pulling on Spotted Horse's arm to extract him from the car. The ensuing struggle went on for anywhere from five to fifteen minutes during which time Krone struck Spotted Horse three or four times with his nightstick, several of the blows hitting Spotted Horse in the head and cheek. Finally, Krone pulled Spotted Horse from the car by his hair or his left shoulder and upper arm, threw him to the ground on his stomach, put his knee on his back and handcuffed him. Following the handcuffing, Krone lifted Spotted Horse by the arms and placed him in the police car.

Spotted Horse was then taken back to Mobridge. On the ride back, Krone noticed the smell of alcohol on Spotted Horse's breath. After arriving back at the station in Mobridge, Krone administered the field sobriety test to Spotted Horse, which he failed. Following the test, Krone arrested Spotted Horse for DUI and read him the implied consent warnings. Spotted Horse agreed to take a blood test and was taken to the Mobridge Hospital for the extraction of blood. The BAC was 0.244.

Spotted Horse was charged with five counts: (1) eluding police in violation of SDCL 32-33-18 (Class 1 misdemeanor); (2) driving while under the influence in violation of SDCL 32-23-1 (Class 1 misdemeanor); (3) resisting arrest in violation of SDCL 22-11-4 (Class 1 misdemeanor); (4) driving without a license in violation of SDCL 32-12-22 (Class 2 misdemeanor); and (5) failure to display current registration in violation of SDCL 32-5-98 (Class 2 misdemeanor). After a jury trial, Spotted Horse was convicted of Counts 2 and 5, driving under the influence and failure to display current registration. He was acquitted of Counts 1 and 3, eluding police and resisting arrest. 3

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the State had jurisdiction to try an Indian who committed a misdemeanor off the reservation, but who fled to the reservation and was arrested by a municipal police officer on the reservation?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not suppressing evidence of unrelated crimes where the defendant alleged use of excessive force in making the arrest?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to suppress the blood test given to defendant because the blood was extracted by an LPN with expanded training?

ANALYSIS

We begin by discussing the appropriate standard of review. The jurisdictional challenge raised by this appeal involves the application and effect of SDCL 1-1-18 and 1-1-21, and procedural compliance with Public Law 280. Because issues regarding the removal of constitutional disclaimers of state jurisdiction are questions of state law, they are reviewed de novo by this court. See Brown v. Egan Consol. School Dist. # 50-2, 449 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1989); Beville v. University of S.D. Bd. of Regents, 420 N.W.2d 9 (S.D.1988). However, the question of substantive compliance with PL 280, i.e., the validity of retrocession of PL 280 jurisdiction, is a question of federal law. Tyndall v. Gunter, 840 F.2d 617, 618 (8th Cir.1988). With these standards in mind, we begin with Spotted Horse's argument that State lacked jurisdiction to make arrests on the reservation.

1. Jurisdiction

To understand our ultimate conclusion, it is necessary to briefly retrace the intermittent nature of state jurisdiction over reservations. In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280, 4 which gave disclaimer 5 states, such as South Dakota, statutory power to assume and exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations if they passed legislation to accept jurisdiction. State v. Onihan, 427 N.W.2d 365, 367 (S.D.1988). Though South Dakota made efforts to pass legislation in 1957 and 1959 to fulfill this mandate, the legislation was ultimately ineffective. See In re High Pine, 78 S.D. 121, 99 N.W.2d 38 (1959); 1951 S.D. Sess. L. ch. 187; 1957 S.D. Sess. L. ch. 319; 1959 S.D. Sess. L. ch. 144, Secs. 1, 2.

Then, in 1961, South Dakota passed SDCL 1-1-18 6 and SDCL 1-1-21, 7 wherein the legislature conditioned acceptance of civil and criminal jurisdiction on federal reimbursement. An exception was provided, however, whereby the State assumed jurisdiction over criminal offenses and civil causes of action on the highways without the requirement of federal reimbursement. The validity of this legislation is the lynchpin of this decision. Following the 1961 legislation, we held that these statutes were ineffective because the State could not assume partial jurisdiction over Indian country. See In re Hankins, 80 S.D. 435, 125 N.W.2d 839 (1964). We then changed course for partial jurisdiction on the highways in Onihan, supra, after the United States Supreme Court held that the state of Washington had validly assumed partial jurisdiction over reservations in the case of Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979).

Now, we must reconsider our position again in light of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 900 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.1990). Rosebud reversed the district court's decision which had sustained the state's exercise of jurisdiction over highways running through reservations in the state, on two principal grounds. First, the 1961 legislation did not validly retrocede jurisdiction to the State within the terms of PL 280. The Rosebud court found that our decision in Onihan had misinterpreted Yakima, thereby improperly overruling the Hankins decision that the State lacked PL 280 jurisdiction. Speaking of the differences between the assumption of jurisdiction in Yakima versus our legislature's actions, the Eighth Circuit stated:

The major concerns reflected in the passage of PL 280 were (1) to reduce the economic burden of federal jurisdiction over reservations, (2) to respond to a perceived hiatus in law enforcement on reservations, and (3) to assimilate Indians into the general population. Yakima, 439 U.S. at 498 .

We believe South Dakota's limited excursion into the area of Indian jurisdiction is not responsive to the concerns underlying the passage of PL 280. Jurisdiction over highways does not go very far in reducing lawlessness on reservations, but simply introduces a third party to the already complex jurisdiction pattern on reservations. It also does little to reduce federal presence on reservations since the federal government retains the financial burden of the majority of jurisdictional concerns. The Washington statute, which left open the possibility of complete jurisdiction upon tribal consent, reflected an acceptance of the burden of jurisdiction, as well as an attempt to accommodate tribal self-governance. The state's partial jurisdiction assumption here represents the contrary result. We believe that the failure to assume jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the purposes of PL 280 is not sufficient "action within the terms of the offer made by Congress to the States in 1953."

900 F.2d at 1170-71 (footnotes omitted).

Second, the Eighth Circuit found that Congress, by amending PL 280 in 1968 8 and requiring tribal consent to any new assumption of jurisdiction, vested the interests of the tribes in self-government and precluded South Dakota from enforcing its 1961 legislation because it was improper to apply Yakima retroactively. The court explained:

The Tribes, particularly in South Dakota, have relied on the protection offered by the tribal consent amendment since 1968. The Tribes have co-existed with state authorities with the knowledge that the state could not assume jurisdiction over them without their consent. The state allowed federal and tribal authorities to exercise jurisdiction prior to and after 1968 without asserting...

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