State v. Sprague
| Decision Date | 09 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 53370-7-II,53370-7-II |
| Citation | 16 Wash.App.2d 213,480 P.3d 471 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Victor Wayne SPRAGUE, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
PUBLISHED OPINION
Glasgow, J. ¶ 1 Officers executed a search warrant at Victor Wayne Sprague's apartment and found about 10 grams of methamphetamine, a scale, plastic grocery store bags, and a pipe in his living room. He was charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. At a jury trial, the State relied on the evidence recovered from Sprague's apartment, as well as incriminating statements Sprague made to the investigating officers. The jury found Sprague guilty, and Sprague appeals his conviction.
¶ 2 Specifically, Sprague argues that the State failed to establish corpus delicti to support the admission of his incriminating statements and that, without these statements, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Sprague also contends that the trial court erred when it declined to grant Sprague's motion for a continuance on the morning of trial, that Sprague's counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and that cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial.
¶ 3 The corpus delicti analysis requires us to consider whether the evidence also supports a hypothesis of mere possession. Because officers testified that it is not uncommon for drug users or addicts to have a scale, and the recovered grocery store bags were not torn into small pieces to serve as packaging, we conclude that Sprague's incriminating statements were improperly admitted under the corpus delicti rule. Even so, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence existed to support Sprague's conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine without his incriminating statements. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, and Sprague was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. We need not address his cumulative error claim. We therefore affirm Sprague's conviction.
FACTS
¶ 4 Officers from the Longview Police Street Crimes Unit executed a search warrant at Sprague's apartment. The warrant authorized a search of Sprague's apartment and person for "illegal narcotics and related contraband." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. It did not authorize a search of Sprague's cell phone or other electronics.
¶ 5 Officers discovered two small bags of methamphetamine in Sprague's living room near his recliner. One bag weighed 8.80 grams and the other weighed 1.41 grams, including the weight of the bags. The officers located a digital scale with methamphetamine residue and a bundle of plastic grocery bags, also in the living room. They found a "homemade meth pipe," "scrapings" from the pipe, and a metal container with methamphetamine residue. 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 129, 140. They did not find any cash, safes, pay/owe sheets, or weapons.
¶ 6 During the search of his apartment, Sprague was detained and questioned. After receiving Miranda1 warnings, Sprague admitted to officers that the methamphetamine belonged to him. He also admitted to selling small amounts of methamphetamine inside his apartment and in the alley behind his apartment. Sprague admitted that he typically tears off pieces of plastic grocery bags to package the methamphetamine.
¶ 7 Sprague was arrested and charged with one count of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. The State added an enhancement for committing this act within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop.
¶ 8 Before trial, Sprague requested a hearing pursuant to CrR 3.5 to determine the admissibility of his statements to officers. Sprague also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the State lacked the independent evidence necessary to corroborate his incriminating statements and establish the corpus delicti of possession with intent to deliver.
¶ 9 In his motion to dismiss, Sprague explained that "[a] defendant's incriminating statement alone is insufficient to establish that a crime took place." CP at 13 (citing State v. Brockob , 159 Wash.2d 311, 328, 150 P.3d 59 (2006) ). Under the corpus delicti rule, the State must present independent evidence in the form of "prima facie corroboration of the crime described in the incriminating statement." Id. (citing Brockob , 159 Wash.2d at 328, 150 P.3d 59 ). In part, Brockob established that the State's independent evidence " ‘must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a[ ] hypothesis of innocence.’ " 159 Wash.2d at 329, 150 P.3d 59 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Aten , 130 Wash.2d 640, 660, 927 P.2d 210 (1996) ).
¶ 10 At a pretrial hearing on the motion, Sprague argued that "the only evidence independent of [ ] Sprague's admissions beyond his mere possession all show[ed] personal use," not an intent to deliver. 1 VRP at 18. Specifically, Sprague argued that the evidence officers found was in a private residence and it was all located in one area, near a recliner. Officers found one scale near the recliner "which could be for personal use." 1 VRP at 17. Sprague emphasized that in most cases finding sufficient evidence to support an inference of an intent to deliver, there is a large amount of cash, and there was no cash or other method of payment recovered from Sprague's apartment. The drugs were not divided into smaller amounts or packaged for sale. A plastic grocery store bag was "lining a trash can ... not ripped into small pieces." Id. There were no safes or locked containers, no documents or communications reflecting sales, and no observed transactions.
¶ 11 The State responded to Sprague's motion by arguing that its independent evidence was "sufficient to support a conviction for possession with intent to deliver" and, therefore, it must be sufficient to establish corpus delicti. CP at 21. Relying on the standard for sufficient evidence to support a conviction of possession with intent to deliver, the State reasoned that it only needed to show possession plus " ‘one additional factor suggestive of intent.’ " CP at 20 (). The State reasoned that under Hotchkiss CP at 21. The State pointed to the presence of the "scale ... other items with methamphetamine residue on them, and plastic grocery-style bags" as additional evidence suggestive of intent. CP at 20-21.
¶ 12 The trial court denied Sprague's motion to dismiss. The trial court discussed its understanding of the relevant case law and determined that Hotchkiss provides the controlling standard. The trial court recognized that the Brockob court's corpus delicti analysis takes into account whether there is a hypothesis consistent with innocence. But the trial court explained that in Hotchkiss , this court recognized that "if [it] applied [the Brockob analysis], the rule of some amount of drugs plus one additional corroborating factor would be swallowed up by the [ Brockob ] rule." 1 VRP at 22. So the trial court looked for "evidence of the drugs plus one additional factor[ ] ... suggestive of the intent to [deliver]." Id.
¶ 13 The trial court determined that the pipe, as well as the absence of money, safes, and pay/owe sheets, suggested personal use. It found that the large amount of methamphetamine and the packaging material in the form of grocery bags suggested an intent to deliver. As for the scale, the trial court concluded that it could support inferences of both personal use and an intent to deliver. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the corpus delicti rule was satisfied by the amount of methamphetamine plus two additional factors—packaging material and a scale.
¶ 14 The trial court acknowledged that, had it instead applied the Brockob court's analysis, it would have granted Sprague's motion. But applying Hotchkiss , the State prevailed.
¶ 15 The trial court held a CrR 3.5 hearing on the morning of trial. It found that the circumstances of Sprague's questioning constituted custodial interrogation, but Sprague received Miranda warnings, understood his rights, and validly waived them. The trial court ruled Sprague's statements admissible at trial. It did not revisit the corpus delicti doctrine at the CrR 3.5 hearing.
¶ 16 On the morning of trial, the State informed Sprague's counsel that officers had conducted a controlled buy of methamphetamine from Sprague prior to executing the warrant underlying this case. The prosecutor explained that she was not going to use this information at trial because the case law is "pretty clear that prior deliveries are not admissible to prove intent." 1 VRP at 32. She told the trial court she "hadn't intended on using [this information] as anything but essentially leverage in negotiating the current, pending case." Id. The prosecutor presented a new plea offer to Sprague—if Sprague decided to plead guilty before trial to "something besides a possession," then the State would not file a new charge of possession with intent to deliver based on the controlled buy. Id.
¶ 17 Defense counsel requested a continuance, arguing that she needed time to investigate the controlled buy.
Counsel argued that the new information affected "how [the defense would] approach the whole case" because the controlled buy involved the same police unit that executed the warrant underlying this case, it potentially involved the same informant, and an additional charge...
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