State v. Spreigl, s. 39466

• Decision Date: 17 December 1965
• Docket Number: 39617,Nos. 39466,s. 39466
• Citation: 272 Minn. 488,139 N.W.2d 167
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Theodore Frederick SPREIGL, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 167

139 N.W.2d 167

272 Minn. 488

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Theodore Frederick SPREIGL, Appellant.

Nos. 39466, 39617.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 17, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1--2. In a prosecution for taking indecent liberties with a stepchild, where the opportunity for collusion is great, the failure of the state to give notice of its intention to introduce evidence that defendant previously committed acts of sodomy with the victim and with other stepchildren requires a new trial.

Although the crime charged and the prior misconduct were somewhat different in character, the similarity to defendant's previous behavior was here sufficient to bring the case within the rule adopted in State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297, and State v. Arradondo, 260 Minn. 512, 110 N.W.2d 469.

3. Courts must exercise extreme caution in receiving the testimony of young children who implicate an accused in prior sex offenses where the opportunity for influence, suggestion, and fabrication is great. Ordinarily it is the court's duty to advise the jury of the limited purpose for which such evidence is received.

4. Where it is not clear to the court whether or not evidence of prior offenses comes within an exception to the general exclusionary rule, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and the testimony should be rejected.

5. In the trial of this and future criminal cases where the state seeks to prove that an accused has been guilty of additional crimes and misconduct on other occasions, although such evidence is otherwise admissible under some exception to the general exclusionary rule, it shall not hereafter be received unless within a reasonable time before trial the state furnishes defendant in writing a statement of the offenses it intends to show he has committed, described with the particularity required of an indictment or information, subject, however, to the following exceptions:

(A) Offenses which are a part of the immediate episode for which defendant is being tried.

(B) Offenses for which defendant has previously been prosecuted.

(C) Offenses which are introduced to rebut defendant's evidence of good character.

6. It is not necessary to consider assignments of error rendered moot by a new trial.

Neumeier, Rheinberger, Eckberg & Kimmel, Stillwater, for appellant.

Robert W. Mattson, Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., St. Paul, Henry W. Pickett, Jr., Asst. Co. Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

OTIS, Justice.

Defendant has been found guilty of taking indecent liberties with his 11-year-old stepdaughter, Sandra, and appeals from the judgment of conviction and from an order denying his petition for a writ of coram nobis.

Sandra testified that on Sunday afternoon, May 6, 1962, defendant took her to the basement of an unfinished house adjacent to her home and committed on her what amounted to an unaccomplished act of sexual intercourse. Over defendant's objection, Sandra disclosed that during the previous year, at intervals of 2, 3, or 4 weeks, defendant compelled her to indulge in acts of fellation with him in the bathroom of their home. In addition, the court permitted another stepdaughter, Pamela, then 10 years old, to testify that every week or two for an unspecified period of time the defendant forced her to commit similar acts of perversion. A stepson, Gerald, also 10, testified to one such offense committed by his stepfather in April 1962. Neither the children's mother nor defendant took the stand, and no testimony was introduced on his behalf except that of two school nurses who described the program on sex education for adolescent girls presented at the school which Sandra attended. Counsel for defendant requested an instruction that the jury disregard all evidence of defendant's prior misconduct except that for which he was being prosecuted, and moved that the evidence of other offenses be stricken. The motion was denied. The jury brought in a verdict of guilty on June 19, 1962. In February 1964 defendant petitioned for a writ of coram nobis based on affidavits submitted by a fellow employee and by defendant's mother which, in effect, attempted to establish an alibi.

Defendant assigns as error (1) the court's refusal to exclude the testimony of Sandra, Pamela, and Gerald concerning prior acts of fellation; (2) the failure of the court to give a cautionary instruction, sua sponte, with respect to the jury's consideration of the prior offenses; and (3) the court's refusal to grant the writ of coram nobis.

1. The basic issue is whether the unquestioned relevance of testimony that a defendant has committed other sex offenses, if true, gives it sufficient probative value to outweigh the patent unfairness which results to an innocent defendant who is confronted with charges against which he is not prepared to defend, which are inflammatory in the extreme, and which emanate from witnesses who are manifestly susceptible to influence and suggestion. We are of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case the challenged testimony should not have been received without prior notice of the state's intention to offer it. There must therefore be a new trial.

2. Subject to specific exceptions which have evolved in this country, our court has consistently adhered to the common-law rule excluding evidence connecting a defendant with other crimes, except for purposes of impeachment under Minn.St. 610.49 if he takes the stand on his own behalf. ¹

In an early case dealing with the problem, we held that evidence of distinct and independent prior offenses was not admissible because it tried defendant for charges of which he had no notice and for which he was unprepared and which prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. ² Subsequently, we enumerated various widely recognized exceptions to the general exclusionary rule where evidence of prior crimes was admissible to show motive, to negative mistake, to establish identity, or 'where the previous offense is a part of a scheme or conspiracy incidental to or embraced in proof of the charge on trial.' ³ Some 10 years later we specifically referred to sex crimes as a class of prosecutions where the exclusionary rule had been liberally extended, and admitted evidence of prior acts of carnal knowledge with the same victim 'on the theory of disclosing the relationship between the parties, opportunity and inclination to commit the act complained of, and as corroborative of the specific charge.' ⁴ Where the prior offense occurred with the same victim and was misconduct of the same or similar character, we stated that it gave rise to a strong inference the illicit relationship once created continued, and tended to characterize the conduct, inclination, and disposition of defendant toward the victim of the offense for which he was being prosecuted. ⁵

While this court by way of dictum in a prosecution for bribery listed sex crimes ⁶ as a blanket exception to the exclusionary rule, our early cases uniformly excluded such evidence where the previous offense involved a victim other than the subject of the prosecution in question ⁷ unless admissible under some other well-defined exception.

It was not until our decision in State v. DePauw, 246 Minn. 91, 74 N.W.2d 297, that we squarely passed on the admissibility of prior sex offenses involving third persons. ⁸ There the charge was indecent assault against a 9-year-old girl. The trial court received evidence that defendant was guilty of similar misconduct against four other children between the ages of 8 and 9 years. All of the offenses occurred in the defendant's home; the victims were all children living in the immediate neighborhood; and all were playmates of defendant's son. We held that the prior offenses and the offense charged constituted a common plan, scheme, or pattern which brought them within the exception to the exclusionary rule. ⁹ However, none of the prior victims was in any way related to defendant, and in each case the misconduct consisted of improperly fondling young children in the same manner as that charged in the principal proceedings. More recently, in State v. Arradondo, 260 Minn. 512, 110 N.W.2d 469, we held it proper in a carnal knowledge prosecution under the rule we adopted in the DePauw case to receive evidence that defendant had committed similar offenses against two other 16-year-old girls.

Unlike the DePauw and Arradondo cases, the prior misconduct here was of a somewhat different character from that with which defendant is now charged. However, both offenses involved sexually molesting small children, and we believe the similarity of behavior is sufficient to justify receiving the challenged evidence at the new trial.

3. A basic assumption implicit in decisions which permit a showing of prior sex offenses is that sex offenders have an established proclivity for recidivism. ¹⁰ Nevertheless, courts have consistently refused to permit such evidence to show defendant's general propensity for crime although the distinction between inclination and disposition has been difficult to articulate in determining whether a common scheme or plan has been proved. ¹¹ In permitting evidence of prior offenses to be received as a part of a common plan or scheme, we have come perilously close to putting the defendant's character and record in issue notwithstanding his failure to take the witness stand, as in the instant case.

Where a defendant is charged with a particular offense, it has been argued that he should be prepared to defend against evidence of similar crimes involving the same victim. ¹² However unfair the result may be to an innocent defendant, where he has no notice of other charges it is even more unjust to confront him with evidence of equally repulsive and outrageous misconduct against third persons. We are not inclined to aggravate a situation which we already regard as potentially oppressive without promulgating appropriate...