State v. Springer

• Decision Date: 05 May 1896
• Citation: 35 S.W. 589,134 Mo. 212
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HARRISON COUNTY BANK v. SPRINGER et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

35 S.W. 589

134 Mo. 212

STATE ex rel. HARRISON COUNTY BANK v. SPRINGER et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 5, 1896.

CERTIORARI — JURISDICTION ON APPEAL — AMENDMENT ON RETURN — COUNTY BOARDS OF EQUALIZATION — INCREASE OF ASSESSMENTS — NOTICE TO OWNER.

1. Under Const. art. 6, § 12, the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction in proceedings by certiorari only where they involve the construction of the revenue laws of the state, or some other question within the classes enumerated in said section. As to such cases its jurisdiction by appeal is exclusive. Id. Amend. 1884, § 5.

2. Certiorari is a proper remedy to review an increase of the assessment of personal property, where made without jurisdiction.

3. The practice in proceedings by certiorari is not regulated by statute, but should be made to conform by the courts to the principles and usages of law. A writ of certiorari to review the action of a public board calls for an exhibit of the record of that body bearing upon the questions involved, and, if a portion of such record is omitted from the return, the court may properly permit the respondents to supply it by amendment.

4. Rev. St. 1889, § 8520, authorizing county boards of equalization to increase the valuation of both real and personal property which, "in their opinion," has been returned below its real value, not having provided for any notice of such increase to be given to owners of personal property, either before or after it is made, such notice is not essential to the validity of their action; the statute itself, requiring the board to meet on the 4th Monday in April to hear reasons why any such increase should not be made, being a sufficient notice to constitute the proceeding "due process of law."

5. Where an increase of the valuation of the personal property of a bank is based on a return of the property by the bank itself, the bank cannot object to the validity of the action on the ground that the property was not assessable to the bank, but to its stockholders.

Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county; Paris C. Stepp, Judge.

Application for a writ of certiorari on relation of the Harrison County Bank against William H. Springer and others, constituting the board of equalization of Harrison county. Writ quashed on final hearing, and relator appeals. Affirmed.

D. J. Heaston and A. F. Woodruff, for appellant. S. C. Price, for respondents.

BARCLAY, J.

The original case in the circuit court was begun by an application for a writ of certiorari directed to the board of equalization of Harrison county. The petitioner was the Harrison County Bank. Mr. Springer and the other members of the board were named as defendants. The circuit court granted the writ, and a return to it was made by the board. Upon a hearing the circuit court "quashed the writ," discharged defendants, and found for them as to the costs. Plaintiff appealed in due course, after the usual motions and exceptions. The procedure in the circuit court need not be minutely described. Its correctness is called in question only on one point. The trial court allowed defendants to amend their return, in the progress of the cause, so as to show the record made by the board at its meeting of April 24, 1893, which had been omitted in the prior return. Beyond that, the case is contested on its merits alone. So we shall not find it necessary to give attention to any other matters of form.

The object of the writ is to quash an assessment of personal property of the bank for taxation for the year 1893. The bank had returned its personal property for assessment at a total valuation of $14,488. The county board of equalization, however, increased the assessment to $31,000. It is that action that the bank seeks to have annulled. The return to the writ of certiorari embraced a copy of the proceedings of the board, duly certified by its secretary, the county clerk. Harrison county, it should be remembered, is under "township organization." It appeared from the return that the board met April 3, 1893 (the first Monday of that month), all the members being present; and, after being duly sworn, they proceeded to equalize the assessment of property in the county for the taxes of that year. At the session of the board begun as above, the following order was made touching the assessment of the personal property of this bank, viz.: "Ordered by the board that the assessment of the Harrison County Bank be, and the same is hereby, raised for taxes of 1893 from $14,488 to $31,000. This is exclusive of real estate." The following order of record was also made by the board at that session, viz.: "Ordered by the board that the secretary of this board have the action of this board in raising the values of certain real estate and personal property for taxes of 1893 published in some newspaper of Harrison county as the law directs." The secretary of the board, in his certificate to the return in certiorari, further stated that "the notice hereunto attached is a true copy of the notice given by the secretary of said board of equalization, as contemplated by the above order of said board, and that said notice was published in the Bethany Republican, a newspaper published in Harrison county, Missouri, in its issue of April 12, 1893." Accompanying this certificate is the following notice: "Board of Equalization Notice. At the annual meeting of the Harrison county board of equalization, held at the courthouse, in the city of Bethany, on the first day of the present month, the following orders were made, raising assessed valuations of personal property, to which the attention of the public is called, that those feeling themselves aggrieved thereby may have an opportunity to appear before the board at its next meeting, on the fourth Monday, it being the 24th day of the present month, and show cause why such increase should not take place. * * * Ordered by the board that the assessment of the Harrison County Bank for taxes of 1893 be, and the same is hereby, raised from $14,488 to $31,000; this being exclusive of real estate. * * *"

1. This case, reaching here by appeal, is not brought within the jurisdiction of the supreme court merely because of its nature, as a proceeding in certiorari. Though the supreme court has original jurisdiction of such writs, its appellate jurisdiction over proceedings of this sort depends on the showing made in each case: If that showing indicates that the real dispute lies within one of the classes of causes over which the supreme court has jurisdiction by the constitution (article 6, § 12), then the case may remain in that court for adjudication; otherwise the case belongs in one of the courts of appeals. The appeal at bar, however, is one "involving the construction of the revenue laws of this state." As such, it comes within the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Const. 1875, art. 6, § 12. Cases of the same sort have been, it is true, entertained and decided in the courts of appeals; but the question of jurisdiction to decide them does not appear to have been considered, and the omission to transfer those cases to the supreme court was probably an oversight. Mining Co. v. Neptune (1885) 19 Mo. App. 438; Taber v. Wilson (1889) 34 Mo. App. 89.

2. Certiorari is a proper remedy to quash an increased tax-assessment of personal property, where such increase of assessment has been made without jurisdiction, which is the claim advanced by the bank in this action.

3. The amendment to the return in certiorari (which the trial court permitted) was but the addition of a short extract from the proceedings of the board on April 24 (the fourth Monday of that month), 1893. The amendment showed by the record that the county board met as a board of appeals on that day, heard an application for a reduction of assessment by another bank, and then adjourned. We have no state statute regulating the course of proceedings on certiorari. But the writ is mentioned in the organic law of the state, and is obviously intended to fill a useful place in our system of practice. It has often been recognized and utilized in Missouri. Const. 1875, art. 6, § 3; State v. Dowling (1872) 50 Mo. 134; Lead Co. v. Simms (1892) 108 Mo. 222, 18 S. W. 906. Our courts have undoubted authority to mold the procedure upon that writ so as to conform to "the principles and usages of law," as developed under the common-law system, so far as may be consistent with the letter and intent of the existing statutory law Rev. St. 1889, § 3243. The writ of certiorari calls for an exhibit of the record of the body whose action is called in question. If the first return of that record in this case was incomplete, it was, at least, the privilege of the defendants to perfect the return by furnishing any authentic part of the desired record necessary to make it complete. The court permitted the amendment of the return, and we consider plaintiff's exception to that ruling groundless. 4 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 228.

4. It is next insisted that the increased assessment is void for want of notice to the plaintiff bank. The printed notice (which, the county clerk certifies, was duly published) is not mentioned in the record of the board, so far as the papers before us disclose. Plaintiff claims that any such publication cannot, therefore, be considered, in determining whether the board had lawful authority to take the action it did take, but that only the actual record can be resorted to, in support of the board's action. It is, no doubt, a general rule that the validity of any course taken by such a body is to be determined, on certiorari, by an inspection of its record. But where steps preliminary to valid action are pointed out by law, and there is no provision requiring evidence thereof to be preserved, or the law is ambiguous or uncertain on that point, the question (if we view the record alone) becomes simply, what is the correct presumption to indulge, in view of the silence...