State v. Springer, 89-105

• Decision Date: 24 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-105,89-105
• Citation: 574 A.2d 1381,133 N.H. 223
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Seth E. SPRINGER.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1381

574 A.2d 1381

133 N.H. 223

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Seth E. SPRINGER.

No. 89-105.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

May 24, 1990.

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (William H. Lyons, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.

Joanne Green, Asst. Appellate Defender, Concord, on the brief, and W. Kirk Abbott, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defender, orally, for defendant.

SOUTER, Justice.

This appeal from an order of restitution issued by the Superior Court (Morrill, J.) questions whether an insurer that has compensated its insured for consequences of a crime is a "victim" suffering loss as a "direct result" of criminal conduct, within the meaning of RSA 651:62, VI, and therefore eligible for restitution under RSA 651:63. We hold it is not and reverse.

A 1985 sentence included an order under the latter statute, directing the defendant, Seth Springer, to make restitution to certain individual theft victims. In 1988, he moved for partial relief from that order on the ground that "a substantial portion of said restitution is now owed to ... insurance companies as subrogated claims for amounts paid on behalf of their insureds." The superior court denied relief after concluding, inter alia, that an insurer that has made good on its insured's criminally-caused loss may be named as payee of a reimbursement order under New Hampshire's restitution act, RSA 651:62-67.

Statutory authorization for a sentencing court to order restitution was first proposed in 1979, see 1979 House bill 862, and was enacted in 1981, see Laws 1981, ch. 329, after a legislative study that gave attention to the Maine statute on the subject, 17-A Me. R.S.A. 1321-29, see Notes of House Judiciary Committee, executive session, March 26, 1980. The New Hampshire statute provides that "[a]ny offender may be sentenced to make restitution," RSA 651:63, defined as "moneys, compensation, work or service to be reimbursed by the offender to the victim ....," RSA 651:62, V. "Victim" is in turn defined as "a person or claimant who suffers personal injury, death or economic loss as a direct result of an offender's criminal conduct or the good faith effort of any person attempting to prevent or preventing the criminal conduct." RSA 651:62, VI.

Although the references to sufferers of "direct" loss expressed a legislative intent to limit the class of victims under the statute, the adjective does not demarcate exactly between those eligible and those not. "Direct" might, for example, have been meant to exclude those with derivative or consortium claims; or dependants who look to an injured person for support; or indemnifiers with rights of recovery by assignment of the indemnitee or under the general principle of an insurer's subrogation to the insured's right of action. See McCullough v. Company, 90 N.H. 409, 411, 10 A.2d 245, 247 (1939). This uncertainty prompts a look at legislative history to determine whether the General Court meant to treat an insurer who has paid for a criminally-caused loss as a "victim" of the "direct" loss on which a statutory restitution order must be predicated.

Two facts stand out. The first is that the availability of insurance as a factor bearing on the need to authorize indemnification orders was on the legislative mind when the 1979 bill was committed to interim study. See N.H.H.R. Jour. 398 (1979) ("the intent of HB 862 is admirable, but raises many questions relating to insurance eligibility...." ). The second such fact is that the Maine statute on which the 1981 legislation was modeled, see Notes supra, identifies an eligible "victim" without any limitation by reference to direct loss, 17-A Me. R.S.A. 1322:7, and expressly provides for indemnifying "collateral sources" of victim compensation, like insurance companies, 17-A Me. R.S.A. 1324:3. Because the subsequent New Hampshire enactment is distinguishable in each respect, there is a fair inference that the restrictive definition of reimbursable loss and the failure to provide for reimbursing collateral sources reflected an intent to exclude insurers, as such, from the class of victims whose losses are subject to statutory restitution orders.

The State's arguments to the contrary deserve mention, unavailing though they are. First, the State cites Pratt v. State, 486 A.2d 1154 (Del.1983), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware construed a statutory provision to order restitution for "direct result[s]" of a crime, as consistent with including insurers, as such, among those entitled to benefit. Without any disrespect to the Supreme Court of Delaware,...