State v. Springer

Decision Date24 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. W2010–02153–SC–R11–CD.,W2010–02153–SC–R11–CD.
Citation406 S.W.3d 526
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Michael Shane SPRINGER.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Clifford K. McGown, Jr., Waverly, Tennessee (on appeal); Tom W. Crider, District Public Defender, and Stephanie Hale, Assistant Public Defender, Trenton, Tennessee (at trial and of counsel on appeal), for the appellant, Michael Shane Springer.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel E. Willis, Senior Counsel; Garry Brown, District Attorney General; and Jason C. Scott, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

SHARON G. LEE, J.

In this appeal, we interpret the meaning of the phrase “term of imprisonment” in Articles III and IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40–31–101 to –108 (2006), and determine whether the defendant is entitled to relief under the IAD. The IAD, a compact between state and federal jurisdictions, provides cooperative procedures for the exchange of prisoners between state and federal jurisdictions so that prisoners can be brought to trial on untried indictments or complaints. Under Article III of the IAD, a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment may request a trial within 180 days after being delivered to another state. Under Article IV of the IAD, an official of one jurisdiction may seek custody of a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment in another jurisdiction, but the prisoner must be tried within 120 days of arrival in that jurisdiction and cannot be “shuttled” back to the original place of imprisonment before the trial. The IAD mandates a dismissal of the indictment for a violation of either Article III or IV. The defendant in this case was arrested on related federal and state charges and taken into federal custody. After the defendant was tried and convicted in federal court, he was indicted by the grand jury in Gibson County on the related state charges. Before being sentenced in federal court, the defendant filed a demand for speedy disposition of the state charges under Article III of the IAD. While the defendant was confined at a federal temporary detention facility after his sentencing in federal court, the Gibson County Sheriff filed a detainer and transported the defendant to Gibson County for an arraignment. After counsel was appointed and the defendant was arraigned, he was transferred back into federal custody. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the state indictment for violations of Articles III and IV of the IAD. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11 and reserved a certified question of law seeking appellate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss because of the alleged violation of the IAD. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. See State v. Springer, No. W2010–02153–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 603820, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Feb. 16, 2012). We hold that for purposes of the IAD, a prisoner who is incarcerated after sentencing is serving a “term of imprisonment.” We further hold that the defendant properly reserved his issues for appeal in the certified question; that the defendant was a federal pretrial detainee at the time he filed a procedurally deficient demand for speedy disposition and is not entitled to relief under Article III; and that the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment when he was transferred, pursuant to a detainer, from the federal temporary detention facility to Gibson County for his arraignment and back to federal custody on the same day. Article IV of the IAD was violated when the defendant was transferred back to the federal detention center before being tried for the state charges. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the conviction is vacated, and the indictment against the defendant is dismissed with prejudice.

I. Factual Background

In August 2006, Michael Shane Springer (Defendant) was arrested on related federal and state charges. While awaiting trial, Defendant was confined in the West Tennessee Detention Facility, a federal temporary detention facility, in Mason, Tennessee. On April 11, 2007, Defendant pleaded guilty to three federal charges. On May 7, 2007, a Gibson County Grand Jury returned a multi-count indictment against Defendant. After Defendant learned of the Gibson County indictment from a federal public defender, Defendant filed a pro se demand for speedy disposition 1 pursuant to Article III of the IAD with the Gibson County Circuit Court Clerk. On August 17, 2007, Defendant was sentenced in federal court to a twenty-year prison term and remained in federal custody at the West Tennessee Detention Facility.

On August 27, 2007, the Gibson County Sheriff lodged a detainer against Defendant.2 On August 30, 2007, Defendant was transported from the West Tennessee Detention Facility to Gibson County for his arraignment and back to federal custody on that same day. Later, Defendant was transferred to a federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, and subsequently to a federal penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona. On September 22, 2009, Defendant was returned to Gibson County for pretrial proceedings.3

On December 7, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on violations of provisions in Articles III and IV of the IAD imposing deadlines for trial and prohibiting a return of a prisoner before trial (the “anti-shuttling provisions”). After hearing evidence and oral arguments, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea, reserving for appeal the issue of whether he was entitled to relief under the IAD.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction; however, each member of the panel expressed a different view. See State v. Springer, No. W2010–02153–CCA–R3–CD, 2012 WL 603820, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Feb. 16, 2012). Judge Bivins held that the certified question of law was adequate for review; that Defendant's request for relief under Article III was procedurally deficient; and that Defendant was not entitled to relief under Article IV because he was not serving a term of imprisonment at the temporary federal facility when he was transferred to Gibson County on August 30, 2007. Judge Woodall agreed that Defendant was not entitled to relief under Article III, but he would have granted relief under Article IV because, in his view, Defendant was serving a term of imprisonment when he was transferred to Gibson County from the temporary federal facility because he had been sentenced in federal court. Judge Glenn agreed that the conviction should be affirmed because Defendant's certified question did not properly present the issues for appeal and, as a result, the Court of Criminal Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

We granted Defendant's Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal and consider the following questions: (1) whether Defendant properly reserved the certified question of law; and (2) whether Defendant is entitled to relief based on violations of Article III and Article IV of the IAD.

II. Analysis
A. Certified Question of Law

When entering his guilty plea, Defendant reserved the following certified question of law:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's Motion to Dismiss alleging the State violated the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (T.C.A. 40–31–101 et seq., U.S.Code Title 18–App.) and the anti-shuttling provisions therein pursuant to Alabama v. Bozeman, 5[3]3 U.S. 146 [121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188] (2001).

Under Tenn. R.Crim. P. 37(b)(2), a defendant may plead guilty and appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case as long as certain conditions are met.4 After entering a guilty plea under Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11(a)(3),5 a defendant must explicitly reserve, with the consent of the state and the trial court, the right to appeal a dispositive question of law. State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tenn.2003). In addition to reserving the question of law, the defendant must draft the question so that its scope and limits are clearly stated for the reviewing court. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 898–99 (Tenn.2008) (quoting State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn.1988)); see also State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 836–37 (Tenn.1996). Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to hear any issue beyond the scope of the certified question. See Day, 263 S.W.3d at 899–900;State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 478–79 (Tenn.1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 836–37;Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650. The defendant bears the burden of ensuring that the final order complies with the requirements of Rule 37 and that the appellate record is sufficient for review. Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650.

The State argues that Defendant's certified question of law did not identify “clearly the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved” as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). Although Defendant's certified question would have benefitted from the incorporation of more fact-specific references, we hold the substance of the question nevertheless satisfies our jurisdictional requirements and that the issue of whether the State violated the anti-shuttling provisions of the IAD in light of Bozeman is properly before this Court. Cf. State v. Colzie, No. M1998–00253–CCA–R3–CD, 1999 WL 1074111, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov. 30, 1999) (holding that a certified question was sufficient when it was “evident that [the] statement of the issue [reflected] the grounds for suppression that Defendant asserted at the trial court,” even though it could have been more precisely drafted); State v. Harris, 919...

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