State v. St. Clair

Citation21 Wn.2d 407,151 P.2d 181
Decision Date22 August 1944
Docket Number29279.
PartiesSTATE v. ST. CLAIR.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Leroy St. Clair was charged with cruelty to animals. From an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss notwithstanding a verdict finding defendant guilty, the State appeals.

Reversed with instructions.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; N. K. Buck, Judge.

Lloyd L. Wiehl and George M. Martin, both of Yakima, for appellant.

Velikanje & Velikanje, of Yakima, for respondent.

BEALS Justice.

The defendant, Leroy St. Clair, was charged by the state of Washington, by way of a criminal complaint filed in justice court, with a misdemeanor, in that in the county of Yakima,

'Leroy St. Clair, then and there being, and then and there having charge and custody of an animal, to-wit, one bay horse, did then and there willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully inflict unnecessary suffering and pain upon said horse by then and there dragging said horse behind a vehicle, to-wit, a tractor, causing said animal to be seriously injured to such an extent that said animal could not walk and that said Leroy St. Clair left and abandoned said injured horse for three days without care, said treatment causing said horse's death.' On his trial Before the justice, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. The defendant appealed to the superior court, and upon his trial Before that court, the jury also returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant then moved for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative for a new trial. The court granted the motion to dismiss and entered an order dismissing the proceeding with prejudice, from which order the state has appealed.

Error is assigned upon the ruling of the court sustaining respondent's motion for an order of dismissal; upon the order dismissing the proceeding; and also upon the giving of an instruction.

Rem.Rev.Stat § 3187, defines the offense of cruelty to animals as follows:

'Every person who cruelly overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, over works, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly beats, mutilates or cruelly kills, or causes, procures, authorizes, requests or encourages so to be overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented deprived of necessary sustenance, cruelly beaten or mutilated or cruelly killed, any animal; and whoever having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary suffering or pain upon the same, or unnecessarily fails to provide the same with the proper food, drink, air, light, space, shelter or protection from the weather, or who willfully and unreasonably drives the same when unfit for labor or with yoke or harness that chafes or galls it, or check rein or any part of its harness too tight for its comfort, or at night when it has been six consecutive hours without a full meal, or who cruelly abandons any animal, shall be guilty of a misdemeannor,' which section is supplemented by § 3200, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

'In this act, the singular shall include the plural; the word 'animal' shall be held to include every living creature, except man; the words 'torture,' 'torment,' and 'cruelty,' shall be held to include every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted.'

It appears that respondent was the owner of an unbroken three year old bay mare which for some time had been pastured upon the farm of Ralph Janshen, respondent's brother-in law, and that during the afternoon of Sunday, October 25, 1942, respondent and Janshen entered the pasture for the purpose of breaking the animal, which is referred to as a 'colt.' In the first place, they hitched the colt to its mother, but the colt balked and refused to follow, several times throwing itself to the ground. As the colt was heavier than the mare, this jarred the latter animal, and to obviate this difficulty, as respondent testified, the men attached the colt to a tractor by a rope which was placed around the colt, passing under its tail. Respondent and Janshen testified that the colt was still hitched to the mare, and that the tractor was used solely as a shock absorber, so that when the colt threw itself the entire jolt would not be borne by the mare. The colt continued to balk, throwing itself to the ground. On one occasion the colt refused to get up, and the men left it lying as it fell and went in search of some cattle. On their return after a lapse of from an hour to an hour and a half, the colt arose from the ground, and the breaking operations proceeded. Concerning this phase of the proceedings, respondent testified:

'We tried to lead her again; just took a hold and tried to lead her by herself. She wouldn't come, move. Tried to drive her; she wouldn't move a foot. So I said, Well, We'll try and lead her again and see what she'll do this time. So we took the horse, had the tractor there, and tried to lead her; she just throwed herself over on her side with all four feet braced straight out.'

Upon the approach of darkness, the colt having again thrown itself and failing to arise, respondent decided to leave the colt as it lay, tied to the tractor, during the night. The rope which passed around the colt was removed, and the animal was tied to the tractor by a rope fastened to the colt's halter. Respondent testified that he left the colt tied to the tractor so that it would not stray into the road. He told Janshen that if he did not return that night to release the colt from the tractor in the morning and turn it loose in the pasture, and that they would wait until winter for further breaking operations. Respondent then departed for his home, did not return to Janshen's that night, and had no further information concerning subsequent events until Wednesday evening.

Janshen testified that during the course of the following morning, he untied the rope that held the colt to the tractor. He stated that when he did this the colt raised its head but did not get up. He further testified that he was busily engaged with his farming operations, and did not again see the colt alive.

Mrs. Janshen testified that sometime during the course of Tuesday morning, from a distance she saw the colt standing on its feet.

Between ten and eleven o'clock on Tuesday morning, Kenneth Wolverton visited the Janshen ranch to pick up the tractor for the purpose of repairing the same. He found the colt lying behind the tractor, and, as it seemed to him, in a dying condition. Upon his return to Yakima, he informed an officer of the local humane society of what he had seen. At about ten o'clock Wednesday morning, Ray Walker, in company with an officer of the humane society, visited the Janshen ranch, where they found the colt dead, the body being still warm. They loaded the dead colt on a truck and took it away. No investigation was made for the purpose of determining the cause of the colt's death.

It appears from the evidence that the field in which the colt was left lying contained alfalfa, and that water was running in an open ditch about fifty feet from where the colt lay, tied to the tractor until Monday morning. While the colt was tied to the tractor it could, of course, obtain neither water nor food.

Respondent argues that no evidence whatever was introduced from which the jury could have found that any pain was inflicted on the colt by respondent. Respondent and Janshen testified that the colt, while lying down, was not dragged along the ground by the moving tractor. These witnesses testified that the purpose of attaching the colt to the tractor was to save the mare from the jolt caused when the colt threw itself on the ground. It would seem that this purpose would not be accomplished unless when the tractor, the mare and the colt were moving, the rope by which the colt was attached to the tractor was taut, and the moving tractor was exerting some force upon the colt to make it follow. When the colt would throw itself to the ground, as described by respondent, the tractor would not stop of itself, but would continue onward until its driver stopped it. How soon after the colt would strike the ground, or brace itself in an endeavor to stand still, the tractor would stop, we do not know. Presumably it would be stopped as soon as possible, because dragging the colt along the surface of the ground while lying down would nowise assist in breaking the animal.

Respondent admits that while he was present, he, as owner, was in charge of the colt. Respondent contends that when he left the Janshen ranch that evening and told Janshen that if he did not return that night, Janshen should in the morning release the colt and turn it into the pasture, his responsibility then ceased. Respondent did not return to Janshen's that night, and respondent is responsible for the condition in which the colt was left, helpless, tied to the tractor and unable to obtain water or food. There is no testimony that during the breaking operations the colt was watered. Evidently the breaking process lasted some time, and the colt was left tied to the tractor from an hour to an hour and a half while the men rounded up the cattle. It does not appear that the colt was given any opportunity to drink prior to being left tied to the tractor for the night. The colt was then lying on its side and apparently unable to rise to its feet.

Mr. Wolverton testified that when he saw the horse Tuesday morning, it was lying with the back of its neck against the rear wheel of the tractor; that the colt merely raised its head a little bit off the ground. He further testified:

'Q. At that time, did you or did you not notice any marks in...

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8 cases
  • State v. Arndt
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • August 5, 1976
    ...set forth several distinct acts and make the commission of each a separate crime, all in one statute. Accord, State v. St. Clair, 21 Wash.2d 407, 413--14, 151 P.2d 181 (1944); State v. Adams, 41 Wash. 552, 83 P. 1108 If RCW 74.08.331 falls within the first category, it is unnecessary to a g......
  • State v. Dixon
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • January 14, 1971
    ...ways charged. State v. Holedger, 15 Wash. 443, 46 P. 652 (1896); State v. Brummett, 98 Wash. 182, 167 P. 120 (1917); State v. St. Clair,21 Wash.2d 407, 151 P.2d 181 (1944). Where, under a penal statute, a single offense can be committed in different ways or by different means and the severa......
  • State v. Golladay, 40474
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • May 28, 1970
    ...v. Powers, 152 Wash. 155, 277 P. 377 (1929), rape; State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 P.2d 1027 (1934), larceny; State v. St. Clair, 21 Wash.2d 407, 151 P.2d 181 (1944), cruelty to animals; State v. Carlson, 50 Wash.2d 220, 310 P.2d 867 (1957), robbery; State v. Scott, 64 Wash.2d 992, 359 P.......
  • State v. Kosanke
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • June 28, 1945
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