State v. St. Louis & S.F.R.Co.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1915
• Docket Number: No. 17709.,17709.
• Citation: 263 Mo. 689,174 S.W. 64
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. and to Use of BUCK, Revenue Collector, v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO.

174 S.W. 64

263 Mo. 689

STATE ex rel. and to Use of BUCK, Revenue Collector, v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. R. CO.

No. 17709.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

February 23, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Scott County; James A. Finch, Judge.

Suit by the State of Missouri, on the relation and to the use of R. L. Buck, Collector of the Revenue of Scott County, against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Suit by the collector for the aggregate amount of taxes above an alleged maximum of 65 cents on the $100 valuation, levied in six school districts of Scott county, for school purposes. The collector had judgment, and defendant appealed.

The case is here upon an agreed statement of facts. As stated, six school districts are involved; but the facts are precisely similar as to each, and one may be taken in our statement as a type for all. The below excerpts from the agreed facts indicate plainly the point of controversy, viz.:

"It is hereby agreed, by and between the parties to the above-entitled cause, by their respective attorneys, that the evidence in this cause would show the following facts, which are agreed to be true: (1) That the total value of the property of the defendant in Scott county, Mo., subject to taxation for state county, school, and other purposes, is $590,834.90. That there was assessed and levied against such property for the year 1911, for state, county, and school taxes, to the aggregate sum of $8,929.19. That of the taxes so assessed and levied, all have been paid, except the sum of $131.34, of the taxes assessed for schools. (2) That in school district No. 2, Scott county, taxes for school purposes were assessed and levied at the rate of 85 cents on the $100 valuation, being 20 cents in excess of 65 cents on the $100. (3) That the taxes sued for herein, amounting to $131.34, are taxes for school purposes in the above numbered and described school districts, in Scott county, Mo., extended on said assessed valuation of $590,834.90, at the excess rate over and above the rate of 65 cents on the $100 in said school districts respectively. (4) That none of said school districts, Nos. 2, 3, 9, 27, 35, and 54 in Scott county, Mo., aforesaid, is formed exclusively of a city, or town, but each and every one of said school districts aforesaid include territory outside the limits of cities and towns within the boundaries of said school districts, respectively; that each of said above numbered and described school districts was organized under and by virtue of the provisions of article 4, c. 106, It. S. 1909."

Defendant by its answer properly raised the constitutional questions discussed in our opinion, and, upon the submission of the case upon the agreed facts, offered a declaration of law that under the law and the facts the judgment should be for defendant. This declaration the court refused and defendant excepted.

We apprehend that the above facts, eked out by our own restatement of the contentions made, will make sufficiently clear the points discussed in the opinion.

W. F. Evans, of St. Louis, and Moses Why-bark and A. P. Stewart, both of Cape Girardeau, for appellant. John T. Barker, Atty. Gen., and Ernest A. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

FARIS, P. J. (after stating the facts as above).

I. Defendant says in its brief that it no longer calls in question the constitutionality of section 10864, but that the contention it urges is that section 10825 is unconstitutional. The latter section simply empowers the county clerk to levy upon all property in a "town school district," not to exceed (even when so authorized inferably by a vote), one per centum for school purposes. Section 10825, R. S. 1909.

Turning to section 10775, which defines, or classifies, the various kinds of public schools and public school districts in this state, we find that by statute a "town school district" is a district "governed by six directors and in which is located any city of the fourth class, or any incorporated town or village." Clearly this is the identical district referred to in the agreed facts. So we need not concern ourselves with the question of the right to organize, or the constitutional validity of the organization of "a consolidated school district," merely for that it has 200 or more children of school age and elects to avail itself of the provisions of section 10864, or of any other sort of districts except town " districts.

As a matter of course, if, as allowed by section 10864, a town district may have attached to it for school purposes contiguous outlying territory beyond the city limits, and yet be allowed by section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution to vote a levy of taxes for school purposes in excess of 65 cents on the $100 valuation, then section 10825 is not invalid. As we see it, therefore, the concrete question is whether a town district may be organized with contiguous territory beyond the town or city limits attached thereto, as provided in section 10864, and yet be permitted to levy taxes at the rate prescribed in the section, supra, of the Constitution, for school districts "formed of cities and towns." Section 11, art. 10, Cons. 1875.

II. Reducing, for the purposes of this discussion, the contention of appellant to its last analysis, does section 11 of article 10 of our Constitution, which fixes the maximum amount of taxes which may be levied upon each $100 valuation at 65 cents, except "in districts formed of cities and towns," require that the limits of such city or town school district be precisely coterminous with the limits of the incorporated town or city, and unless school district limits are exactly coterminous with the town limits and no outside contiguous territory is attached, can the district legally levy more than 65 cents taxes on the $100 valuation for school purposes? If it cannot, section 10864 is in a way unconstitutional, and in every aspect useless, since said section plainly provides for the attachment of contiguous territory lying outside of the town or city limits, and since, if such territory cannot be attached to a town or city school district, there is no taxing distinction or even any useful difference remaining as between such a district and the ordinary country school district.

Must then the limits of a town or city school district (called hereinafter for brevity a town district) be precisely coterminous with the city limits in order that more than 65 cents on the $100 valuation may be levied therein for school purposes? If section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution means that no contiguous country territory may be attached, then section 10864 is invalid. The pertinent part of that section of the Constitution reads thus:

"* * * For school purposes in districts composed of cities which have one hundred thousand inhabitants or more, the annual rate on property shall not exceed sixty cents on the hundred dollars valuation and in other districts forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation: Provided, the aforesaid annual rates for school purposes may be increased, in districts formed of cities and towns, to an amount not to exceed one dollar on the hundred dollars valuation, and in other districts to an amount not to exceed sixty-five cents on the hundred dollars valuation, on the condition that a majority of the voters who are taxpayers, voting at an election held to decide the question, vote for said increase."

This section of the Constitution was amended at the general election in 1902, by striking out of the Constitution of 1875 the words "the annual rate on property shall not exceed," and by inserting at the place of and in lieu thereof the words which we italicize in the above excerpt from the Constitution. Laws 1901, p. 266.

It is manifest that section 10864 contemplates the attaching and grants the privilege of attaching to a town district contiguous territory outside the city limits. This is made...