State v. Staat, No. 41472

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: Heard before KNUTSON; ROGOSHESKE; OTIS
• Citation: 192 N.W.2d 192,291 Minn. 394
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jerry Lee STAAT, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 12 November 1971
• Docket Number: No. 41472

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192 N.W.2d 192 291 Minn. 394 STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Jerry Lee STAAT, Appellant. No. 41472. Supreme Court of Minnesota. Nov. 12, 1971.

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Syllabus by the Court

[291 MINN 394] In a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotic drugs, the evidence did not as a matter of law establish all essential foundational facts for invoking the physician-patient privilege created by Minn.St. 595.02(4), and therefore the trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's claim of privilege and in admitting into evidence two bottles, containing narcotic drugs, discovered on defendant's person when he was brought to the hospital in an unconscious and critical condition.

[291 MINN 395] C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Rosalie E. Wahl, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Henry W. McCarr, Jr. and David, G. Roston, Asst., County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and MURPHY, OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and ROLLOFF, JJ.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of unlawful possession of narcotics in violation of Minn.St.1969, §§ 618.01, 618.02, and 618.21. The dispositive issue raised is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the physician-patient privilege created by Minn.St. 595.02(4) did not bar admission into evidence of two bottles of narcotic drugs discovered on defendant's person when he was brought to the hospital in an unconscious and critical condition. We hold the ruling was not erroneous and affirm defendant's conviction.

On the morning of June 6, 1967, a Hennepin County General Hospital ambulance crew responded to an anonymous call and found the defendant lying unconscious in a Minneapolis city park. Alerted by the ambulance driver, Dr. Thomas Coulon (a resident physician) and a hospital orderly were present in the emergency room when defendant, still unconscious and critically ill, was brought in on a stretcher. Simultaneously with the resident's efforts to 'evaluate'

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defendant's condition, the orderly removed and searched defendant's shirt and pants. Substantial evidence indicates that this procedure in this type of case is hospital routine to prepare an unconscious patient for the doctor's preliminary examination, to discover the patient's identity, and to make an inventory of his personal belongings. However, there is conflicting evidence in the record that the resident physician, while examining defendant, directed the orderly to '(f)ind something.' The orderly's search produced a wallet and identification[291 MINN 396] cards, some loose change, and two small bottles containing codeine sulphate and dihydrocodeinone, both of which are opium derivatives classified under our statutes as narcotic drugs. Upon discovery of the bottles and the doctor's observation of needle marks on defendant's arm, Dr. Coulon immediately had the orderly move defendant to the postanaesthesia recovery room on the fourth floor of the hospital for treatment by Dr. Erik Carlson, the intern then on duty, whom Dr. Coulon advised of his findings and to whom the orderly delivered the two bottles.

A Minneapolis police officer shortly appeared at the hospital, having been alerted through an arrangement whereby the hospital notifies the police department when a patient suspected of taking an overdose of drugs is admitted. After talking to the orderly, the ambulance driver, and the doctors; observing the defendant as he was undergoing treatment; and obtaining possession of the two bottles from Dr. Carlson, the officer placed a hold on defendant so that the police department would be informed when he was ready to be released from the hospital. He was released to the custody of the police the following evening. A complaint charging defendant with unlawful possession of narcotics was filed and a warrant was issued the next day.

Subsequent to a preliminary hearing and bindover but prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the two bottles containing the drugs. Based upon the testimony of the ambulance driver and the orderly, which was submitted by the state, the trial court denied suppression. At a jurywaived trial both physicians testified for the state, and the court admitted the bottles of drugs into evidence. Following trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not to exceed 5 years. Defendant appeals from his conviction on the grounds that the two bottles of narcotic drugs should have been ruled within the physician-patient privilege and therefore inadmissible, and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

At common law, confidential communications between physician[291 MINN 397] and patient, like confidential communications generally, were not legally privileged. This rule has been changed by statute in many states, beginning with New York in 1828. 2 N.Y.Rev.Stat. 1829, Part 3, c. 7, Tit. 3, § 73. Minn.St. 595.02(4) ¹ provides in part:

'A licensed physician or surgeon, or dentist shall not, without the consent of his patient, be allowed to disclose any information or any opinion based thereon which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.'

The theory underlying this privilege is that a patient's fear of an unwarranted, embarrassing, and detrimental disclosure in court of information given to his doctor would deter the patient 'from freely disclosing his symptoms to the detriment of his health.' Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 408, 72 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1955); State v. Fontana, 277 Minn. 286, 152 N.W.2d 503 (1967). In Snyker we

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noted that it was then recognized that this theory is highly speculative and the privilege often criticized. In Nelson v. Ackermann, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d 500 (1957), the privilege was exhaustively considered, and it was observed that it is probably the most abused privilege in the field of evidence. See, also, 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev.1961) § 2380a; McCormick, Evidence, § 108. Despite persistent academic and judicial criticism of this evidentiary privilege as an impediment to the ascertainment of truth, it is nevertheless our duty to enforce it to the full extent reasonably necessary for the attainment of the longstanding legislative policy for which it was created, namely, to provide a shield for safeguarding and promoting confidential communications between a patient and his attending physician.

[291 MINN 398] Accordingly, as the statute requires, we must determine whether the evidence in a particular case establishes (1) that a physician-patient relationship existed; (2) that the 'information' acquired by the physician was of the type contemplated by the statute; (3) that such information was acquired by the physician in attending the patient; and (4) that the information was necessary to enable him to act in a professional capacity. Assuming, as do the parties, that the legislature intended no distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in the statute's application, ² this

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court has held that the burden rests upon [291 MINN 399] the claimant of the privilege to establish all the facts necessary to invoke it. State v. Anderson, 247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956). See, Brown v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688, 44 A.L.R.2d 535 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev.1961) § 2381. Thus,...