State v. Staatz
| Decision Date | 29 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-86-0374-AP,CR-86-0374-AP |
| Citation | 159 Ariz. 411,768 P.2d 143 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Larry Daniel STAATZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III, Janet Keating, and Crane McClennen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
Francisco Leon, P.C. by Francisco Leon, Tucson, for appellant.
The defendant, Larry Staatz, was convicted of murder in the first degree and two counts of theft of property over $1,000. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder count and to concurrent 13.25 year terms on each of the theft counts, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031. We affirm.
The defendant met the victim, James Errara, when Errara gave him a ride when he was hitchhiking. The defendant and Errara became friendly, and Errara invited him to the trailer park where Errara lived. The defendant did some work on Errara's car and had a glass of tea with him. The next day, the defendant asked his wife to give him a ride to an area near Errara's trailer. The defendant told his wife that he was going to pick up a car and some money. The defendant later claimed that he was unable to find the person from whom he intended to borrow a car for a trip to Phoenix, so he went to Errara's house. Neighbors saw the defendant and Errara around Errara's trailer. One neighbor saw the defendant and Errara leave the trailer park together in Errara's car with the defendant doing the driving. Later in the evening the manager of the trailer park saw the defendant alone drive from the trailer park in Errara's car.
When the defendant arrived home in Errara's car, he was covered with blood and had a cut on his hand. He told his wife that the cut was from the car radio. He told her that he got a car and a diamond ring from the man he was going to see that morning. That night the defendant went to a clinic where he had his hand treated. The next morning he left the state in Errara's car.
Approximately eight days later the trailer park manager called the Pima County Sheriff's Office to report a terrible odor coming from the Errara trailer. Officers from the sheriff's office discovered Errara's body in the kitchen of his trailer. His body had approximately thirty stab wounds and was in a state of decomposition. Although there was blood in three rooms of the trailer, there were no signs of a struggle. There were indications that the body of the victim had been dragged from the dining room to the kitchen.
Defendant was arrested in the state of Washington after selling Errara's car and ring. He was returned to Arizona for trial.
After his return to Arizona the defendant was questioned by detectives from the sheriff's office. The defendant gave a statement to them about the events which occurred in the victim's trailer and admitted killing him. At trial, the defendant testified that when he was in Errara's trailer the victim made sexual advances towards him. When the defendant rebuffed him, Errara grabbed defendant's knife from the table and came after him. The defendant grabbed the knife, cutting his hand in the process. He stated that Errara then grabbed his testicles, whereupon the defendant went "berserk" and began to stab Errara until Errara let go of him. The defendant admitted that he took the ring and automobile of the victim when he left the scene.
The defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Did the trial court err in admitting defendant's statements to the police officers?
II. Did the trial court err in admitting photographs of victim's body?
III. Did the trial court err in using the new rule of criminal procedure regarding peremptory challenges?
IV. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that it must unanimously find defendant not guilty of the greater offenses before considering lesser-included offenses?
Prior to defendant's second trial, 1 he moved to suppress his statements to the law enforcement officers, alleging that the statements were obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), after the defendant had asserted his right to counsel. In Edwards the Court held that if, following Miranda warnings, an accused requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id., 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. An accused may waive this right only by initiating further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. The waiver must further be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent relinquishment of the right to counsel. Id., 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884.
The record reflects that the defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights, was asked whether he would answer questions. He responded that he would answer them, depending on the question. The investigating officers then proceeded to discuss the crime and the evidence against the defendant. The defendant stated, "Maybe I should be talking to a lawyer," or "Maybe it would be in my best interests to speak to a lawyer." 2
The officers were then silent for about a minute. The testimony of Det. Dhaemers indicated that defendant made a statement breaking the silence:
Q. Okay. So let me ask you this: Do you recall Mr. Staatz mentioning something about he probably ought to speak to a lawyer?
[Det. Dhaemers]. Yes.
Q. And after he mentioned that, did you leave the room and did Sergeant Miranda leave the room?
A. No.
Q. Did either you or Sergeant Miranda keep talking to him?
A. No. In fact, we gave him time to decide whether he wanted to speak to us or not. And he decided to speak to us.
Q. And how did you find that out?
A. Because he continued to talk.
Reporter's Transcript (R.T.) July 15, 1985 at 56.
The defendant testified:
Q. And when you said, "I think it would probably be a good idea if I talked to my attorney," what happened next?
[The Defendant]. I know that they--there was some more talk from them. Which I do not remember. At some point shortly after that for reasons still unknown even to myself I decided that I would talk to them.
Q. Did they, how long did you wait to decide that?
A. Maybe a minute, maybe two minutes.
The trial court found that the defendant's statements were "equivocal" regarding counsel and did not rise to the level of a request for counsel. The trial court found no evidence that the police subsequently "attempted to persuade the defendant, promise him anything or otherwise cajole him into answering." Minute Entry, Aug. 23, 1985. The court then found that defendant "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made the statements without promises or threats and without invoking his right against self-incrimination or right to counsel." Id.
The threshold question is whether the defendant in this case actually invoked his right to an attorney. If the defendant did invoke that right, the statements are admissible only if the defendant waived the right to an attorney. The defendant asserts that he may effectively invoke the right to counsel in less than positive language, and interrogation must cease.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet reached the issue of whether and when a suspect effectively invokes his right to counsel. Different jurisdictions have adopted varying views when addressing equivocal requests for an attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir.1985),cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986); United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 2178, 95 L.Ed.2d 835 (1987) (); United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056, 107 S.Ct. 932, 93 L.Ed.2d 983 (1987); People v. Kendricks, 121 Ill.App.3d 442, 77 Ill.Dec. 41, 459 N.E.2d 1137 (1984) (); Cannady v. State, 427 So.2d 723 (Fla.1983); and cf. State v. Linden, 136 Ariz. 129, 664 P.2d 673 (App.1983) ().
We have adopted the position that when the request is ambiguous, police must cease interrogation or attempt to clarify defendant's request. See State v. Finehout, 136 Ariz. 226, 231, 665 P.2d 570, 575 (1983); State v. Inman, 151 Ariz. 413, 728 P.2d 283 (App.1986).
In Finehout, we stated, "Even if the defendant's assertion is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the limit of permissible continuing interrogation immediately after the assertion would be for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the defendant intended to invoke his right to silence ... or to waive this right." 136 Ariz. at 229, 665 P.2d at 573 (citations omitted). In this instance, the defendant testified to differing versions of statements he made to the officers. Among differing recollections of the statements he made were: "Maybe I should be talking to a lawyer;" and "Maybe it would be in my best interests to speak to a lawyer." R.T. July 15, 1985 at 75. These statements are certainly susceptible to more than one interpretation.
The state contends that defendant was thinking out loud and did not affirmatively invoke his right to an attorney. See Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct....
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