State v. Stafford
| Decision Date | 11 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | Nos. CR,s. CR |
| Citation | 281 A.2d 827,6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 613 |
| Court | Circuit Court of Connecticut. Connecticut Circuit Court, Appellate Division |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Kim R. STAFFORD. STATE of Connecticut v. Gary W. CAMPBELL. 13-12210, 13-12211. |
Charles B. Alaimo, Enfield, for appellant (defendant stafford).
Phillip N. Armentano, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant Campbell).
Seymour A. Rothenberg, Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).
The information in each case is identical; the defendants were tried together, the issues and evidence are identical, and each moved to consolidate the appeals, which motions were granted. It is therefore sufficient to render a single opinion applicable to both cases. Each defendant was convicted of stealing goods exceeding $15 in value but not exceeding $250, in violation of § 53-63 of the General Statutes, and has appealed. They have assigned error in the denial of their motions to suppress and exclude certain evidence, in the denial of their motions to dismiss the informations, in the denial of their motion to correct the finding, in rulings on evidence, and in the conclusion that on all evidence they were each guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. They have also assigned error in the overruling of their claims of law. Assignments of error not pursued in the brief may be disregarded. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Stratford, 139 Conn. 388, 390, 94 A.2d 1; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. § 167.
The assignment of error directed to the conclusion reached by the court that each defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt makes unnecessary a detailed consideration of the claims of error directed against the finding. State v. Pundy, 147 Conn. 7, 8, 156 A.2d 193. There was little or no conflicting evidence, since the only witnesses produced were state's witnesses.
In their assignment of errors and brief, the defendants claim that error was committed in the denial of their motions to suppress certain evidence as well as in the denial of their motions to dismiss the informations. It appears solely from this recitation that there was a preliminary hearing on the motions. The record does not contain a finding, a transcript or any of the other material essential for the review of such an assignment of error, and we therefore give the matter no further consideration.
The evidence for the most part parallels that shown by the finding and may be summarized as follows: At 3:10 a.m. on October 9, 1969, Joseph Bieluch, a state trooper, was patrolling route 91 in the town of Windsor. His attention was called to a northbound car, which had entered route 91 from the Kennedy Road ramp, because the operator (Stafford) appeared very young and the car was moving slower than other traffic; it appeared to hesitate as it came onto route 91. Campbell, the only passenger, was sitting next to Stafford. The trooper stopped the car for the purpose of checking the operator's license and the registration. While the operator was getting his license, the officer observed six cases of a cola drink in cans strewn about the back-seat area, some cans in the cases and some out of the cases. The officer was aware that a bottling plant was located west of Kennedy Road, and the defendant's car, when first observed by the officer, was 1000 feet from the plant. He asked each of the young men where they had obtained the soda and each gave conflicting answers. Stafford said that Campbell had worked at the plant and had been fired and a friend, probably the plant manager, had given Campbell the soda because it was going to be thrown away. Campbell stated that Stafford had obtained the soda somewhere and they would get a receipt for it tomorrow. At this point the officer arrested each of the defendants on a charge of larceny and advised them of their rights. The officer then asked Stafford if there was anything in the trunk of the car, and he said 'No.' He said it was stuffed in a little bit, was jammed-which it was-and would not open. He added, 'Go ahead, if you can open it.' The officer was given the keys, opened the trunk and found twenty-two cases of the soda in the trunk. A case contains twenty-four cans. Thereafter, the Windsor police arrived and Campbell gave a name other than his own. James Molaskey, comptroller of the soda plant, was produced by the state and testified that each defendant had worked at the plant in the past. Within a day or two following the arrest, the comptroller testified, he discovered a quantity of soda missing, about forty cases. The soda seized by the police was of the same type as that missing. No one at the plant had been ordered to throw any soda away. Some eighty-eight cases of the soda, or a 'pallet,' had been in the rear of the plant outside the building. Onehalf a 'pallet' was later found hidden behind old wooden cases at the back of the plant where soda is not stored; the remainder was missing. The soda found hidden was returned to the plant and later sold. The wholesale value of a case of the soda is $2.65, but if the soda is sold in vending machines, it runs between fifteen and twenty-five cents a can.
The court concluded that on all the evidence each defendant was guilty of violating § 53-63 beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendants made the following claims of law, all of which were overruled by the court: (1) The first conversation was a custodial interrogation and there was no evidence that the defendants were advised of their rights prior thereto; therefore any statements made were inadmissible as a matter of law. (2) The arrest was not based on a warrant or on probable cause and was therefore invalid, and any product thereof was inadmissible as a matter of law. (3) No connection was made at the trial between the soda seized and the soda missing from the plant, and therefore the defendants are not guilty as a matter of law. The court's rulings were correct, as will hereinafter be reflected in our opinion.
The defendants first claim that the alleged crime was a misdemeanor and a warrantless arrest in such an instance can only be made as provided in General Statutes § 6-49; that is, if the person arrested 'is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others.' They argue that those conditions had not come into operation and probable cause had not been established. The state does not rely on 'speedy information,' and therefore the question is whether the defendants were 'taken or apprehended in the act.'
State v. DelVecchio, 149 Conn. 567, 574, 575, 182 A.2d 402, 406; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 229, 125 A. 636; State v. Spellman, 153 Conn. 65, 69, 70, 212 A.2d 413. The officer's attention was attracted to the car because of its unusual operation. When he stopped the car at 3:10 a.m., he observed an operator extremely young in appearance, and in the back seat he observed six cases or 144 cans of soda strewn about in plain view. The car had entered route 91 from ...
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Sanville v. State
...Beasley, 250 Cal.App.2d 71, 58 Cal.Rptr. 485 (1967); People v. Allison, 249 Cal.App.2d 653, 57 Cal.Rptr. 635 (1967); State v. Stafford, 6 Conn.Cir. 613, 281 A.2d 827 (1971); James v. State, Fla.App., 223 So.2d 52 (1969); People v. Farnsworth, 10 Ill.App.3d 844, 295 N.E.2d 83 (1973); People ......