State v. Stafford

• Decision Date: 14 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 103,521.,103,521.
• Citation: 290 P.3d 562
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Reginald STAFFORD, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

290 P.3d 562

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Reginald STAFFORD, Appellant.

No. 103,521.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 14, 2012.

[290 P.3d 568]

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 22–3204 states that when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any crime, the court may order a separate trial for any one defendant when requested by such defendant or by the prosecuting attorney. Accordingly, severance is within the district court's discretion. Severance should occur, however, when a defendant establishes that there would be actual prejudice if a joint trial occurred. A defendant therefore has the burden of showing on appeal that actual prejudice occurred and that judicial discretion was abused by the denial of the defendant's motion to sever.

2. The following factors are to be considered when deciding whether the danger of prejudice requires severance: (1) The defendants have antagonistic defenses; (2) important evidence in favor of one of the defendants which would be admissible in a separate trial would not be allowed in a joint trial; (3) evidence incompetent as to one defendant and introducible against another would work prejudicially to the former with the jury; (4) a confession by one defendant, if introduced and proved, would be calculated to prejudice the jury against the other; and (5) one of the defendants who could give evidence for the whole or some of the other defendants would become a competent and compellable witness on the separate trials of such other defendants.

3. Mere speculation on the part of the defendant that he or she would have presented a different kind of defense had the district court ordered separate trials is not enough to show that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant separate trials.

4. A district court's decision to deny a request for a psychological examination of the complaining witness in a sex crime is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.

5. In general, a defendant is entitled to a psychological examination of the complaining witness in a sex crime case on a showing that compelling circumstances justify such an examination. A determination of whether such compelling circumstances exist requires examination of the totality of the circumstances in the case, with the following nonexclusive list of factors to be considered: (1) whether there was corroborating evidence of the complaining witness' version of the facts, (2) whether the complaining witness demonstrates mental instability, (3) whether the complaining witness demonstrates a lack of veracity, (4) whether similar charges by the complaining witness against others are proven to be false, (5) whether the defendant's motion for a psychological evaluation of the complaining witness appears to be a fishing expedition, and (6) whether the complaining witness provides an unusual response when questioned about his or her understanding of what it means to tell the truth.

6. A district court may exercise reasonable control over the scope of cross-examination. A district court's decision to limit cross-examination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

7. K.S.A. 60–401(b) defines relevant evidence as evidence that is probative and material. In analyzing whether the evidence is material, the focus is on whether the fact at issue has a legitimate and effective bearing

[290 P.3d 569]

on the decision of the case and is in dispute. Evidence is probative if it has any tendency to prove any material fact.

8. Because a district court is in a position to view a juror's demeanor as he or she is being questioned, an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the district court's failure to strike a juror for cause. The party asserting an abuse of discretion bears the burden of establishing it.

9. An appellate court applies a de novo standard of review to the issue of whether a witness' refusal or inability to answer questions at trial made him or her unavailable as a witness for hearsay purposes.

10. K.S.A. 60–460 defines hearsay as evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. Generally, hearsay is inadmissible at trial, but when the declarant of the statement is present at trial, available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, and the statement itself would be admissible if made by the declarant while testifying as a witness, then the statement can be admitted into evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 60–460(a).

11. If a declarant, while testifying at trial, answers some questions concerning the subject matter of an out-of-court statement, yet refuses or is unable to answer other questions, the declarant is considered available for cross-examination and, accordingly, his or her prior out-of-court statement may be properly admitted into evidence under K.S.A. 60–460(a).

12. An appellate court begins its analysis of an alternative means issue by looking at the language used in the applicable statute to determine whether the legislature intended to establish alternative means through the use of the language at issue. Issues of statutory interpretation and construction, including issues of whether a statute creates alternative means, raise questions of law reviewable de novo on appeal.

13. The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. An appellate court's first attempt to ascertain legislative intent is through an analysis of the language employed, giving ordinary words their ordinary meaning. If a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court does not need to speculate further about legislative intent and, likewise, the court need not resort to canons of statutory construction or legislative history.

14. In determining if the legislature intended to state alternative means of committing a crime, a court must analyze whether the legislature listed two or more alternative distinct, material elements of a crime—that is, separate or distinct mens rea, actus reus, and, in some statutes, causation elements. Or, did the legislature list options within a means, that is, options that merely describe a material element or describe a factual circumstance that would prove the element? The listing of alternative distinct, material elements, when incorporated into an elements instruction, creates an alternative means issue demanding super-sufficiency of the evidence. Often this intent can be discerned from the structure of the statute. On the other hand, the legislature generally does not intend to create alternative means when it merely describes a material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime. Such descriptions are secondary matters—options within a means—that do not, even if included in a jury instruction, raise a sufficiency issue that requires a court to examine whether the option is supported by evidence.

15. Words or phrases stated in a series and separated by the disjunctive “or” do not establish alternative means of committing a crime if they fail to state additional and distinct ways of committing the subject crime, that is, if they do not require proof of at least one distinct, material element of mens rea, actus reus, or causation.

16. K.S.A. 21–3506(a)(1) proscribes the aggravated crime of engaging in the act of sodomy with a child who is under 14 years of age. The language and punctuation of K.S.A. 21–3501(2) indicate that there are three general but distinct ways in which one can complete the act of sodomy: (1) oral contact of genitalia, (2) anal penetration, and (3) sexual intercourse with an animal.

[290 P.3d 570]

17. The phrase “oral contact or oral penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia” found in K.S.A. 21–3501(2) does not create two alternative means of committing sodomy. Instead, the phrase merely gives a full description of one means of committing sodomy—oral contact of genitalia.

18. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, when making a sufficiency of the evidence determination, appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make determinations regarding witness credibility.

19. Generally, the exact date that an offense was allegedly committed is not an element of the crime. This court has held where a defendant is not misled or prejudiced in making his or her defense by the allegation of when the crime occurred, a conviction may properly follow upon sufficient proof that the crime was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations.

20. Appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires a two-step analysis. First, an appellate court decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that a prosecutor is allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, if misconduct is found, an appellate court must determine whether the improper comments prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.

21. A Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–19, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), violation occurs when the State attempts to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial by arguing or by introducing evidence that the defendant did not avail himself or herself of the first opportunity to clear his or her name when confronted by police officers but instead invoked his or her constitutional right to remain silent.

22. Even though a prosecutor is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial and is given latitude in drawing those inferences, it is unreasonable for a prosecutor...