State v. Stallings

Citation476 P.3d 905
Decision Date27 August 2020
Docket NumberNO. S-1-SC-36843,S-1-SC-36843
Parties STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rick STALLINGS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of New Mexico

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, William A. O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Lauren Joseph Wolongevicz, Assistant Attorney General, Emily C. Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} The right to self-representation must be respected when it is clearly invoked. This case requires us to decide whether the right is clearly invoked when a defendant rejects appointed counsel and seeks to represent himself as a second choice, if substitute counsel cannot be appointed.

{2} In the months leading up to Defendant Rick Stallings’ trial for first-degree murder, Defendant grew to dislike his public defender. He repeatedly asked for one of two things: either to be given a different attorney or to proceed pro se. Although he understood that he had no right to choose his attorney, he fired his attorney. The district court allowed a second attorney to be appointed, but Defendant soon grew to dislike his second attorney. He demanded to fire his second attorney and sought either the appointment of a third attorney or to proceed pro se. The district court did not appoint a third attorney, but allowed Defendant to proceed pro se.

{3} On appeal, Defendant claims that he did not clearly invoke the right to self-representation. We hold that Defendant's assertion of his desire to proceed pro se was conditional, but that did not render it unclear. Defendant did not have a right to select among appointed counsel, thus he decisively asserted his right to self-representation by firing his attorney. Additionally, Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent because the district court conducted a full inquiry into Defendant's capacity to represent himself and thoroughly warned Defendant of the dangers of self-representation.

{4} Defendant manifested a clear and unambiguous intention to represent himself, and he waived counsel knowingly and intelligently. There was no error in allowing Defendant to represent himself at trial. Finding no merit in Defendant's other issues, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Evidence Presented at Trial

{5} In the afternoon of September 30, 2015, Karen Cugnini was murdered in her home after she walked in on a man in the midst of a burglary. Her body was discovered the next morning by a concerned friend. Victim had been shot in the back of the head, and a .22 caliber shell casing lay beside her on the bedroom floor. Victim's white pickup truck was missing from the driveway, and several gallon-sized Ziploc bags of old pawn Native American jewelry, Native American rugs, boxes of silverware, checkbooks, a purse, and a .38 caliber silver pistol were among the items missing from the home. Police found a single rubber glove in the middle of the living room and an empty water bottle on top of a piece of furniture.

{6} Abundant evidence linked Defendant to the crime. At four o'clock in the afternoon on the date of the incident, a neighbor saw Defendant driving a white pickup truck while wearing a rubber glove on only one hand. Police later found Victim's truck parked behind a house that belonged to the mother of Defendant's girlfriend. The woman told police that Defendant drove the truck to her house, then tried to sell her some Native American jewelry out of gallon-sized Ziploc bags. Defendant also claimed to have rugs for sale. Other witnesses corroborated the woman's account. Multiple witnesses testified that they saw Defendant carrying a small silver pistol after the date of the incident, and that prior to that time they had seen him in possession of a .22 caliber rifle.

{7} In the days after the shooting, Defendant kept company with a group of acquaintances who all testified against Defendant at trial. Their testimony revealed that at Defendant's initiative, members of the group used Victim's credit cards and checks at local businesses to obtain goods, services, and cash totaling in excess of $6,000. They rented hotel rooms and consumed methamphetamine together. During that time, Defendant told three different people that he had committed homicide. Defendant told David Gutierrez that he "had to kill" a woman during a burglary. Defendant told Michelle Every that he broke into a house and "had to off" a woman because she had seen his face. He told Randy Hyde that a woman had walked in on him when he was making a sandwich in her kitchen, and Defendant "shot her in the head."

{8} After a three-day manhunt, police tracked Defendant to Gutierrez's house. A SWAT team surrounded the area. Defendant jumped a fence and, when he was apprehended, provided a false name and claimed to be in need of medical attention. Defendant's true identity was discovered when he tried to dispose of his wallet by kicking it under a police car. In addition to Defendant's identification, the wallet contained a bag of methamphetamine. Police found Victim's driver's license and some of her stolen jewelry inside Gutierrez's house. Testing of the water bottle that was found at the crime scene revealed Defendant's DNA on the mouthpiece.

{9} While in jail, Defendant wrote a series of letters to his girlfriend in which he made several incriminating statements. Among the letters was a hand-drawn map directing the girlfriend to "treasure," which Defendant described as "two wooden boxes of silverware ... rugs and other things." Police went to the location indicated on the treasure map. They interviewed the property owner, who confirmed that some months earlier he found two boxes of silverware and a .22 caliber rifle on the property. He thought the items were trash, and had discarded them.

B. Procedural History

{10} Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, aggravated burglary with a deadly weapon, larceny (over $20,000), larceny of a firearm, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm by a felon, and theft of a credit card. On October 14, 2015, contract public defender Thomas Clark entered his appearance on behalf of Defendant in this case. Clark also represented Defendant in three other criminal cases pending before the same district judge.1

{11} Six months into Clark's representation, Defendant prepared a pro se "Motion to Recuse Attorney Thomas Clark," which he submitted during a status conference on April 11, 2016. In the motion, he asserted that there had been an irreparable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship due to Clark's alleged dishonesty and failure to provide Defendant with discovery. Defendant asked for the following relief:

[P]lease allow another attorney to be assigned to represent me or be standby counsel as I continue on representing myself. I have access to the jail legal library computer and, therefore, I feel I am more than capable and willing to represent myself on all three (3) above cases as long as I had standby counsel[.]

{12} The district court allowed Defendant to elaborate, then had the following exchange:

THE COURT: Mr. Stallings, at this point are you looking to proceed pro se or are you looking—
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: —do you want to proceed pro se?
DEFENDANT: I'd rather go pro se than have him on my case.

Defendant informed the court that he would accept representation from "anybody. Anybody but [Clark]." However, Defendant withdrew his motion at a later hearing, telling the district court that he was now "comfortable" with Clark as his attorney.

{13} At a status conference on October 24, 2016, Defendant again sought to fire Clark through a second pro se "Motion to Recuse Attorney Thomas Clark." Defendant alleged that there had been a complete breakdown of communication and that Clark was intentionally sabotaging the case. Defendant asserted, "I have written him over 50 letters in past year and have only got 10 replys [sic]." Defendant asked the district court "to please assign someone else more capable" or "if you will not grant my request, then I will go it alone."

{14} The district court informed Defendant that he did not have the right to choose his attorney, to which Defendant replied, "Yeah, I know." He asserted, "[I]f you can't get [Clark] off my case, then I will go it alone. But if you will allow another attorney, I'd appreciate it."

{15} The district court held a hearing on Defendant's second motion to recuse Clark on November 1, 2016. At that hearing, the district court conducted a thorough inquiry into Defendant's desire to represent himself and his capacity to do so. Defendant affirmed that he wished to pursue his motion, and that he understood that he did not have the right to choose his attorney. "Given that," the district court asked, "do you wish to proceed pro se?" Defendant responded, "Yes, ma'am." The district court inquired into Defendant's age, English language ability, education, experience with the criminal justice system, and understanding of the charges and possible penalties in all three cases.

{16} The district court emphasized the severe penalties Defendant faced in the murder case. Defendant said that he understood. The district court then asked Defendant if he was "comfortable in proceeding pro se in a case of this severity." Defendant replied, "Oh, absolutely not.... But I can't—I'm not going to go with this guy." The district court again explained that Defendant did not have a right to choose his counsel, but gave Defendant a choice: "your choice is to proceed pro se .... or you can proceed with Mr. Clark." Defendant replied, "Well, I won't proceed with Mr. Clark, so I guess that leaves me no choice." The district court clarified, "So your choice is to proceed pro se or on your own[?]" Defendant responded, "Yes."

{17} The district court then asked a series of questions to ensure that Defendant understood the dangers of self-representation. Specifically, the...

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3 cases
  • State v. Cruz
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • March 4, 2021
    ...counsel does not imply an exercise of the right to self-representation. See generally State v. Stallings , 2020-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 41-61, 476 P.3d 905 (explaining that defendants must timely invoke the right to self-representation and competently waive the right to counsel in order to proceed pro......
  • State v. Romero
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • November 16, 2022
    ... ... choice of counsel. State v. Lucero , 1986-NMCA-085, ... ¶ 21, 104 N.M. 587, 725 P.2d 266. "Dissatisfaction ... with trial counsel's tactics or strategy is not ... sufficient grounds for replacement of counsel." ... State v. Stallings , 2020-NMSC-019, ¶ 37, 476 ... P.3d 905 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A ... showing of good cause is required: "Without a showing of ... good cause, [a] defendant may not insist upon substitution of ... court-appointed counsel." State v. Lewis , ... ...
  • State v. Coriz
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • March 22, 2021
    ...a mistrial. "We review the denial of a motion for mistral under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Stallings, 2020-NMSC-019, ¶ 62, 476 P.3d 905. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts "in an obviously erroneous, arbitrary, or unwarranted manner[,] State v. Fry, 2006-NMS......

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