State v. Stallings
| Citation | 163 P.3d 1232 |
| Decision Date | 10 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 93,895.,No. 93,879.,93,879.,93,895. |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee/Cross-appellant, v. Darrell STALLINGS, Appellant/Cross-appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Jessica J. Travis, of Keck & Travis, LLC, of Olathe, and Carl E. Cornwell, of Cornwell, Erickson, Travis & Breer, of Olathe, were on the briefs for the appellant/cross-appellee.
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee/cross-appellant.
Following Darrell Stallings' conviction on five counts of capital murder, the State sought the death penalty. Pursuant to Stallings' request for allocution and over the State's objection, the district court permitted Stallings to address the sentencing jury on the issue of mitigation of punishment; Stallings was not sworn or subject to cross-examination. The jury could not agree on the death penalty, and the court sentenced Stallings to five consecutive hard-50 life sentences on the capital murder convictions.
When Stallings appealed his convictions, the State cross-appealed on the issue of whether a defendant has a right to allocution before the jury during the death penalty phase of a capital murder trial. The State does not challenge Stallings' sentencing but rather proceeds upon a question reserved as a matter of statewide interest pursuant to K.S.A.2006 Supp. 22-3602(b)(3). Stallings subsequently withdrew his appeal, leaving the State's cross-appeal as the only matter currently before us. Based on our statutory law, we sustain the State's cross-appeal.
In Kansas, allocution in general is governed by statute. See K.S.A. 22-3422; K.S.A. 22-3424(e). Likewise, the unique sentencing scheme in a death penalty case, which utilizes a jury, is a creature of statute. See K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624. Interpreting the interplay among the sentencing statutes involves a de novo standard of review. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 977, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (). Moreover, Stallings' constitutional argument does not restrict our review standard.
We are guided by well-established rules of statutory construction. The most fundamental rule is that we should ascertain the legislature's intent through the statutory language it employs, giving ordinary words their ordinary meaning. State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are charged with the responsibility to give effect to the legislature's expressed intent, resisting the temptation to determine what the law should or should not be. Bryan, 281 Kan. at 159, 130 P.3d 85.
Generally, criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the accused, and any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of the person subjected to the criminal statute. Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 977-78, 40 P.3d 139. However, this strict construction rule "`is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent.'" State v. McCurry, 279 Kan. 118, 121, 105 P.3d 1247 (2005) .
When several provisions apply to a topic, they "`must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible.'" Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 89, 106 P.3d 492 (2005) (quoting State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 203, 83 P.3d 206 [2004]). If the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, we start with a presumption of validity and look for any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid. State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 898, 899, 127 P.3d 257 (2006).
The Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure addresses a criminal defendant's general right to allocution in two statutes. The first, K.S.A. 22-3422, entitled "Allocution," states:
(Emphasis added.)
The second pertinent statutory provision, K.S.A. 22-3424(e), recites:
"Before imposing sentence the court shall: (1) Allow the prosecuting attorney to address the court, if the prosecuting attorney so requests; (2) afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant; (3) allow the victim or such members of the victim's family as the court deems appropriate to address the court, if the victim or the victim's family so requests; and (4) address the defendant personally and ask the defendant if the defendant wishes to make a statement on the defendant's own behalf and to present any evidence in mitigation of punishment." (Emphasis added.)
Those general sentencing statutes, which predate our current death penalty laws, clearly state that the defendant has the right to address the court, i.e., the sentencing judge. The obvious reason for providing that the defendant direct his or her remarks to the court is that in noncapital cases the judge decides the sentence to be imposed without any input from the jury.
In contrast, the legislature created a separate jury sentencing procedure for capital murder cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624. If a defendant is charged with capital murder, the prosecutor must file a written notice of the State's intent to seek the death penalty. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(a). If a defendant who is at least 18 years old and not mentally retarded is convicted of capital murder, the State can move for a separate sentencing proceeding before a jury to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(b). In that separate proceeding, any evidence the court deems relevant, regardless of admissibility under the rules of evidence, may be presented, including matters related to the aggravating circumstances of K.S.A. 21-4625, which the State has previously identified, and any mitigating circumstances; no testimony by the defendant shall be admissible at any subsequent criminal proceeding. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(c). At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court is to provide the jury with oral and written instructions to guide its deliberations. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(d).
"If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4625 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(e).
However, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, the trial court is required to review the jury's death verdict "to ascertain whether the imposition of such sentence is supported by the evidence," and, if not, "the court shall modify the sentence . . . to life without the possibility of parole, and no sentence of death shall be imposed." K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4624(f). The statute does not mention allocution.
On appeal, the State inaccurately contends that the district court found Stallings "had a right of allocution in front of the jury . . . without being under oath." However, in its Order Regarding Allocution, the district court recognized that, although it was going to permit Stallings to address the jury regarding the issue of mitigation of punishment, "[t]his is not a right authorized by Kansas law." The court noted that Kansas law recognizes the right of allocution to the sentencing judge, but opined "that right has little meaning in a capital murder case where the jury, not the judge, makes the decision whether to impose the death penalty."
In an apparent attempt to give meaning to Stallings' allocution, while addressing the State's concerns about allowing a defendant to make an unsworn, unchallenged statement to the factfinding jury, the court crafted its own solution. The sentencing court ruled that Stallings' comments would be limited to the issue of mitigation; that he would submit the substance of his statement in writing to the court in advance; that Stallings would be specifically precluded from addressing his dissatisfaction with current or former counsel and the evidence regarding guilt, except for his mental state at the time the killings were committed; that Stallings' noncompliance with the court's requirements would result in termination of his statement; and that Stallings' statement would occur before the attorneys' closing arguments. In discussing the permissible topic of mitigation of punishment, the district court's order specifically referred to the following pattern instruction language:
(Emphasis added.)
As the State points out, the general allocution statutes plainly provide the defendant an opportunity to address the sentencing court, not the sentencing jury. Likewise, the death penalty sentencing procedure does not establish a right of allocution before the jury, separate and apart from the defendant's right to testify during the evidentiary phase. Stallings invites us to refrain from strictly construing the statutes and to judicially expand the statutory law so as to allow an unsworn, unchallenged statement to the death penalty jury. We decline the invitation.
With respect to allocution before the judge, Stallings...
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