State v. Stallworth

• Decision Date: 23 April 2021
• Docket Number: CR-19-0546
• Citation: 337 So.3d 1201
• Parties: STATE of Alabama v. Jarron Lekell STALLWORTH
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

337 So.3d 1201

STATE of Alabama

v.Jarron Lekell STALLWORTH

CR-19-0546

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 23, 2021

Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Michael Nunnelley, asst. att'y gen., for appellant.

Bruce Maddox, Montgomery, for appellee.

McCOOL, Judge.

The State of Alabama appeals the decision of the Dallas Circuit Court dismissing the indictment charging Jarron Lekell Stallworth with one count of first-degree burglary, see of § 13A-7-5(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, and one count of first-degree assault, see of § 13A-6-20, Ala. Code 1975.

Procedural Background

On April 20, 2019, the Dallas County grand jury indicted Stallworth for one count of first-degree burglary and one count of first-degree assault. The indictment reads as follows:

"COUNT 1

"The Grand Jury of said county charge that, before the finding of this indictment, JARRON LEKELL STALLWORTH, AKA POP, whose name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did knowingly and unlawfully enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling of, to wit: ERICA RODGERS, with intent to commit a crime therein, to wit: ASSAULT, and in effecting entry or while in dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime, to wit: ERICA RODGERS, in violation of Section 13A-7-5(a)(2) of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.

"COUNT 2

"The Grand Jury of said county charge that, before the finding of this indictment, JARRON LEKELL STALLWORTH, AKA POP, whose name is otherwise unknown to the Grand Jury, did, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, cause serious physical injury to any person, to wit: ERICA RODGERS, by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, to wit: A GUN, in violation of Section 13A-6-20 of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."

(C. 6.)

On January 9, 2020, Stallworth filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. Stallworth alleged the following in his motion to dismiss:

"1. The alleged victim in this case, Erica Rodgers, was living with [Stallworth] at the time of the incident leading to the indictment in this case. Count One alleges that [Stallworth] committed Burglary by going into her residence unlawfully, etc. [Stallworth] lived there, had a key which he used to enter, and entered only because he was returning home, his only intent. Attached hereto and incorporated by reference is a copy of the affidavit of Ms. Rodgers attesting to these facts, designated Exhibit 1.

"2. The altercation that occurred after the [Stallworth] returned home was instigated by Ms. Rodgers in her anger that he had been away from home. In the course of her attack on [Stallworth], Ms. Rodgers slipped, fell, and injured her head. The only physical acts by [Stallworth] were in self-defense. Ms. Rodgers addresses these facts in her affidavit.

"3. Ms. Rodgers states in her affidavit that, after the arrest of [Stallworth], she went to the Selma Police Department to try to correct this matter and was not allowed to correct the factual allegations against [Stallworth] by Detective Jeff Hardy.

"4. [Stallworth] suspects that the Grand Jury indicted upon testimony that was untrue, although such may not have been known by the State.

"5. It is clear that the State cannot prevail in this case and, thus, the interests of justice require[ ] dismissal. This is true not only because of judicial economy but, even more, because [Stallworth] is incarcerated [and] unable to make bond on charges of which he is clearly innocent."

(C. 90.) In support of his motion to dismiss the indictment, Stallworth also attached an affidavit from Erica Rodgers, the alleged victim, in which Rodgers stated that she did not wish to pursue the matter against Stallworth and claimed that the facts presented by Stallworth in his motion to dismiss were the true statements of what had happened during the incident.

On January 13, 2020, the circuit court filed an order, stating:

"MOTION TO DISMISS filed by [Stallworth] is hereby submitted. The State, if it objects, shall file a response within (7) days, or the motion shall be deemed GRANTED."

(C. 94.)

The State filed its objection to Stallworth's motion to dismiss on January 29, 2020. In its objection, the State argued: "The Court does not have the authority to grant the defendant's motion at this time." (C. 97.) The State requested that the case remain set for trial.

On February 4, 2020, the court entered an order setting a trial date for March 2, 2020.

On March 2, 2020, the circuit court entered the following order:

"THIS MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT FOR A PRE-TRIAL HEARING AND PURSUANT TO THE STATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER ISSUED BY ACTING CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE ROBERT BRYANT ON JANUARY 13, 2020, THIS CASE IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE."

(C. 99);(capitalization in original.)

On March 6, 2020, pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P., the State filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing the indictment against Stallworth, claiming that the court lacked the authority to dismiss the indictment.

Discussion

On appeal, the State reasserts its claim that the circuit court lacked the authority to dismiss the indictment against Stallworth. Specifically, the State contends that the court's order granting Stallworth's motion to dismiss constituted a "pretrial determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, which falls outside of the grounds for pretrial dismissal of an indictment permitted by the Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure and Alabama caselaw" and that the State did not invite the circuit court's error. (State's brief, at 7.) Stallworth argues that the State's appeal was untimely and that, even if the State's appeal was timely, the circuit court's dismissal of the indictment against him was proper.

I.

As an initial matter, Stallworth contends that this appeal is due to be dismissed because, he says, the State's notice of appeal was untimely. Specifically, he claims that, because the circuit court's January 13, 2020, order stated that "[t]he State, if it objects, shall file a response within (7) days, or the motion shall be deemed GRANTED," the indictment should have been considered dismissed on January 20, 2020. Thus, Stallworth maintains, the State's appeal, which was not filed until March 6, 2020, was untimely. We disagree.

First, we question whether a circuit court has the authority to issue a conditional order purporting to render an automatic ruling if certain conditions are or are not met without requiring the court to take further action. However, even assuming, without deciding, that the circuit court had the authority to issue such a conditional order, the record indicates that was not the circuit court's intention in the present case. Although the State's objection to Stallworth's motion to dismiss was not filed within the seven-day time period set forth in the circuit court's January 13 order, the record indicates that on February 4, 2020, the court held an arraignment, accepted Stallworth's not-guilty plea, and entered an order setting trial for March 2, 2020. See (C. 98.) The court then issued a final order dismissing the indictment against Stallworth on March 2, 2020. Because the record indicates that the court's intention was not an automatic dismissal based on the State's lack of action within a certain time, and because the court's final dismissal was not entered until March 2, 2020, the State's March 6, 2020, notice of appeal was timely. See Rule 15.7(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

II.

We turn now to the State's claim that the circuit court lacked the authority to dismiss the indictment against Stallworth. The State maintains that the court's dismissal constituted a "pretrial determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, which falls outside of the grounds for pretrial dismissal of an indictment permitted by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure and Alabama caselaw" and that the State did not invite the circuit court's error.

This Court has previously considered the court's authority to dismiss an indictment against a defendant, stating:

"A trial court's authority to grant a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment is limited by Rule 13.5(c)(1), Ala. R.Crim. P. State v. Bethel, 55 So. 3d 377, 378–79 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Rule 13.5(c)(1) states that a ‘motion to dismiss the indictment may be based upon objections to the venire, the lack of legal qualifications of an individual grand juror, the legal insufficiency of the indictment, or the failure of the indictment to charge an offense.’ "

State v. Walker, 192 So. 3d 426, 428 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). This Court has also held:

" ‘ Rule 13.5(c)(1) does not provide for the dismissal of an indictment based on the insufficiency of the evidence or, as in this case, a possible lack of evidence. SeeState v. Edwards, 590 So.2d 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (establishment of the corpus delicti requires proof of facts by the State so entwined with the merits of the case that a decision as to whether it had been proved should not be made before trial but should be postponed until trial); State v. McClain, 911 So. 2d 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (trial court cannot dismiss the indictment based on a lack of evidence).’

"[ State v. Foster, 935 So.2d 1216, 1216-17 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).] SeeState v. Anderson, 8 So. 3d 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008). SeealsoUnited States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) (‘It is well-settled that "a court may not dismiss an indictment ... on a determination of facts that should have been developed at trial." United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987).’)."

State v. Bethel, 55 So. 3d 377, 379 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

Additionally, in Ex parte Worley, 102 So. 3d 428, 429 (Ala. 2010), the Alabama Supreme Court considered a case in which the trial court granted a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment based on the trial court's conclusion that the State's evidence was...