State v. Standard Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1900
• Citation: 61 Neb. 28,84 N.W. 413
• Parties: STATE v. STANDARD OIL CO.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

61 Neb. 28

84 N.W. 413

STATE

v.STANDARD OIL CO.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Dec. 5, 1900.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The action provided for in section 4 of the anti–trust law (chapter 91a, Comp. St. 1899) to prohibit foreign corporations from doing business in this state in contravention of our laws, is a civil action, both in substance and form.

2. A foreign corporation, by reason of having done one or more of the criminal acts mentioned in section 2 of the anti–trust law (chapter 91a, Comp. St. 1899), may, by injunction or quo warranto, be excluded from the state.

3. In construing an act of the legislature all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

4. Sections 3 and 4 of the anti–trust law (chapter 91a, Comp. St. 1899), providing for ousting corporations by civil action from the exercise of powers and privileges which have been abused, are declaratory of the common law.

5. Foreign corporations do business here not by right but by comity, and the state may, at pleasure, revoke the privilege which it has granted such corporations.

6. The revocation of the privilege given a foreign corporation to do business here is not the infliction of a penalty.

7. A foreign corporation doing business in violation of the anti–trust law (chapter 91a, Comp. St. 1899) may be required, under section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to furnish evidence against itself in an action brought to exclude it from the state.

Action by the state against the Standard Oil Company. Application by the attorney general for authority to inspect books and papers of defendant. Application granted.The Attorney General, for the State.

Frank L. McCoy, Woolworth & McHugh, Alfred D. Eddy, and John M. Thurston, for defendant.

SULLIVAN, J.

This is an original action instituted by the plaintiff to prevent the Standard Oil Company, an Indiana corporation, from continuing to do business in this state. The question now before us for decision arises on the attorney general's application for an order requiring the defendant to permit him to inspect and copy its books and records for the purpose of obtaining evidence to sustain the averments of the petition. Section 394 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the motion is made, provides that: “Either party or his attorney may demand of the adverse party an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of a book, paper, or document in his possession or under his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of the action or defense therein. Such demand shall be in writing, specifying the book, paper or document with sufficient particularity to enable the other party to distinguish it, and if compliance with the demand within four days be refused, the court or judge, on motion and notice to the adverse party, may in their discretion order the adverse party to give the other, within a specified time, an inspection and copy, or permission to take a copy, of such book, paper, or document; and on failure to comply with such order, the court may exclude the paper or document from being given in evidence, or, if wanted as evidence by the party applying, may direct the jury to presume it to be such as the party by affidavit alleges it to be. This section is not to be construed to prevent a party from compelling another to produce any book, paper, or document when he is examined as a witness.” The motion is resisted on the ground that the purpose of the action is to enforce a penalty or forfeiture, and that to grant the order would be to require the defendant to furnish evidence against itself in a criminal case. We are of opinion that the action is in substance, as well as in form, a civil controversy, and that the motion may be granted without violating that provision of the constitution which declares that “no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to give evidence against himself.” Const. art. 1, § 12. The petition charges that the defendant has violated the anti–trust law (chapter 91a, Comp. St. 1899), and asks that it be, for that reason, enjoined from further prosecuting its business here. The first section of the act in question defines a trust. The second characterizes as misdemeanors and conspiracies against trade all acts by any person or persons carrying on, or creating, or attempting to create a trust, and provides punishment for the commission of such acts. The third section declares that any domestic corporation which has violated the statute shall forfeit its charter, and may be ousted from its franchises by quo warranto. The fourth section, so far as material to the present inquiry, is as follows: “Every foreign corporation or person not a resident of this state, violating any of the provisions of this act, is hereby denied the right and prohibited from doing any business within this state; and it shall be the duty of the attorney–general and each county attorney within his county, to enforce this provision by injunction, or other proper proceedings, in any county in which such foreign corporation or non–resident person does business, in the name of the state on his relation.” It will be noticed that the second section of the law in plain terms prescribes penalties for the acts therein denounced as criminal. And it will be also observed that the...